

Traffic Organizations, railroad labor, and truck and bus associations.

The second week will be devoted to various State commissions, agricultural associations, National Industrial Traffic League and various citizens' traffic associations and traffic boards and chambers of commerce.

It is going to be necessary to limit the time for this hearing if possible. It is also desired to avoid any repetition in statements before the committee.

The committee would be pleased to have those who are intending to appear to advise the clerk promptly the least amount of time they will need in which to present their testimony.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. ELLIOTT: Joint Committee on the Disposition of Executive Papers. House Report No. 961. Report on the disposition of certain papers of sundry executive departments. Ordered to be printed.

Mr. RANDOLPH: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 3636. A bill relating to the sale, in the District of Columbia, of certain small rockfish; without amendment (Rept. No. 967). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. RANDOLPH: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 3867. A bill to amend the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia with respect to the making and publishing of annual reports by trust companies; without amendment (Rept. No. 968). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. RANDOLPH: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 3868. A bill to provide that veterans may obtain copies of public records in the District of Columbia, without the payment of any fees, for use in presenting claims to the Veterans' Administration; without amendment (Rept. No. 969). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. RANDOLPH: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 3873. A bill to provide for the opening of a road within the boundaries of the District of Columbia Training School property in Anne Arundel County, Md.; without amendment (Rept. No. 970). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. MANASCO: Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. H. R. 4129. A bill to provide for reorganizing agencies of the Government, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 971). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. McGEHEE: Committee on Claims. S. 559. An act to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for reimbursement of officers, enlisted men, and others, in the naval service of the United States for property lost, damaged, or destroyed in such service," approved October 27, 1943, so as to make the provisions thereof effective with respect to losses occurring on or after October 31, 1941; without amendment (Rept. No. 962). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. PITTENGER: Committee on Claims. H. R. 3995. A bill for the relief of Ellis Duke, also known as Elias Duke; with amendment (Rept. No. 963). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. McGEHEE: Committee on Claims. H. R. 3987. A bill for the relief of Myrtle C. Radabaugh; without amendment (Rept. No. 964). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. McGEHEE: Committee on Claims. H. R. 4018. A bill for the relief of Robert A. Hudson; with amendment (Rept. No. 965). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. McGEHEE: Committee on Claims. H. R. 4048. A bill to provide for an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the decisions of the Court of Claims in two suits instituted by H. B. Nelson (doing business as the H. B. Nelson Construction Co.); without amendment (Rept. No. 966). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. HENRY:

H. R. 4143. A bill to amend Revised Statutes 4921 (U. S. C. A., title 35, patents, sec. 70) providing that damages be ascertained on the basis of compensation for infringement, as in actions for infringement in the United States Court of Claims; to the Committee on Patents.

By Mr. IZAC:

H. R. 4144. A bill to amend the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, as amended; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. MAY:

H. R. 4145. A bill to authorize payment for accumulated and accrued annual leave to persons whose civilian appointments were terminated pursuant to section 4 of the act of December 22, 1942 (56 Stat. 1073); to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. McGLINCHEY:

H. R. 4146. A bill to direct the discharge of fathers; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. TRAYNOR:

H. R. 4147. A bill to establish a Chiropody (Podiatry) Corps in the Medical Corps of the United States Army; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. DICKSTEIN:

H. R. 4148. A bill to amend the Nationality Act of 1940; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

H. R. 4149. A bill to provide for the establishment of lawful entry into the United States of certain aliens not subject to deportation who entered the United States prior to July 1, 1924; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. CELLER:

H. R. 4150. A bill to amend the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 to provide severance pay for employees whose employment has terminated by reason of cancellation or termination of Government contracts resulting from the cessation of hostilities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STIGLER:

H. R. 4151. A bill to encourage the provision of useful public works, and for other related purposes; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. REES of Kansas:

H. Res. 354. Resolution authorizing an investigation of the diversion of sugar to brewers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. PRICE of Florida:

H. Res. 355. Resolution authorizing report on Army demobilization; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

1176. By Mr. BARRETT of Wyoming: Petition of Ben. R. Simpkins and 32 citizens of Park County, Wyo., in favor of H. R. 2000; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1177. By Mr. LeCOMPTE: Petition of Mrs. Claude A. Babb, What Cheer, Iowa, and other citizens of Thornburg and What Cheer, Iowa, urging that the draft be continued so that men now in service may be released; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

1178. By Mr. SHORT: Petition of Harley C. Rusk and other citizens of Jasper County, Mo., urging the passage of the Bryson bill, H. R. 2082; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1179. Also, petition of C. S. Henry and other citizens of Joplin, Mo., favoring a 30-year-service retirement for rail workers; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

SENATE

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1945

(Legislative day of Monday, September 10, 1945)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Reverend Bernard Braskamp, D. D., pastor of the Gunton Temple Memorial Presbyterian Church, Washington, D. C., offered the following prayer:

O Thou who art man's unfailing friend, grant that in this moment of prayer we may enter the fellowship of all who are seekers and finders of God.

We pray that our spirits may be illumined by Thy spirit and touched to finer issues. Make us the beneficiaries of some new experience of divine wisdom and power with which to meet the tasks and responsibilities that challenge the consecration of our noblest manhood.

Emancipate our minds and hearts from doubt and fear and everything that is contrary to Thy holy will. Sustain us in fidelity to the lofty principles which Thou hast ordained. May we earnestly covet the benediction which Thou dost bestow upon the faithful.

Hear us in the name of the Christ. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. BARKLEY, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of the calendar day Thursday, September 20, 1945, was dispensed with, and the Journal was approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting a nomination was communicated* to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bill and joint resolution, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 1196. An act to make permanent the judgeship provided for by the act entitled

"An act to provide for the appointment of an additional district judge for the eastern and western districts of Missouri," approved December 24, 1942; and

H. J. Res. 225. Joint resolution to quiet the titles of the respective States, and others, to lands beneath tidewaters and lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of such States and to prevent further clouding of such titles.

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on September 20, 1945, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills and joint resolution:

S. 374. An act to amend the act of October 29, 1919, entitled "An act to punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce";

S. 397. An act to provide for the presentation of medals to members of the United States Antarctic Expedition of 1939-41;

S. 1045. An act to provide for pay and allowances and transportation and subsistence of personnel discharged or released from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard because of under age at the time of enlistment, and for other purposes; and

S. J. Res. 78. Joint resolution to provide for designation of the Veterans' Administration hospital at Crugers-on-Hudson, near Peekskill, N. Y., as "Franklin Delano Roosevelt Hospital."

REPORT OF BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE DURING THE RECESS

Under authority of the order of the Senate of the 20th instant,

Mr. WAGNER (for himself and Mr. TOBEY), from the Committee on Banking and Currency, to which was referred the bill (S. 380) to establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free competitive economy, through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, labor, State, and local governments, and the Federal Government, reported it with amendments on September 22, 1945, and submitted a report (No. 583) thereon.

CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. President, almost 2 months ago the first atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima and a major part of its population—men, women, and children. Since that holocaust—the greatest in all history—there has been only one real question before the people of this world. Is atomic energy to advance the welfare of all humanity or is it to provide the means of global suicide?

Two alternatives, and only two, now confront us and we must soon choose between them. Is atomic power to be controlled by an international organization as its instrument for the guaranty of world peace and plenty, or are the nations to enter a race for the development of ever more horrible military instruments—a race which can end only in the annihilation of all the competitors?

Those alternatives the people of the United States and the rest of the world have had before them since August—those two and no others—a vicious, concentrated search for weapons of human destruction, or a plan for the peaceful sharing and the international control of the gigantic powers of nature. Have we brought to the consideration of these alternatives the qualities of concentrated

clear thinking, candor, and courage? It seems to me we have not. After the first days of mingled wonder and foreboding, we have relaxed and are now dissipating our energies on unhappy controversies of very minor importance to the public welfare. But I cannot urge too strongly that we must not make a decision by default; that all is lost if we let the world drift into an era of intense, brutal competition at the conclusion of which looms catastrophe for all of us.

I would not be understood as implying that wise and just action by the Government of the United States would happily and forever settle the dangerous hazards involved. Most unfortunately, that is not true. The good will, the courage, the candor, and the cooperation of every other Allied nation, great and small, is necessary. These failing, nothing we can do will help divert world chaos. But, manifestly, the initiative to establish an international policy to control the atomic bomb must come from us. We built it; in its use we killed hundreds of thousands of human beings; we possess now its fearful mastery more than any other nation. No one else now has the power even to attempt to banish from this unhappy world the fear that our bomb creation has engendered.

I am, therefore, most happy that two Senate committees are now directing their attention to the atomic problem. The Military Affairs Committee—under the leadership of the senior Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS]—has already favorably reported to the Senate a resolution providing for a commission to deal with the atomic bomb. The senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose leadership was so potent in perfecting our present international organization, now has pending a resolution for the creation of a special joint committee of the House and Senate to deal with this same question of our policy on the atomic bomb. I hope that any congressional committee handling this hazardous issue will have as members both the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG]—two of our ablest and most philosophical statesmen.

For the benefit of any congressional committee which may be appointed, I should like to suggest that we must realize that the atomic bomb is only one of many dreadful engines of warfare now being perfected in secret workshops and darkened laboratories everywhere. Today our atomic bomb and other technological weapons may be the most fiendish; tomorrow they may be humane compared with the race-destroying instruments of other governments.

Who knows how soon—if it is not already accomplished—some scientist may breed a virulent germ to spread the black or scarlet plague that will end us all? Who knows how soon—if it is not already perfected—a poisonous spray of gas, as deadly to us as DDT to insect life, will be ready for our destruction? Who knows if some chemist in some other land is not, as I speak, learning how to unleash the titanic power of every element while our scientists are still using uranium atoms only? Who knows what

miracle of radar, death-dealing rays, or other cruel and brutal methods of extinction may be now developing in this unhappy world?

So, Mr. President, I think that any committee appointed from the Senate to consider our atomic-bomb policy should be given power to inquire into and to report a policy on all the other potent instruments of mass destruction now developing in the arsenals and laboratories of our country.

Mr. President, somewhere along the road of competitive armament lies a catastrophe that will engulf and doom civilized man. We need not travel that road. There is no compulsion in our nature that compels it. But if we would avoid it, we had best begin to act. There are many of us here who feel as I do—who, doubtful of our wisdom, would prefer to go forward into a world organization at a slower pace, feeling their way through preliminary stages of experiments in cooperation, of widening regional agreements. But our preferences do not affect the atomic bomb. It demands international control, or it will mete out international chaos. Nor can we hope to stave off its insistence by prohibitions on atomic research. No other nation would agree to stop research as long as we—and we only—held the secret. If, on the other hand, we committed the secret to the World Council, then there would be every reason to encourage it, with the hope that atomic energy could be exploited and controlled for the good, and not the evil, of mankind.

We move forward, willy-nilly, into a furiously dynamic world—the atomic age. In it the life of man can be peaceful, free of poverty, and creative. Or, in the strident words of Hobbes, it can be "nasty, brutish, and short." Whether it shall be the one or the other depends on our decision to choose—international control of the atomic bomb, or international competition in carnage.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE PAUL P. CRET

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. President, the special committee appointed under Senate Joint Resolution 31 to work with the Architect of the Capitol, Mr. David Lynn, and others for the reconstruction and repair of the Senate Chamber, recently engaged the services of Mr. Paul P. Cret, one of the outstanding architects and designers of the present age, as consulting engineer and adviser on the work contemplated.

A few days ago Mr. Cret passed away at his home in Philadelphia.

Some of the outstanding examples of his hand and brain are the Pan-American Building in Washington, the Detroit Institute of Art, the Federal Reserve Board Building in Washington, the Hall of Science at the Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago, and many others. The Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington is considered by many to be his greatest achievement. It has been pronounced by men who are qualified to know as "a pearl" among modern works of architecture.

Since his death the Commission of Fine Arts, composed of Gilmore D. Clarke, Chairman, William F. Lamb,

Henry V. Poor 3d, Ralph Stackpole and David E. Finley, has volunteered its services to supervise the work on the Senate Chamber designs. The Senate special committee is to have a joint meeting with the Commission of Fine Arts on October 5, at which meeting preliminary plans will be considered along the line of suggestions which have already been made or will be made at the meeting.

I ask unanimous consent that a most interesting and able editorial appearing in the Washington Evening Star of September 11, entitled "Paul P. Cret," be inserted at this point in the RECORD, where it may be read by future generations.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PAUL P. CRET

Few men of his time have left so many monuments as Paul P. Cret. He was an artist of the very greatest distinction, and he will be remembered as long as the structures he created stand—and longer, too, as they take their respective places in recorded history. The Folger Shakespeare Library undoubtedly was his greatest achievement. It is, as the donors always considered it, "a pearl" among modern works of architecture.

But Dr. Cret had accomplished many notable triumphs before he came to East Capitol Street. Born in Lyons, France, October 23, 1876, he was educated at the fine arts schools of his native city and of Paris and through those institutions received the discipline of the classic tradition to which, despite more than a little pressure from the age in which he lived, he remained faithful all his life. From 1903 to 1937 he served as professor of design at the University of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile he was associated with Albert Kelsey in the execution of the drawings for the Pan American Building on Seventeenth Street here, with Zantzinger, Borie, and Medary in the Indianapolis Public Library and the Detroit Institute of Arts, and with Smith and Basset in the County Building at Hartford. His independent designs included the Federal Reserve Board Building, the Central Heating Plant and the Calvert Street Bridge in Washington, the Valley Forge Memorial Arch and the Delaware Bridge in Philadelphia, the Hall of Science at the Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago, new buildings for the University of Texas and for the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The enterprises in which he probably found the keenest satisfaction were the Chateau Thierry, Bony, Waereghem, and Gibraltar war memorials, into which he put his love for the country of his birth as well as that for the country of his adoption.

No adequate conception of Dr. Cret's career, however, can be obtained from mere reading of a list of the projects to which he contributed his genius. In order to appreciate him fully it is necessary to consider the pure and lovely grace of the buildings he brought into existence. He was possessed of powers of imagination of the highest order, but he also was gifted with the force of character required for translating dreams into realities. Whatever he touched took on some element of the strength that was in him. Thus he left his mark on the whole world both directly and, as in the Federal Commission of Fine Arts, for example, through his influence upon others. No man could ask a grander privilege.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

XCI—560

REPORT OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for the calendar year ended December 31, 1944 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Finance.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Letters from the Chairman of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice and the Chairman of the National Mediation Board, transmitting, pursuant to law, estimates of personnel requirements for their respective offices for the quarter ending December 31, 1945 (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Civil Service.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIAL

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following petitions and a memorial, which were referred as indicated:

A resolution adopted by the American Geographical Union, Washington, D. C., favoring an appropriation for the making of maps for national planning and other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce.

A letter in the nature of a petition from a member of the armed forces of the United States, praying for the enactment of legislation providing for the prompt release of members of the armed forces; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

A resolution adopted by the executive committee of the Arkansas Valley Ditch Association, assembled at Pueblo, Colo., protesting against the enactment of legislation providing for the creation of the Missouri Valley Authority, the Columbia Valley Authority, the Ohio Valley Authority, and the Savannah Valley Authority; to the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation.

DISCONTINUANCE OF USE TAX ON AUTOMOBILES

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to present for appropriate reference and printing in the RECORD a letter from the Wisconsin Motor Carriers' Association embodying a resolution adopted by the board of directors of that association at a meeting held in Milwaukee, Wis., on September 10, 1945, relating to the discontinuance of the \$5 use tax on motor vehicles.

There being no objection, the letter was received, referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WISCONSIN MOTOR CARRIERS'

ASSOCIATION,

Madison, Wis., September 18, 1945.

The Honorable ALEXANDER WILEY,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WILEY: We are pleased to advise you that at a meeting of the board of directors of the Wisconsin Motor Carriers' Association, held in Milwaukee on September 10, 1945, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

"Resolved by the board of directors of the Wisconsin Motor Carriers' Association, That the \$5 use tax on motor vehicles should be abolished; and be it further

"Resolved, That the officers of this association be hereby instructed to take all necessary steps to bring this resolution to the attention of the Senators and Congressmen of this State and to other proper officials and organizations."

I am pleased to transmit this resolution to you and trust that you will give favorable consideration to the suggestion contained

therein on any legislation that may be proposed on this subject.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE TIERNAN, President.
E. G. DOWE, Secretary.

THE COAL SITUATION

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to present for appropriate reference and printing in the RECORD a resolution adopted by the city council of the city of Superior, Wis., relating to the very critical coal situation.

There being no objection, the resolution was received, referred to the Committee on Mines and Mining, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolution declaring the existence of an emergency with respect to the inadequate supply of coal now on the docks in the Head of the Lakes area, and requesting the Solid Fuels Administration and the proper agents and officers of the Government of the United States to take immediate steps to rectify the situation

Whereas the supply of coal presently on the docks in the Head of the Lakes area is entirely inadequate to care for consumers' needs and wants during the coming heating season; and

Whereas reliable figures and information show a deficiency on the docks in the Head of the Lakes area of approximately 6,000,000 tons, and all bituminous coal used by industrial plants and domestic consumers moves from these docks; and

Whereas it is imperative that coal should be carried by boats to such docks immediately in order to insure a sufficient supply to last until the opening of the 1946 navigation season, which will probably not open until late in April or early in May of 1946; and

Whereas the close of navigation in 1945 will be approximately on the 17th of November, but that date cannot be relied upon because of severe weather conditions which may cause lake shipments to cease earlier than November 17; and

Whereas a failure to have on hand a sufficient supply of coal on the docks in the Head of the Lakes area before the close of the present navigation season will create conditions fraught with imminent danger to the health, welfare, and good order of all of the communities in the Head of the Lakes area; and

Whereas this serious coal shortage was called to the attention of the Solid Fuels Administration officials at a meeting held in the mayor's office in the city of Duluth, Minn., on June 12, 1945, and the situation has not been rectified or in anywise made better since that date: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the City Council of the City of Superior, Wis., That an emergency is declared to exist, and that steps must of necessity be immediately taken to rectify that emergency for the preservation of the health, welfare, and good order of the city of Superior, Wis., and specifically on behalf of the citizens of the city of Superior, Wis., and generally on behalf of all neighboring communities, and that this resolution stand as a petition to the Congress of the United States, the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, that the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government of the United States take immediate steps to insure at the Head of the Lakes area a sufficient supply of bituminous coal on the docks before the close of the 1945 navigation season, in order to prevent extreme suffering and hardship in this area during the coming heating season; and be it further

Resolved by the City Council of the City of Superior, Wis., That the Solid Fuels Administration be immediately requested to give every reasonable opportunity to provide, and that the said Solid Fuels Administration do provide No. 1-A priorities which will immediately facilitate the shipping of coal from lower lake ports to docks in the area served by the Head of the Lakes; and be it further

Resolved by the City Council of the City of Superior, Wis., That the city clerk be forthwith directed to mail a certified copy of this resolution to ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE and ALEXANDER WILEY, the Senators for the State of Wisconsin, to ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Congressman for the Tenth Congressional District, President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, and Under Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas, all at Washington, D. C.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. ELLENDER:

From the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

S. 1414. A bill to assist in soil-conservation and water-conservation work by making certain surplus materials, equipment, and supplies available for such work through the distribution thereof, by grant or loan, to public bodies organized under State laws, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. No. 584).

From the Committee on Claims:

S. 998. A bill for the relief of Gregory Stelmak; with an amendment (Rept. No. 585), and

S. 1101. A bill for the relief of the estate of Manuel Rose Lima; without amendment (Rept. No. 586).

By Mr. WILEY, from the Committee on Claims:

S. 865. A bill for the relief of Richard A. Alberry; with amendments (Rept. No. 587).

By Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. 1233. A bill to provide for the appointment of an additional district judge for the district of Kansas; with an amendment (Rept. No. 588).

By Mr. THOMAS of Utah, from the Committee on Military Affairs:

H. R. 3951. A bill to stimulate volunteer enlistments in the Regular Military and Naval Establishments of the United States; with an amendment (Rept. No. 589).

MANUFACTURE OF NITRATES FOR FERTILIZER FROM AGRICULTURAL AND FOREST PRODUCTS

Mr. BUTLER, from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 176) which was ordered to be placed on the Calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of Agriculture is hereby requested to make an immediate study to determine the advisability of continuing the operation of all federally owned plants and facilities which were used during the war for the exclusive processing of agricultural commodities and forest products or for manufacturing nitrates for fertilizer and to report to the Congress his findings and recommendations based thereon.

Until the report of the Secretary of Agriculture is received and considered by the Congress, all Federal agencies having jurisdiction over the above-mentioned plants are requested to refrain from leasing, selling, or otherwise disposing of, any such plants without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture. Until such time as the Congress has had an opportunity to study the recommendations of the Secretary of Agriculture and formulate a policy with reference to the future operation or disposition of the above-

mentioned plants, all Government agencies having jurisdiction over said plants are requested to continue the operation thereof, provided the products from such operation can be effectively used by the Federal Government, or provided the plants can be used to process surplus or perishable crops.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. SALTONSTALL:

S. 1421. A bill to authorize the appointment of William T. Bayley as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. GREEN:

S. 1422. A bill to provide optional retirement for Government officers and employees who have rendered at least 25 years of service; to the Committee on Civil Service.

S. 1423. A bill for the relief of Charles L. Phillips; to the Committee on Claims.

S. 1424. A bill to renew and extend certain letters patent; to the Committee on Patents.

By Mr. BUTLER:

S. 1425. A bill to revive and reenact the act entitled "An act to authorize the county of Burt, State of Nebraska, to construct, maintain, and operate a toll bridge across the Missouri River at or near Decatur, Nebr.," approved June 8, 1940; to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. MCCARRAN (for himself, Mr. BURTON, and Mr. CAPPER):

S. 1426. A bill to provide for the replanning and rebuilding of slum, blighted, and other areas of the District of Columbia and the assembly, by purchase or condemnation, of real property in such areas and the sale or lease thereof for the redevelopment of such area in accordance with said plans; and to provide for the organization of, procedure for, and the financing of such planning, acquisition, and sale or lease; and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. LANGER:

S. 1427. A bill to provide for insurance or annuities without cost to certain veterans, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 1428. A bill authorizing the naturalization of Meta D. Wippeling; to the Committee on Immigration.

S. 1429. A bill to amend paragraph (3) of subsection (s) of section 75 of the act entitled "An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved July 1, 1898, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. J. Res. 97. Joint resolution to provide for replacement of medical personnel commissioned from civilian life with persons trained under the Army Specialized Training Program; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

FULL EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1945—AMENDMENT

Mr. TAFT submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 380) to establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free competitive economy, through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and the Federal Government, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

HOUSE BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The following bill and joint resolution were each read twice by their titles and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

H. R. 1196. An act to make permanent the judgeship provided for by the act entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of an additional district judge for the eastern and western districts of Missouri," approved December 24, 1942; and

H. J. Res. 225. Joint resolution to quiet the titles of the respective States, and others, to lands beneath tidewaters and lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of such States and to prevent further clouding of such titles.

STATEMENT ON DEMOBILIZATION BY GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (S. DOC. 90)

Mr. THOMAS of Utah. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement on demobilization made by Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, delivered to Members of the Congress in the auditorium of the Library of Congress on Thursday, September 20, 1945, be printed as a Senate document.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS OF UTAH ON FULL-EMPLOYMENT BILL

[Mr. THOMAS of Utah asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD the testimony given by him before the Banking and Currency Committee concerning the so-called full employment bill, which appears in the Appendix.]

HON. LEWIS B. SCHWELLENBACH—ARTICLE BY JACK H. POLLACK

[Mr. MAGNUSON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Labor Is His Business," by Jack H. Pollack, dealing with Secretary of Labor Lewis Schwellenbach, published in the This Week magazine of the New York Herald Tribune of September 16, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

CHICAGO AND THE ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT—EDITORIAL FROM THE CHICAGO SUN

[Mr. AIKEN asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Chicago and the St. Lawrence Project," published in the Chicago Sun of September 22, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

CRITICS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SOUTH—STATEMENT BY E. H. CRUMP

[Mr. STEWART asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article based on a statement by Mr. E. H. Crump, of Memphis, Tenn., relative to attempts to prevent the postwar migration of industry to the South, published in the Memphis Commercial Appeal for September 16, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

CONTROL OF THE ATOMIC BOMB SECRET

[Mr. BUCK asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a letter from Mr. W. S. Carpenter, Jr., president of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., to the Secretary of State, under date of September 4, 1945, and a further letter from Mr. Carpenter to the stockholders of that company relative to the industrial development of the use of the atomic energy, which appear in the Appendix.]

SENIORITY CREDIT FOR SERVICEMEN—EDITORIAL FROM RAILROAD WORKERS' JOURNAL

[Mr. BUTLER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Servicemen Deserve Service," published in the October 1945 issue of the Railroad Workers' Journal, which appears in the Appendix.]

LEST WE FORGET—EDITORIAL FROM STAMFORD (CONN.) ADVOCATE

[Mr. McMAHON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an editorial entitled "Lest We Forget," published in the Stamford (Conn.) Advocate of September 4, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

USE OF NATIONAL GUARD TO TRAIN YOUTH—ARTICLE BY FRANCIS S. MURPHY

[Mr. McMAHON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an editorial entitled "Use National Guard To Train Youth," written by Francis S. Murphy, publisher of the Hartford Times, and printed in the Greenwich (Conn.) Time of August 8, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. BARKLEY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Guffey	Myers
Andrews	Gurney	O'Daniel
Bailey	Hart	Overton
Ball	Hatch	Radcliffe
Barkley	Hawkes	Reed
Bilbo	Hayden	Revercomb
Brewster	Hickenlooper	Robertson
Bridges	Hill	Saltonstall
Briggs	Hoe	Shipstead
Brooks	Johnson, Colo.	Smith
Buck	Johnston, S. C.	Stewart
Burton	La Follette	Taft
Butler	Langer	Taylor
Capehart	Lucas	Thomas, Okla.
Capper	McCarran	Thomas, Utah
Carville	McClellan	Tunnell
Chandler	McFarland	Tydings
Chavez	McKellar	Vandenberg
Connally	McMahon	Wagner
Cordon	Magnuson	Wheeler
Donnell	Maybank	Wherry
Downey	Mead	White
Ellender	Millikin	Wiley
Ferguson	Mitchell	Willis
Fulbright	Moore	Wilson
George	Morse	Young
Gerry	Murdoch	
Green	Murray	

Mr. HILL. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. GLASS] are absent from the Senate because of illness.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. BANKHEAD], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Florida [Mr. PEPPER] is absent on official business.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BUSHFIELD] and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. THOMAS] are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. AUSTIN] and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] is absent on official business.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Eighty-two Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, in view of the fact that today we have no legislation program ready for consideration,

I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the nomination of William C. Mathes, of California, to be United States district judge for the southern district of California, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

B. Howard Caughran, of Indiana, to be United States attorney for the southern district of Indiana;

James Joseph Gillespie, of Iowa, to be United States marshal for the southern district of Iowa; and

Chester M. Foresman, of North Dakota, to be United States marshal for the district of North Dakota.

By Mr. THOMAS of Utah, from the Committee on Military Affairs:

W. Stuart Symington, of Missouri, to be Surplus Property Administrator;

Robert Porter Patterson, of New York, to be Secretary of War;

Brig. Gen. William Clayton Rose (colonel, Adjutant General's Department), Army of the United States, to be a temporary major general in the Army of the United States; and

Sundry officers for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States, under the provisions of law.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. If there be no further reports of committees, the clerk will state the nominations on the executive calendar.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Dean G. Acheson, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of State.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is: Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?

Mr. WHERRY. There was so much confusion in the Chamber that I could not hear the statement made by the President pro tempore.

Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. Is the Senate now in executive session?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate is now in executive session, and the subject under consideration is the nomination of Dean G. Acheson, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of State.

The question is: Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I move that the nomination be recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations for further consideration.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nebraska has moved that the nomination be recommitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for further consideration. All in favor of the motion—

Mr. BARKLEY. On that motion I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I wish to supplement the remarks I made on the floor of the Senate Thursday afternoon relative to the nomination of Mr. Acheson to be Under Secretary of State, and to refer again to the statement Mr. Acheson is said to have made, as reported by the Washington Post on September 20, from which report I quote as follows:

The United States Government, not the occupation forces under General MacArthur, is determining American policy toward Japan.

Secondly, he stated that there was a decision on the part of the State Department for social and economic revolution in Japan.

And, thirdly, in speaking of this Government's policy toward Japan he said that the policy would not be changed, and that it would be carried out "regardless of cost."

Those statements were made by Mr. Acheson, as reported by the Washington Post, and which I read to the Senate last Thursday.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I am glad always to yield to the distinguished majority leader, and I think he knows that to be true. I respect him by reason of the office he holds, and I shall yield this time, but I ask that until I conclude my statement I be not further interrupted. I ask that I be given the opportunity to place in the Record a statement of what I interpret the situation to be, and then I shall be very glad to yield.

Mr. BARKLEY. I do not desire to interrupt the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. I yield this time.

Mr. BARKLEY. The Senator said he was reading from an article in the Washington Post what Mr. Acheson was said to have said. I wondered whether the Senator was going to read the statement that Mr. Acheson actually made.

Mr. WHERRY. Yes.

Mr. BARKLEY. There is a stenographic report, an accurate report, of what he said.

Mr. WHERRY. Yes; if the distinguished Senator will bear with me. I was simply bringing the Senate up to date respecting what had transpired. I shall not only ask that my queries submitted to Mr. Acheson be incorporated in the Record as a part of my remarks, but I shall ask to have his reply thereto inserted in the Record. He has given me authority to do so. He has already released his answer to my queries, and his answer can be interpreted as Senators care to interpret it as it relates to his previous statement.

Mr. President, I think the Members of the Senate will recall that I asked that consideration of the nomination be delayed until Monday. I wish to remind Senators specifically that I also stated on the floor on Thursday that I had no intention, when I rose on the floor of the United States Senate, to ask that the nomination be delayed. Members who were present will recall, as I am sure the distinguished majority leader will, that I said I simply wanted to insert into

the RECORD further statements relative to the demobilization of our forces in Japan, a subject in which I am vitally interested, as well as the demobilization of our forces across the water in Europe, a subject in which I am also vitally interested. It was because of that statement of mine that the colloquy developed among Members of the Senate respecting Mr. Acheson's nomination, and before any Member of the Senate expressed opposition to the nomination last Thursday, I respectfully asked the majority leader if it were not possible to delay consideration of the nomination until Monday without any further argument. I wish to bring the Members of the Senate who did not hear the discussion Thursday up to date on the subject. There were not many Members present at that time. As I previously stated, I did not arise at that time to delay the nomination or to raise objection to the nomination, because up to that moment I had no personal objection to Mr. Acheson.

Mr. President, I am cognizant of the fact that the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously favorably reported his nomination. I realize how futile it would be to attempt to override the action of the Foreign Relations Committee and to have his nomination recommitted to the Foreign Relations Committee. But in view of the colloquy which developed Thursday in the Senate Chamber, and in view of the editorials I have read and the letters and telegrams I have received during the week end, I wish to make a presentation for the RECORD respecting the nomination of Mr. Acheson.

Although I may be alone in my vote, I want the RECORD to show that I do not support the nomination of Mr. Acheson. I have not solicited any support for the motion I have just made.

In view of the fact that the able junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHANDLER] also made some remarks in line with those I made, I wish to say prior to the time he made them I did not know he intended to make any remarks relative to the nomination of Mr. Acheson. I acted solely upon my own motion. I presented my personal viewpoint. While I should like very much to be supported in the motion I have just made, yet, as I said, it still represents my personal viewpoint, and other Senators, of course, have the privilege of voting as they choose respecting recommitment of the nomination. I had hoped that over the week end the answers from Mr. Acheson would clarify the former statements which he is reported in the Washington Post to have made to the press, and that I would be enabled to know what his position or the administration's policy was toward Japan, and whether or not he was speaking for himself or for the State Department. I had hoped that Mr. Acheson would clarify his rebuke to General MacArthur and also the relationship which exists between the State Department and General MacArthur concerning our occupation of Japan.

At this point I should like to enter into the RECORD a list of the questions which I forwarded to Mr. Acheson on Friday

afternoon. These questions were asked in good faith. I wish to read them:

1. Is General MacArthur acting as a representative only of the United States Government or of the Allied Governments as well in implementing the terms of the Potsdam agreement?
2. Do you know of any instance or instances wherein General MacArthur has evidenced any unwillingness to discharge his responsibilities as agent of the Allied Governments?
3. Are you wholeheartedly in agreement with the Potsdam Declaration?

I am speaking to Mr. Acheson personally. In view of the policy he has announced, I wanted to know whether it was his personal policy to foster a social economic revolution, paid for by the taxpayers of the country, or whether he was the "hatchet man" for the administration in announcing to the public that that was the administration's policy.

4. Are not our dealings with Japan already honor bound by our commitment to the Potsdam Declaration?
5. Is there anything in the Potsdam Declaration which requires the Allied Nations to deal with Hirohito any differently than General MacArthur is now dealing with him?
6. Is there any provision in the Potsdam Declaration for any one of the Allied Governments deliberately to foster a social and economic revolution in Japan?
7. In implementing the provisions of this declaration, do you believe that the judgment, the wisdom, and the magnanimity of spirit of General MacArthur's address aboard the U. S. S. *Missouri* could be surpassed when he said: "Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the peoples of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice, or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone benefits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all of our people unreservedly to faithful compliance with the undertakings they are here formally to assume."
8. Is not the real ground for any quarrel between the State Department and General MacArthur the fact that he did not use the normal channels through which to transmit to the American people his conclusions as to his future needs in Japan, and if he had used the normal channels, what guaranty is there that the American people would have been informed?

That is a very important question, because of the question which follows.

9. If, after the few weeks that General MacArthur has been in Tokyo he has been able to revise his estimate of future needs so drastically, are not we warranted in assuming that General Eisenhower has made a similar revision? Do you know whether such a revision has been made by General Eisenhower and transmitted to this country; and if so, whether or not the information has yet been given to the American people?

I expect to have something to say about the questions which he did not answer. This particular question was unanswered, and I should like to have it answered. Information has come to me from high military sources which I cannot reveal that there has been a revised estimate given by General Eisenhower to the high command, and that figure has not been made known to the American people.

Mr. Acheson has already publicly released the answers to my questions, and the answers do not contain any informa-

tion which the public should not have. In all fairness to Mr. Acheson, I shall ask to have inserted in the RECORD his answers together with all the accompanying exhibits, including the Potsdam agreement, together with the signatures, and the release made by the administration Saturday night, which sets forth the policy which this Government has and expects to maintain toward Japan in the future.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I am reluctant to yield. I should like to comply with my colleague's request, but I asked the distinguished majority leader [Mr. BARKLEY], when he requested me to yield, to allow me to complete my statement without interruption. I told him that at the conclusion of my statement I would be glad to yield. I will yield to the Senator at this time, but I should like to complete my statement. I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I rise only to ask the Senator to read the answer from the nominee.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator, and I shall be glad to read it. I shall have to send to my office for a copy of the answer. Evidently it is not among the papers before me.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I have a copy of the answer, which I shall be glad to lend the Senator.

Mr. WHERRY. I would appreciate the use of the copy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks the letter and the exhibits which Mr. Acheson sent to me, including the Potsdam agreement, and also the release which was made Saturday night by the State Department relative to its policies in Japan.

There being no objection, the matters referred to were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SEPTEMBER 21, 1945.

The Honorable DEAN ACHESON,
Acting Secretary of State,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The confirmation of your nomination as Under Secretary of State is to be called up on the Senate floor Monday. I am tremendously interested in the future policies of our Government which deal with demobilization and with laying the foundations for the restoration of peaceful relations among the nations of the world.

I was amazed to read in the Washington Post of Thursday, September 20, your rebuke of General MacArthur and your views relative to our future relationships with Japan. Inasmuch as I will be called upon to vote upon your nomination, I am anxious to know whether the following three statements from the Post are substantially correct in reflecting your views:

1. The United States Government not the occupation forces under General MacArthur is determining American policy toward Japan.
2. A decision on the part of the State Department for social and economic revolution in Japan.
3. In speaking of this Government's policy toward Japan, you said the policy would not be changed and that it would be carried out regardless of cost.

Mr. Secretary, do these statements reflect your attitude toward this Government's Japanese policy and toward MacArthur's administration of the task he has been assigned? Furthermore, I feel it my duty to direct the following questions to you and ask that you be good enough to forward your reply to me by Monday morning, at the latest, since my further interest in your confirmation will be largely conditioned by your answers.

1. Is General MacArthur acting as a representative only of the United States Government or of the Allied Governments as well in implementing the terms of the Potsdam agreement?

2. Do you know of any instance or instances wherein General MacArthur has evidenced any unwillingness to discharge his responsibilities as agent of the Allied Governments?

3. Are you wholeheartedly in agreement with the Potsdam Declaration?

4. Are not our dealings with Japan already honor bound by our commitment to the Potsdam Declaration?

5. Is there anything in the Potsdam Declaration which requires the Allied Nations to deal with Hirohito any differently than General MacArthur is now dealing with him?

6. Is there any provision in the Potsdam Declaration for any one of the Allied Governments deliberately to foster a social and economic revolution in Japan?

7. In implementing the provisions of this declaration, do you believe that the judgment, the wisdom, and the magnanimity of spirit of General MacArthur's address aboard the U. S. S. *Missouri* could be surpassed when he said, "Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the peoples of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice, or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone benefits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all of our people unreservedly to faithful compliance with the undertakings they are here formally to assume."

8. Is not the real ground for any quarrel between the State Department and General MacArthur the fact that he did not use the normal channels through which to transmit to the American people his conclusions as to his future needs in Japan, and if he had used the normal channels, what guaranty is there that the American people would have been informed?

9. If, after the few weeks that MacArthur has been in Tokyo, he has been able to revise his estimate of future needs so drastically, are not we warranted in assuming that General Eisenhower has made a similar revision? Do you know whether such a revision has been made by General Eisenhower and transmitted to this country, and, if so, whether that information has yet been given to the American people?

Because of the confusion which your statements have caused, you should have an opportunity to clarify them. I am sure there are a great number of American people who are as intensely interested in your answers as I will be. Therefore, I am making this letter public and trust you will do the same with your reply.

Very truly yours,

KENNETH S. WHERRY.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1945.

The Honorable KENNETH S. WHERRY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR WHERRY: It is plain to me from your letter of September 21 that you have not had before you the statement which I made in response to a question from the press. I enclose the stenographic transcript of both question and answer. I also enclose a copy of the Potsdam proclamation, calling your attention specifically to paragraphs

numbered 6 to 12, and the statement of general policy relating to Japan which has been released by the White House.

With the documents before you, you will have the exact text of my answer and also the official pronouncements of the Government on the same subject with which to test the correctness of my statement.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON,
Acting Secretary.

Enclosures:

1. Excerpt from stenographic transcript of the Acting Secretary of State's press conference of September 19, 1945 (in duplicate).

2. Copy of Potsdam Proclamation (in duplicate).

3. Copy of statement of general policy relating to Japan (in duplicate).

ENCLOSURE No. 1

Question. Sir, there were reports that you were disturbed over some of the recent statements made by General MacArthur. Do you have any comment to make on the occupation?

Answer. Well, I have not any comment to make on the state of my own being. That is not a very important matter.

I have no comment to make on the military aspect of what General MacArthur stated. That is a purely military matter with which the State Department is not properly concerned. I think I can say that I am surprised that anybody can foresee at this time the number of forces which will be necessary in Japan. That may come from my inadequate knowledge of the military field, however, and it is not very important.

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government and is still held so far as I know, and I think I know. In carrying out that policy, the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy and the policy is and has been that the surrender of Japan will be carried out; that Japan will be put in a position where it cannot renew aggressive warfare; that the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war will be changed so that that will to war will not continue and that whatever it takes to carry this out will be used to carry it out.

ENCLOSURE No. 2

PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHINA

1. We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruc-

tion of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.

9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world-trade relations shall be permitted.

12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

13. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

ENCLOSURE No. 3

UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

Purpose of this document

This document is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate United States departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

Part I. Ultimate Objectives

The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other States and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this Government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

(a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.

(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

(c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

(d) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

Part II. Allied Authority

1. Military occupation

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal Allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. For that reason, participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a supreme commander designated by the United States.

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.

2. Relationship to Japanese Government

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the supreme commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the supreme commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal power of government in matters of domestic administra-

tion. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the supreme commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the supreme commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the supreme commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the supreme commander should intervene only where necessary to insure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

3. Publicity as to policies

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of progress made in their fulfillment.

Part III. Political

1. Disarmament and demilitarization

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the military and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people.

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded, and the Japanese imperial general headquarters, the general staff, and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval matériel, military and naval vessels, and military and naval installations, and military, naval, and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered, and shall be disposed of as required by the supreme commander.

High officials of the Japanese imperial general headquarters, and general staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultranationalist and militarist organizations, and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultranationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional, and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

Militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militarism and ultranationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

2. War criminals

Persons charged by the supreme commander or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its

nationals shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the supreme commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

3. Encouragement of desire for individual liberties and democratic processes

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discriminations on grounds of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended, or amended as required; and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal, and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth in articles 1 and 3 of this part III and thereafter shall be progressively influenced, to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

Part IV. Economic

1. Economic demilitarization

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others: The immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

2. Promotion of democratic forces

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization, and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the supreme commander:

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends; and

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

3. Resumption of peaceful economic activity

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease, and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected—and, if necessary, directed—to maintain, develop, and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

(a) To avoid acute economic distress.

(b) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

(c) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments.

(d) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

In this connection, the Japanese authorities or their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation.

4. Reparations and restitution

Reparations: Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made—

(a) Through the transfer—as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan.

(b) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization.

Restitution: Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property.

5. Fiscal, monetary, and banking policies

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

6. International trade and financial relations

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the supreme commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs.

7. Japanese property located abroad

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the imperial household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities.

8. Equality of opportunity for foreign enterprise within Japan

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity.

9. Imperial household property

Imperial household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

Mr. WHERRY. First I should like to read the letter:

MY DEAR SENATOR WHERRY: It is plain to me from your letter of September 21 that you have not yet had before you the statement which I made in response to a question from the press. I enclose the stenographic transcript of both question and answer. I also enclose a copy of the Potsdam Proclamation, calling your attention specifically to paragraphs numbered 6 to 12, and the statement of general policy relating to Japan which has been released by the White House.

With the documents before you you will have the exact text of my answer and also the official pronouncements of the Government on the same subject with which to test the correctness of my statement.

The enclosures include, first, an excerpt from the stenographic transcript of the Acting Secretary of State's press conference of September 19, 1945; second, a copy of the Potsdam Proclamation; and, third, a copy of the statement of general policy relating to Japan.

Relative to the first enclosure, I read the questions and answers:

Question. Sir, there were reports that you were disturbed over some of the recent statements made by General MacArthur, do you have any comment to make on the occupation?

He was speaking to the press on the 19th of September.

Answer. Well, I have not any comment to make on the state of my own being. That is not a very important matter.

Mr. President, I am standing in the rear of the Chamber. There was some comment the other day with regard to the fact that I went down to the front of the Chamber in what is called the well. I did so because of those whom I thought might be interested in hearing what I had to say. When we speak loudly we are accused of shouting. I do not wish to have too much competition. If I may, I should like to have order in the Chamber. I shall be glad to complete my statement as quickly as I can. The reason I stand back here is because this is my regularly appointed place, and there would be no significance today in my going down to the front of the Chamber. I would appreciate it if I could have the cooperation of the Members of the Senate until my statement has been completed.

I continue reading from Mr. Acheson's answer.

I have no comment to make on the military aspects of what General MacArthur stated. That is purely a military matter with which the State Department is not properly concerned. I think I can say that I am surprised that anybody can foresee at this time the number of forces which will be necessary in Japan. That may come from my inadequate knowledge of the military field, however, and it is not very important.

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government, and is still held so far as I know, and I think I know.

By the way, that is what I want to have clarified. I want to know what Mr. Acheson knows about our policy. That is the only reason I stood on the floor of the Senate last Thursday and spoke with regard to this nomination. I wanted to know what the social and economic policy might be to which Mr. Acheson was referring in his statement to the press.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes. The Senator from Texas is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I do not wish to yield to only one or two Senators and not to any others who ask me to yield.

Mr. CONNALLY. I decline to go further.

Mr. WHERRY. No; I will yield if the Senator from Texas has something to say about this particular phase of the matter.

Mr. CONNALLY. I was about to ask the Senator a very polite question.

Mr. WHERRY. I will treat the Senator with respect. He may go ahead and ask his question.

Mr. CONNALLY. I suppose the Senator will read on, will he not, concerning the—

Mr. WHERRY. If the Senator will give me sufficient time, I will put this exhibit, as well as the remainder of the exhibits which I have, in the RECORD. I do not wish to be unfair. Moreover, I will put into the RECORD copies of comments which have come to me from places in various States of the Union, so that the RECORD will show the reaction to this situation of some of the editors and other persons throughout the country.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator has said that he wants to know Mr. Acheson's source of knowledge with regard to what the policy of the Government is. He quotes, does he not, in his statement, the Potsdam agreement?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes.

Mr. CONNALLY. Will the Senator put that in the RECORD also?

Mr. WHERRY. I certainly will. I have already said that I will put into the RECORD not only this exhibit but also the Potsdam agreement and the statement that came from the administration last Saturday night. Does that fully answer the distinguished Senator's question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I assume that it answers the question so far as the Senator wishes to go.

Mr. WHERRY. I will present the documents fully in order that all the answers will be contained in the RECORD. I thank the Senator for his contribution. [Laughter.]

I repeat from the answer of Mr. Acheson:

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government, and is still held so far as I know, and I think I know.

Those are the words of Mr. Acheson. I continue reading:

In carrying out that policy, the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy, and the policy is and has been that the surrender of Japan will be carried out; that Japan will be put in a position where it cannot renew aggressive warfare; that the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war will be changed so that that will to war will not continue and that whatever it takes to carry this out will be used to carry it out.

Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator read again that answer? It seems to me to be one of the most extraordinary statements on policy I have ever heard.

Mr. WHERRY. I have read from a copy of an excerpt from the stenographic transcript of the Acting Secretary of State's press conference of September 19, 1945, in which he sets out questions and answers. The answers are replies to questions which I put to Mr. Acheson in the letter which I wrote to him. I will read from the copy again.

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government and is still held so far as I know, and I think I know. In carrying out that policy, the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy and the policy is and has been that the surrender of Japan will be carried out;

Mr. TAFT. The remaining part of the statement is what I wanted.

Mr. WHERRY. It reads as follows:

That Japan will be put in a position where it cannot renew aggressive warfare; that the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war will be changed so that that will to war will not continue and that whatever it takes to carry this out will be used to carry it out.

Mr. TAFT. How does the Senator think he can change the social system of another country?

Mr. WHERRY. I have an answer to that in my direct statement. The only way by which to change it is to go into

the country and upset the system there, and if that cannot be done politically, it will have to be done in some other way. What that other way is is something which I would like to have clarified, because it will involve not only the money of our taxpayers, but possibly hundreds of thousands of American lives. I am vitally interested in that matter. The policy to which Mr. Acheson has referred has not been made clear by the State Department?

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I have asked not to be interrupted. Does the Senator make his request for the purpose of asking a question?

Mr. TYDINGS. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I should like to ask the Senator if he has read the entire memorandum?

Mr. WHERRY. I believe I have. I am trying to get it into the RECORD as fast as I can do so. I want to put into the RECORD the agreement which was signed, then the Potsdam agreement, followed by the State Department's reply which was placed in the newspapers last Saturday night.

Mr. TYDINGS. Does the Senator not think that his inquiry relative to what the policy may be is answered and clarified beginning on page 6 of the memorandum with the words "ultimate objectives"?

Mr. WHERRY. That seems to be one attempt to clarify the policy, but it is still not clear to me. I want to know how far the State Department wishes to go in adopting that policy.

Mr. TYDINGS. That is what Mr. Acheson explained to the press.

Mr. WHERRY. I have read into the RECORD the answer which he made to the press. It was taken down by his own stenographer and is a part of the stenographic record. Regardless of what was quoted by the Washington Post, what I have read is the record of his statement. It was sent to me by Mr. Acheson in all good faith. I want to be fair to him. I do not want to misquote him or misinterpret what he means. Senators will have to interpret his statement for themselves.

This is of significance to me. It is the first information I have had and doubt if anyone has had it before. Possibly someone has had it. I read from the Potsdam agreement:

The attached proclamation by the heads of Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China was signed by the President of the United States and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at Potsdam and concurred in by the President of the National Government of China, who communicated with President Truman by dispatch.

There is not one word there about whether the Soviet Union either signed the agreement or permitted anyone else to sign for it.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think the Senator wishes to be fair.

Mr. WHERRY. I do.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think the Senator will agree that when the Potsdam agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan. Therefore, it would not have been proper for a country not at war with Japan to have joined in this agreement.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to have the Senator permit me to continue for a moment.

Mr. President, to my knowledge there has been no agreement, supplementing the Potsdam agreement, which the Russian people have signed or by which they have an agreement with the United States which we know anything about.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me now?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. Is there any doubt in the Senator's mind that Russia had agreed to go to war with Japan at the time when we had the Potsdam meeting?

Mr. WHERRY. No; I am not disputing that.

Mr. CHANDLER. There was no meeting after that, was there?

Mr. WHERRY. No.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask that I be permitted to complete my statement. However, I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. BARKLEY. Since the Senator is yielding generally, I should like to ask about his statement that he has not heard of any subsequent agreement. The Senator will recall that the articles of surrender signed by Japan on the battleship *Missouri* were also signed by representatives of Russia, China, the United States, France, Great Britain, and possibly other countries. That is the later document which followed the Potsdam agreement which was not signed by Russia because, as the Senator from Maryland has said, Russia was not then at war with Japan.

Mr. WHERRY. Has any agreement been made with Russia since that time by which the United States has made definite commitments to Russia?

Mr. BARKLEY. I do not know.

Mr. WHERRY. No; and I do not know either. That is what I am trying to find out. We did not find out until Saturday night about the Government's policy, which apparently was determined in August, but was not released until Saturday night.

Mr. BARKLEY. Oh, no; the Government's policy was incorporated in the Potsdam agreement. Subsequently, Russia declared war against Japan, and subsequent to that the articles of surrender were promulgated and signed by all the governments involved.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, on the basis of the stenographic report which Mr. Acheson has forwarded to me, I submit that Mr. Acheson's rebuke of General MacArthur becomes all the more mysterious. In the stenographic report, there is the following comment, which, to me, is nothing more than completely ambiguous:

I have no comment to make on the military aspects of what General MacArthur

stated. That is a purely military matter with which the State Department is not properly concerned.

Mr. Acheson went on to say, however, in the same paragraph:

The occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy.

If that was Mr. Acheson's position, why did he rebuke General MacArthur about his estimate of 200,000 men? Concerning General MacArthur's statement that he needed only 200,000 to occupy Japan, Mr. Acheson had already said:

That is a purely military matter with which the State Department is not properly concerned.

Yet, in the same paragraph, he rebuked General MacArthur for making that statement.

I still maintain, Mr. President, that there is more to this deliberate rebuke of General MacArthur by Mr. Acheson than appears on the printed pages of the current discussion of the matter.

I now wish to read an Associated Press dispatch of September 23, 1945, dated in Tokyo.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Texas?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes; I yield to the distinguished Senator.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not wish to have the Senator yield unless he chooses to do so.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to finish my statement, and then I shall be glad to yield to the Senator, if he does not mind waiting for a few minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well.

Mr. WHERRY. This is exhibit 4, from the New York Times:

SEPTEMBER 23, 1945.—America's current long-distance discussion on occupation policy has produced genuine bewilderment among Japanese coupled with the opinion in some quarters that it further emphasizes potentially dangerous indecision among the Allies.

Some say that this situation has not made any difference, but that dispatch has come from Tokyo.

Mr. President, I also wish to place in the RECORD at this point a statement made by the president of the United Press, to be found in the New York Times for the same day—September 23—on the front page. In it the interview between General MacArthur and the president of the United Press is given in full, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MACARTHUR DECLARES JAPAN ENDED AS A GREAT POWER—ORDERS DOIHARA ARRESTED—RUIN IN WAR CITED—ALLIED CHIEFTAIN PLEDGES TO DESTROY WAR-MAKING ABILITY OF JAPANESE—SEES A LONG OCCUPATION—DENIES ARMS ARE BEING HIDDEN BY MILITARY—DISAVOWS ANY POLITICAL AMBITION

(By Hugh Baillie)

Tokyo, September 21.—Japan will never again become a world power, Gen. Douglas MacArthur said today in an interview.

"Japan industrially, commercially, militarily, and every other way is in a state of

complete collapse," General MacArthur declared. "Her food supplies are scarce and she faces conditions in this emergency that may well become catastrophic. Her punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter."

The supreme commander told me that war-criminal trials would commence very shortly. Japan's army will be absolutely abolished by October 15. The remnants of Japan's navy are doomed to destruction except "minor specimens which may be retainable for scientific or museum purposes."

ARMS PLANTS TO BE DESTROYED

All Japanese munitions and all munitions plants that survived the war will be destroyed, General MacArthur said. Japan will be kept on an austerity basis regarding sports, entertainment, and luxuries.

The Japanese are not being treated brutally but the surrender terms, no matter how harsh, are being rigidly enforced, General MacArthur emphasized. Furthermore, he said, Japan can expect no relief, no food, clothing, or supplies from the Allied Powers this winter.

General MacArthur pointed out that the complete execution of the terms imposed by the Allies was expected to take many years. He plans to remain personally on the scene enforcing, directing, and administering Allied rule over the Japanese.

Reiterating that he had no political aspirations, General MacArthur said that he started as a soldier and intended to finish as one.

LAST PUBLIC ASSIGNMENT

"I'm on my last public assignment, which when concluded will mark the definite end of my service," he said.

General MacArthur received me in his headquarters in Tokyo. My first question was: "In the occupation of Japan are the terms of the Potsdam Declaration being enforced to the letter?"

"Absolutely yes."

"There seems to be an impression in the United States that you are going to tolerate the existence of a standing army of Japanese who will do most of the policing of Japan," I said. "Would you care to comment on this?"

This query evoked an emphatic reply.

"There is no fabric of truth in this statement," General MacArthur said.

"The Japanese Army is being completely demobilized by October 15 and absolutely abolished."

I then asked what would be done with the remnants of the Japanese Navy.

He replied decisively, "All of it will be destroyed except minor specimens which may be retained for scientific or museum purposes."

Asked how long the occupation of Japan would be continued, General MacArthur answered, "I am sure it will take many years to fulfill the terms of the surrender."

Asked if he had any authenticated reports of concealment of weapons by Japanese soldiers or civilians, General MacArthur said, "None. I have no doubt that in the beginning in small isolated cases individuals have attempted to conceal arms, but it would be impossible in any degree."

There have been many reports regarding the numerical strength of the American Army at present in Japan and the future maximum that will be required for the occupation, so I asked General MacArthur for a statement on this.

"At the present time there are approximately 150,000 troops in Japan," he said. "The maximum figure will reach approximately 500,000."

He said that it was not planned to use American troops for any construction of housing for the Japanese and that there was no plan for importing food, clothing or supplies for the use of the Japanese population this winter.

"Will the demobilized Japanese Army in Japan be put to work under the supervision of American authorities?" I asked.

"They will be a responsibility of the Japanese themselves," he said. "They will be absorbed into the normal Japanese civil population."

Asked if there was any deterioration in the attitude of respect and cooperation shown by Japanese soldiers and civilians toward the occupation forces, General MacArthur replied, "None whatsoever."

"Is the retention of the Emperor serving a useful purpose?" I asked. General MacArthur said: "His retention during the surrender and demobilizing steps is serving its full purpose. An untold saving in American lives, money, and time has resulted."

Regarding reports in the United States that General MacArthur was not treating the Japanese with sufficient harshness, he commented:

"The Japanese are not being treated with brutality, but every step provided by the surrender terms, no matter how harsh, is being enforced. Their humiliation, their despair, and the hardships which they face cannot be overestimated."

Asked whether he believed the Japanese military elements and people realize their defeat, General MacArthur replied: "Completely, although there will always be the guardhouse type of lawyers who will present their own arguments. An educational campaign is planned further to drive home the realization of their complete defeat."

"Could our troops have safely entered Tokyo before they did?" I asked.

ENTRY TIED TO SAFETY

"I believe the entrance was made as soon as possible without taking unwarranted risks," General MacArthur replied.

"When the First Cavalry Division arrived it was pushed into Tokyo without delay. The only other troops available to me at the time was the Eleventh Airborne Division, which lightly held the Yokohama beachhead."

"It would have been foolhardy to push this division into Tokyo sooner."

I then asked, "Are discharged Japanese soldiers going into the gendarmerie in any numbers, so that Japan would continue to have a large disciplined force? Is the total strength of the gendarmerie to be controlled?"

General MacArthur replied, "The Japanese gendarmerie is strictly a police force composed solely of state and civil policemen. It has little or no basis of military training. Its strength is strictly controlled, and no discharged soldiers will be added to this force. The military police and the secret police are being abolished."

General MacArthur then stated, as supreme commander, that he was planning to keep Japan on an austerity basis, particularly in regard to sports, entertainment, and luxury of any nature.

Asked whether any Japanese munitions or arms had actually been delivered to the American occupation forces yet, General MacArthur said:

"Yes, and all arms and ammunitions being assembled for destruction."

Asked for the ultimate objective of the military occupation of Japan, he said: "The complete execution of the terms imposed by the Allied Powers is the ultimate objective. This is expected to take many years."

"None whatsoever," he said when asked whether there had been any "incidents" since our landing that would indicate that Japan had a tendency to become truculent.

"Why was the Japanese Diet permitted to meet?" I asked.

"The Diet was permitted to meet as the representative group of the people for the purpose of disseminating the surrender terms and directives."

General MacArthur said that the progress of the occupation had surpassed his expectations.

Asked whether he would refer to it as an invasion or as a pacification, he replied, "Neither. It is the occupation of a conquered country by the forces that defeated it."

Asked if he believed that Japan would ever become a world power again, General MacArthur said emphatically, "Never again when the terms of the surrender have been accomplished."

I asked the Supreme Commander whether he anticipated visiting the United States in the near future and he replied, "No, I regret to say. I feel the situation here will require my personal presence for some time to come."

I asked, "Now that the war is over, have you any political aspirations?"

General MacArthur replied, "None whatsoever. I have never entered politics and never intend to do so. I have stated before and reiterate now that I started as a soldier, and shall finish as one. I am on my last public assignment, which, when concluded, will mark the definite end of my service."

"What has been the conduct of American troops in Japan, General MacArthur?" I asked.

PRaises Troops' Conduct

He replied, "They have been magnificent in every way. They have acted with dignity, with firmness, and with a self-restraint that has been admirable. Wherever they go, they are America's finest diplomats."

Responsible to an inquiry as to whether Japan's industries were generally operative, General MacArthur said, "Japan industrially, commercially, militarily, and in every other way is in a state of complete collapse."

"Her resources of every kind are absolutely exhausted. Her food supplies are scant, and she faces conditions of emergency that may well become catastrophic. Her punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter."

Asked whether any fraternization was developing between American troops and the Japanese civilian population, General MacArthur said, "None. The general aloofness of the American soldier, based upon his innate self-respect, is one of the most noticeable characteristics of the occupation."

Asked whether he thought our troops enjoyed the occupation, General MacArthur replied, "I believe the predominant interest of our officers and soldiers is to do their duty wherever and however it may occur. Within this limitation, their burning desire is to return home."

"General, will the war criminals be brought to trial within a reasonable length of time?" I asked.

"Yes," he said. "Trials will commence very shortly."

"Will all Japanese munitions and munition-manufacturing plants be abolished?" I asked.

"Yes, entirely so," he said. "Many were destroyed during the war. All will be eventually."

In conclusion I asked General MacArthur whether the policies that governed a defeated Japan would be determined by him or by a higher authority.

He replied, "All major policies will be determined on the highest governmental levels by the Allied Powers and will be executed by me as their agent, as I may be directed."

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the statements of Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo and Dean Acheson in Washington on enforcement of long-range peace controls have clouded rather than clarified policies for Japan.

Mr. President, I also wish to call to the attention of the Senate the fact that the liberal press throughout the United States has attacked General MacArthur. I do not wish to dwell too long on this particular point, but I wish to say that over the week end I have received copies of statements or articles appearing in what I call the more liberal press. Some may go further and may call it radical, or some may go further and may call it communistic. Somehow they have gotten around into Dean Acheson's corner, judging from some of the statements they have made. Talk about blackening General MacArthur's name or blackening his name! I shall not introduce them for the RECORD, but I shall call attention to some of them.

I submit, Mr. President, that it is not only the Japanese who are confused. There is an ever-growing number of Americans who find in the White House release of Saturday, September 22, concerning our occupation policy toward Japan, no reassurance whatsoever as to what our real policy toward Japan is.

To those who will be interested, I submit articles from the Saturday, September 22, edition of the Daily Worker, and the Sunday, September 23, edition of PM as the outstanding illustrations of the type of support Mr. Acheson is receiving and of the violent and abusive attacks of General MacArthur which are blackening his name and which cannot fail to cause him loss of face in carrying out his difficult task in Japan.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Daily Worker of September 22, 1945]

TORIES RALLY TO MACARTHUR—WHITEWASH MANIPULATED IN CONGRESS AND IN PRESS

(By Joseph Starobin)

A campaign to whitewash Gen. Douglas MacArthur was sprung on the American people yesterday.

Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press, which is under Scripps-Howard domination, interviewed the Allied supreme commander at his Tokyo headquarters. It was a transparent attempt to offset the growing popular anger with the dangerous prospect of a soft peace for Japan.

The specter that Japan's Imperialist system would remain intact to make war upon another generation of Americans is so menacing that Dean Acheson, State Department Under Secretary, was compelled to rebuke MacArthur last Wednesday.

Prominent Republican reactionaries, like Senator KENNETH WHERRY, of Nebraska, and Alfred Landon, the repudiated GOP Presidential aspirant in 1936, came to MacArthur's defense. Similar support was heard from Democratic reactionaries like Senator ALBERT CHANDLER, of Kentucky.

And then the United Press interview popped up—as though by a careful prearrangement.

All yesterday afternoon United Press reporters were lining up congressional reactionaries, attempting to whitewash MacArthur. Even an ordinarily farsighted progressive like Elbert Thomas of Utah was hooked into the campaign.

MacArthur's interview with Hugh Baillie repeats—in words—what has already been promised many times, namely, that Japan is going to get a tough peace. But so far the actual deeds do not correspond with the promises.

As Representative ED. V. IZAC (Democrat, California) declared:

"The fact still remains that the American people are not convinced that we're harsh enough toward either Germany or Japan. The evidence still remains that we endeavor to be so fair that we are probably making it necessary to fight another war 24 years from now."

The political general, smarting under rising American criticism, had evidently been well prepared for the Baillie interview. As the UP president himself says:

"Occasionally he (MacArthur) fell silent to meditate, but mostly the answers came instantaneously. He senses the questions before the phraseology has actually been completed."

MacArthur's statements were largely a rehash of past official promises, with a few variations.

He repeated again that the retention of the Japanese Emperor was necessary "during the surrender and demobilizing steps."

When asked why the Japanese Diet was permitted to meet, the American general referred to it as a "representative group of the people." Its job, he said, "was to disseminate the surrender terms and directives."

MacArthur insisted that there was no anti-American guerrilla activity, that all arms were being turned in to the authorities and that these arms, together with munition-making plants, would be destroyed.

"Japan industrially, commercially, and militarily," he said, "was in a state of complete collapse." He painted a picture of exhaustion in Japan so grim that it almost causes sympathy, and said the "conditions of emergency were likely to be catastrophic."

He added that the punishment of Japan is just beginning, also declaring that he expected to remain in Japan for some time to come.

MacArthur, who was boomed as a GOP Presidential candidate in 1944 and is still looked upon as a possible reactionary choice for 1948, denied any political ambitions.

"I am on my last public assignment, which, when concluded, will mark the definite end of my service," he said.

As for the Japanese Army, which is supposed to be fully demobilized by October 15, MacArthur said it would be absorbed into the civilian population.

He denied that Army officers were entering the Japanese police and gendarmerie, and he claimed that the secret military and political police would be abolished.

Attempting to contradict Australian reports that the American Army was behaving as though it were a "tourist and shopping expedition," MacArthur spoke of the "general aloofness of the American soldier."

OMISSIONS

But the trouble with Baillie's questions, of course, was that they were not very searching or very important. In fact Baillie admitted in his own story that "my own observations are certainly in accord with his estimate" that is, with MacArthur's.

MacArthur declared, for example, that the war criminals' trials would start shortly. But whether any of the big industrial leaders, the Zaibatsu, would be included was not even touched on.

Nothing was said about the resumption of political liberties in Japan; the whole impression is that the existing Japanese feudal-Fascist system would simply be required to knuckle under to the United States, without any inner changes.

That, obviously, will not bring democracy in Japan at any time, and therefore means only the subordination of one imperialism to another.

Not a word was mentioned about the release of political prisoners in Japan—those who opposed the Fascists for years—or the beginnings of normal political parties, opposition newspapers, etc.

Nothing, also, on Japanese trade-union organization.

Nothing on agrarian reform, which is a critical precondition for democracy in Japan. Nothing on the nationalization of the big industries under the auspices of a really democratic government.

IF MACARTHUR COMMANDED IN REICH

(By Alfred G. Larke)

TOKYO, September 21.—Adolf Hitler's greatest mistake was in fighting against Eisenhower, Zhukov, and Montgomery, instead of drawing MacArthur for an opponent. His biggest mistake was in not palming himself off as the religious leader of his Nation, as well as the political leader.

The United Nations would have won all the battles, just the same. But judging by what has happened in Japan, here is what Adolf could have brought about in Germany:

1. The United States, U. S. S. R. and Great Britain, having reached the Rhine and the Oder, would have quit fighting, largely at the insistence of the reactionary press in the United States, crying to "bring the boys home," and asking what other civilized nation would be left in Europe if Germany were destroyed.

2. Hitler would have fired his wartime cabinet and brought back the liberals and moderates who helped rule the nation when it was attacking only Austria and Czechoslovakia.

3. A few chiefs of staff would have had to commit suicide.

4. A campaign would be started in Germany and internationally to prove it was the militarists, not the industrialists, who forced Germany into war.

5. Hitler would be told he was going to be shorn of civil or temporal power but might remain as the spiritual leader of the Nazis and that all United States occupation orders would be issued to him, and through him to the German public.

6. The supreme commander of the Allied forces would bring occupation troops in as a personal guard of honor, explaining it would be violation of international law to call them occupation troops.

7. About the twelfth day of occupation, the supreme commander would announce how happy he was that the Fuehrer was obeying all commands, in contrast to the situation in other countries, where "the only leaders the people followed during the war were of necessity placed in jails." (MacArthur, regarding the Emperor, September 11, United Press dispatch.)

8. Thr e weeks after occupation the Gestapo would still be operating and Heinrich Himmler's lieutenants would be placed in charge of Belgium and Czechoslovakia because our Army couldn't locate native leaders and had to preserve law and order.

What difference does it make, so long as we beat the Japanese? A lot. If Japan keeps the same bosses it has had for the past 50 years, indeed the past 10 centuries, how are the people to learn how to run their own government? And if the people have no say, who will keep the peace?

Taking full advantage of public pressure created by his good friends and political backers, the Hearsts, Howards, Pattersons, and McCormicks, General MacArthur has gone out of his way, while slapping the Japanese Emperor's stooges around, to blow kisses to the Emperor himself—the man without whose authority everyone admits the stooges could never have hoodwinked and bulldozed the Japanese people.

Lately the general has taken to announcing American policy in Japan without consulting either our State or War Departments. In Yokohama an American correspondent asked MacArthur's public-relations officer, a general, why the Japanese "thought police" were not put out of operation. He claimed he knew an American citizen in Tokyo who

had been taken into custody by these police a week after occupation. What was MacArthur going to do about it?

The general hesitated a bit, then said: "We intend to maintain law and order. Any other questions?" Law and order. Where did you hear that last? During a strike? During the bonus march? In Greece?

[From New York PM of September 23, 1945]

APPROVAL OF ACHESON BY SENATE IS LIKELY—
OPPOSITION TALKS LOUD, BUT IT LACKS SUPPORT

(By Alexander H. Uhl)

WASHINGTON, September 22.—The savage attack on Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson by the New York Daily News and the Washington Times-Herald, as well as that by other MacArthur worshipers in the Senate, are not likely to get very far. As things stand now there is every indication that Acheson will be confirmed as Under Secretary of State, though there will be a lot of hot air let off before debate is over.

Acheson's confirmation, which was to have come before the Senate Thursday afternoon, will come up on Monday. It is likely that Senators WHERRY and CHANDLER, who rushed to the defense of MacArthur, will resume their attacks on Acheson, but indications over the week end are that the confirmation will go through. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee approved it unanimously last Wednesday. And study of Thursday's debate indicated little support for any effort to oppose that recommendation.

CRITICISM VERBOTEN

Actually, neither WHERRY nor CHANDLER appeared to have any clear-cut idea of what Acheson had said and when you boiled down their remarks you didn't have much more than the broad and somewhat untenable statement that you must not criticize MacArthur.

Which, of course, is all right for fishers in troubled waters and hero worshipers, but is hardly likely to determine the Senate vote.

The debate, in fact, brought out what is obviously the feeling of the Senate that the peace with Japan must assure carrying out the Potsdam declaration. What is astonishing about the seven pages it occupies in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is how so many words could be used to say so little.

It is the line taken by the Patterson press that is far more revealing. To begin with, the Daily News editorial started off with a gross misrepresentation when it used the heading, "You can quote me on this," and later, in the body of the editorial, added:

"The Acheson statement was couched in terms which its author evidently considered tops in heavy sarcasm. To emphasize, he added: 'You can quote me on this.'"

EXPLANATION

The implication here is that Acheson deliberately volunteered direct quotation of his remarks. In reality, he was asked by reporters if they could quote him directly, something that frequently is done at the Department in the case of important statements, and Acheson granted the permission.

But the whole line of the editorial simply served to point up the desperate eagerness of the old isolationist, anti-Soviet crowd to build MacArthur up as the shining knight in armor who is going to tell the "liberals" where to head off some day.

They have been having their troubles doing this of late, for exactly the same people who have been screaming for the full truth of Pearl Harbor have been strangely silent when it comes to an investigation of what happened in the Philippines 12 hours later and their embarrassment is understandably acute. And now their hero has been catching some more hell and, of course they don't like it.

The "red herring" act by which the News seeks to smear everyone who has the audacity to criticize MacArthur, is pretty old stuff, but it is important as an indication of the line that has been increasingly bolder since the end of the war.

MACARTHUR'S HARD PEACE

It's good to know that the voice of the people—the essence of democracy—carries across the Pacific even faster than our three B-29's made it. It's even better to know that the voice is not only being heard, but apparently heeded by MacArthur. That's shown in MacArthur's interview with Hugh Baillie, president of United Press, and his order for the arrest of Gen. Kenji Doihara, the "Lawrence of Manchuria."

It's also good to know that MacArthur considers this his last assignment, and that he has no political plans for the future, probably meaning the Presidency. If he means it, it's a hard-headed realization that he can't win because of the handicap of the people on his side—the Hearst-Patterson-McCormick press and its followers and spokesmen in and out of Congress.

But while it has been proved that MacArthur is susceptible to democratic pressure by the people, there is still no proof that he has the know-how to bring democracy to Japan. There is not even proof that he understands what is wanted from him.

For instance, after the deluge of criticism, he denied a week ago that there would be a "soft peace" and now promises a "hard peace" for Japan; points that she is short of food and in a state of collapse, and says she can expect "no relief, no food, no clothing, or supplies from the Allied Powers this winter."

That's not a hard peace; it's a stupid one. Alexander H. Uhl answered that one in PM September 17: "A 'hard peace' for Japan must mean a just peace, a peace that is infinitely more than a punishment peace, but rather a peace that can hold hope of striking at the essential causes of war and the system that made war possible. Such a peace is vital to ourselves as well as for the Japanese people. Battering some Japanese on the heads with a brickbat isn't a 'hard peace.' Tearing power out of the hands of the Mitsubishi and Mitsui and giving it to the Japanese people is * * *."

I can only add that the Mitsui and Mitsubishi won't starve this winter; the people, the workers, and the peasants who could bring democracy to Japan, will.

There are some good points in the MacArthur interview: quick war-crime trials are promised (but no assurance that the trials will reach beyond professional militarists), the army will be demobilized by October 15 and the navy destroyed, the military and secret police will be abolished. But the credibility of his forecast that Japan will never again become a great power must be judged in the light of a forecast he made in 1939, quoted by John McCarten in the American Mercury of January 1944:

"It has been assumed, in my opinion erroneously, that Japan covets these (Philippine) islands. Just why has never been satisfactorily explained. Proponents of such a theory fail fully to credit the logic of the Japanese mind. Strategically, possession of these islands would introduce an element of extraordinary weakness in the Japanese Empire. It would split that Empire militarily into two parts, separated by a broad stretch of ocean, and in between it would lie its present military enemy, China.

"Every reason that is now advanced as to the indefensibility of the archipelago by the United States, because of its distance therefrom, would apply in principle to this defense of Japan."

Ceiling zero, visibility zero.

RICHARD A. YAFFE.

PRESS AXIS SEES RED OVER ITS FAVORITE SON MAC ARTHUR BACKERS, PRESS

It is interesting to watch the tactics of the newspaper axis in its defense of MacArthur. The Daily News lumps the Communists and the liberals and impugns their motives, the Journal-American inferentially smears all critics in a headlined red scare, and the Chicago Tribune distorts the meaning of a hard peace to make it appear that its real end is to hurt the Japanese people rather than to help them achieve democracy.

"Our 'liberals,' to whom Acting Secretary Acheson seems to be playing up, turned against MacArthur the moment the Japs surrendered. MacArthur's name is reported, for example, to have been booed and hissed at a big Communist pow-wow in New York Tuesday evening. 'Liberals' of other persuasions are just about as violently against MacArthur as are the Reds. Why?"

"OUR LIBERALS VERSUS MAC ARTHUR

"Is it that MacArthur is not sharing the occupation job with the Russians? That arrangement seems to be all right with Stalin, however. Or is there some 'liberal' suspicion that the United States secretly intends to build up Japan as a future buffer against Russia?" (New York Daily News, September 21, 1945.)

"REDS FOMENTING MAC ARTHUR SMEAR FACE UNITED STATES PROBE

"(By David Sentner)

"WASHINGTON, September 21.—William Z. Foster and other Red leaders will be quizzed on the current smear campaign being waged by the Communists against General MacArthur when they are called as witnesses next Wednesday before the House committee." (New York Journal-American, September 21, 1945.)

"Nevertheless, General MacArthur is being accused of incompetence. His course is being condemned as a 'kid-glove policy.' That's pretty funny. It assumes that it is better to get what you want from the other fellow by socking him than by persuading him. The truth is that there was a time when we had to sock the Japs, and MacArthur did that. Now it is no longer necessary, but the general's critics want him to go on socking anyhow. It is odd that the people who are screaming loudest about MacArthur's kid gloves are those who are most certain that the era of universal peace is upon us. Maybe they think that peace is promoted by a victor nation throwing its weight around." (Chicago Tribune, September 18, 1945.)

MAC ARTHUR BACKERS, POLITICAL

Now look at a sampling of those pressing this line—Representative REED of New York, who voted against all defense measures; Senator WHERRY, anti-labor reactionary; RANKIN, whose record you know:

Hon. DANIEL A. REED, of New York, in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, September 19, 1945:

"Mr. REED of New York. Mr. Speaker, the character assassins have ventured into the open, and from now on General MacArthur will be the victim. Why? Because he has dared to express his honest opinion with reference to the required number of men to occupy Japan, an estimate which is at variance with those who are opposed to the demobilization of our boys." (From CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

"Mr. WHERRY. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an editorial entitled 'Statesman MacArthur,' published in the Chicago Daily Tribune of September 18, 1945.

"There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"STATESMAN MAC ARTHUR

"Throughout much of the war a group of MacArthur haters in this country and abroad

sniped at the general. They said he didn't understand modern combat, called him a braggart." (From CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

Hon. JOHN E. RANKIN, of Mississippi, in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, September 19, 1945:

"Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, some newspapers, in particular the Washington Post and the Communist Daily Worker, have attacked General MacArthur for his statement to the effect that within 6 months he would probably need not more than 200,000 men in Japan. None of the papers which attacked General MacArthur have published his full statement. I got hold of it last night and I am inserting it in the RECORD this morning. It is absolutely unanswerable." (From CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

MAC ARTHUR CRITICS, MILITARY

Again a sampling—the list is longer than this column. Here are opinions of ranking Pacific military leaders who don't follow the MacArthur line:

"Winwright says, 'Occupy Japan for 20 years.'" (PM, September 18, 1945.)

"The Japs are spiritually undefeated," said the founder of the Flying Tigers and commanding general of the succeeding China Air Task Force and Fourteenth Air Force. "They realized after the atomic bombings that they didn't make proper preparations for the war. They feel they won't be defeated again."

"General Chennault, once in first place on the Japanese list of war criminals with President Roosevelt as No. 2, declared the greatest potential danger was in leaving the Japanese Emperor in control." (Quoted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

"Too lenient treatment of Japan will 'Sure as death and taxes lead to another war,' the admiral said in a speech broadcast to the naval aviation anniversary dinner in Washington." (Admiral Halsey, quoted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

MAC ARTHUR CRITICS, PRESS

Now, some viewpoints from the non-Axis press. The Tribune is liberal-Republican, the Sun conservative-Republican, the Times conservative-Independent, and the World-Telegram is on a teeter weighted on the right:

"LORD HIGH EVERYTHING ELSE

"The general's actions so far have tended to strengthen the imperial institution of Japan, one of the world's worst political evils and thus to give more power to the rapacious oligarchy which controls the institution. The general's assertion that the occupation force in Japan probably could be cut to 200,000 within 6 months no doubt encouraged members of the oligarchy to believe that all they are required to do is bow low in the presence of the general until he gives them a good-conduct parole." (New York Herald Tribune, September 21, 1945.)

"TOKYO AND WASHINGTON

"2. While General MacArthur must decide the pace at which new policies are introduced, he cannot be left to determine what these policies themselves will be. The questions at issue here involve far more than the judgment and the purposes of the commander in the field. They involve the judgment and the purposes of the whole Government of the United States, acting in cooperation with its allies. Under Secretary of State Acheson is entirely right when he says that 'the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy.'" (New York Times, September 21, 1945.)

"MAC ARTHUR AND WASHINGTON

"As for the general, he was obviously in the wrong in announcing to the world that 'within 6 months the occupation force will probably number not more than 200,000 men,' when his latest official estimate to the President and War Department specified 500,000. This was generally though errone-

ously interpreted to mean a change in the American policy of a firm military occupation as long as necessary to enforce the surrender terms. It also raised false hopes of a faster demobilization of American troops than possible." (World-Telegram, September 20, 1945.)

"THE PEACE IS YET TO BE WON

"What has happened, of course, is that what General MacArthur said has been exploited by those campaigning so aggressively to halt the draft and bring the boys back home at once. They have been quick to jump at the 200,000 figure of the general as an over all requirement fixed definitely by the commanding officer in the field. Why, they ask, if 80,000,000 militant Japanese can be held in check by 200,000 men, cannot the cowed Germans in the section this country is occupying be controlled by a fraction of that number? To answer that, President Truman felt impelled to elaborate on his statement of the preceding day and back up Mr. Acheson by agreeing that, in respect to Japan, 'No one now can foresee what those needs are going to be.' That, of course, is sound. Clearly General MacArthur, in his enthusiasm over the smoothness with which the occupation is going, spoke with a definiteness which the uncertainties of the future may not justify. Neither in Tokyo nor in this country should it be forgotten that the peace has yet to be won." (New York Sun, September 20, 1945.)

THE REAL ISSUE

If a newspaper wants to defend MacArthur, that's its business, but when the press axis creates a witch hunt over criticism of MacArthur it becomes everybody's business. For if democracy dies stillborn in Japan, world peace may die with it.

R. A. Y.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, we seem to be confronted in these attacks with an organized campaign to remove General MacArthur. As further evidence of the organized smear campaign which is now under way, I ask that an article entitled "Boos Hint Communists Plan MacArthur Smear Campaign," published in the Washington Times-Herald of September 24, be printed in the RECORD at this point, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROPAGANDA WHEELS GREASED—BOOS HINT COMMUNISTS PLAN MACARTHUR SMEAR CAMPAIGN— DEMONSTRATION AT NEW YORK MEETING SEEN BUT START OF SCHEME TO DIM GENERAL'S STAR

(By Guy Richards and Russ Symontowne)
New York, September 23.—A few small boos—harbingers of bigger and better boos to come—greeted the name of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at the Madison Square Garden meeting of 12,000 Communists and their sympathizers last Tuesday night.

The boos went almost unnoticed against the background of tumultuous cheering for the early overthrow of capitalism and the quick rise of the socialist state, demanded by leaders of the newly reorganized party.

SEEN AS TEST BOOS

But it is almost certain these were test boos, little samples of a wide variety of boos and hisses, hoots and jeers soon to come rolling from the party's production lines.

In fact, we were told by Communists off the record, and it took little reading between the lines of party publications to assure us, the great Red propaganda machines are ready-greased for a full-scale smear campaign against the general who brought an end to the world's greatest war.

GROUND WORK DESCRIBED

Today we will describe how the ground work for this campaign to discredit MacArthur has been laid and what the Reds hope to gain by it in this country. In another article we will attempt to show how this get-MacArthur movement fits into the jigsaw picture of Moscow's plan for world expansion.

Before he left New York for Chicago, where he spoke tonight, William Z. Foster, national chairman of the party, gave us a quotation which broadly summarizes the party's new hatred of MacArthur.

"MacArthur's conduct in Japan," said Foster, "has been such as to require his correction by the President and by the State Department. His activity on behalf of a quisling regime in the Philippines, his methods in Japan and Korea, demonstrate that he is unfit to carry out the job of crushing Japanese fascism and its collaborators."

"It is no wonder that the reactionary, pro-Fascist press in America is grooming him for the Presidency in 1948."

A careful study of the columns of the Daily Worker, the Communist official organ, and talks with Communist leaders disclosed the party's alleged grievances against MacArthur.

MAC ARTHUR IS TARGET

But also it was revealed to us that the party is not hankering at this time for an out-and-out fight with the Truman administration and intends to use MacArthur as a convenient target for abuse it might otherwise heap upon the President and State Department.

"We may never learn to love Harry Truman but we may still wish to support him in 1948 against some greater reactionary," one Communist put it. "For the time being at least, MacArthur will serve our purpose very well."

Now, turning to the specific Communist "case" against the general, we found that until quite recently the party had very little against him.

BLASTS FROM DAILY WORKERS

Quite suddenly the Daily Worker began, shortly after VJ-day, to blossom forth with headlines, articles, and editorials blasting the general.

"As a reactionary military man he didn't matter so much to us," said one Communist high in the leadership. "But as a reactionary boss of Japan, playing with its Fascist elements, he matters a great deal."

The first thing gripping the Reds is the fact that only American soldiers are occupying Japan.

"Instead of planning a joint occupation with our allies, as in Germany, the United States is making the job harder and costlier," a Worker editorial of last Wednesday read.

WANTED REDS IN JAPAN

"Of course we wanted Russian soldiers in Japan," a Communist leader told one of us. "We wanted the same quick and virtually bloodless revolution we had in European countries, in Poland, Rumania, and even France. We wanted the old Fascist leaders, not merely the military but the industrial war makers as well, turned out immediately and democratic elements installed in their places. As it is, every day MacArthur plays with these industrialists and politicians they entrench themselves and fix fascism's hold more tightly on Japan."

So, it is the party line to fix the blame upon MacArthur for the over-all occupation plan which was surely decided upon by the administration in agreement with the other Allies.

In many editorials in the last two weeks the Worker has harped upon MacArthur's continuance in office of Japanese officials.

"If we can raise enough heat we might be able to force the administration to withdraw MacArthur from Japan," a Communist told

one of us. "Frankly, we are not very hopeful. But, it might be done. He's been spanked several times by the administration."

A series of articles, signed with a nom de plume and datelined from the Philippines, appeared last week in the Worker, purporting to show that under MacArthur's orders troops in the Philippines were working with Quislings and in some instances actually jailing Filipinos who worked in the underground.

RED FEAR CITED

Russia's mounting fear of American might peeps through the lines written by James S. Allen in the Worker September 16:

"It is well known," Allen wrote, "among those in close contact with MacArthur, and it has also been voiced in the press, that the commander views Japan as a base of reconnaissance against the Soviet Union."

The Daily Worker is seeking hard to make it appear that MacArthur is on the defensive. This is an old and familiar party tactic, used often before against its enemies. When MacArthur announced that he believed only 200,000 troops would be needed to occupy Japan, instantly the Worker declared this was bait to make American mothers and fathers of soldiers and sailors accept his soft handling of the Japanese.

NOT VERY HOPEFUL

But, while the party feels that abusing MacArthur as a Fascist is helpful and useful in restoring it to prewar vigor, one leader confided to us it really had little hope of altering the course of affairs in Japan.

"However," this man said, "we will certainly fix his wagon for the Presidency. You see, we don't really think he can be elected President. But you never can tell what will happen in politics and it is a good thing to knock him out of the race now."

"However," he continued, "that isn't the main idea. Our real fear is that the reactionary and Fascist politicians and newspapers will build him up and then use him to force the nomination and election of some lesser known Fascist tool. If we can discredit him thoroughly now, he will lose his value to the American reactionaries long before 1948 rolls around."

It was a little boo for MacArthur at the Garden last Tuesday, but that little boo will soon become a great big boo, if the Communists can so contrive it. The party line says: "Get MacArthur!"

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see where there is any rebuke involved. Exactly what language does the Senator consider a rebuke?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I refuse to yield any further for the Senator to make a speech. If he wants to make a speech in his own time, that is all right with me.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was merely asking a question.

Mr. WHERRY. I am making a statement relative to the objections I have to confirming the nomination of a distinguished citizen. Mr. Acheson, at this time. I should like to complete my statement, and then if the distinguished Senator from Arkansas wants to take the opposing ground, as I know he will, that will be all right with me.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I merely asked the question what language the Senator considered a rebuke. Can the Senator give the Senate his idea as to what constitutes a rebuke in that stenographic transcript of the interview?

Mr. WHERRY. If the Senator will be patient with me, I think I can refer to

many editorials outside of my own State which will convince the Senator that Mr. Acheson's statement was considered a rebuke by the American people and also by the people of Japan.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I do not want to engage in discussion with the Senator—

Mr. WHERRY. I notice that no Senator wants to engage in a discussion, but Senators are attempting to prevent me from making a coherent statement, and they are doing a very good job of it. If they will bear with me, I shall be glad to finish my statement, and then they can ask any question. I shall be glad to yield to any Senator at any time if I may be permitted to complete my statement in the RECORD.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, the Senator from Nebraska does not have to emphasize that. I was wondering if he was going to put into the RECORD editorials from the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers, since he has used the name of the Daily Worker and PM with some obvious aspersions upon those publications. If he is going to put them into the RECORD I would not want to do it myself.

Mr. WHERRY. I will say I am going to put in a number of editorials, including some from Texas and one or two from Kentucky. I have also a lot of correspondence to which I intend to refer, so that the Senate may be advised how the people feel about the matter.

I ask permission to insert in the RECORD at this point an article by Sidney Shalett, appearing in the New York Times of September 23, which I think will be highly informative to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. If he wants something placed in the RECORD from the New York Times.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

OUR POLICY TOWARD JAPAN IS EXAMINED
ANEW—CONTRADICTIONS GIVE IMPETUS TO
WORK ON A SOUND, LONG-RANGE COURSE

(By Sidney Shalett)

WASHINGTON, September 22.—The MacArthur-State Department controversy over the long-range occupation of Japan produced, on the surface, a number of lively forensic reactions. Beneath the surface, however, the dispute served to heighten the serious concern in certain responsible official quarters here that our basic policies for the rule of conquered countries are by no means as firmly formulated as they should be.

Certain officials in Washington directly concerned with the keeping of the peace we have just won—and among them is at least one high War Department authority—were disturbed by the frictions. These sources have felt for some time that our long-range policies of occupation in Europe, as far as international agreement on the ultimate fate of Germany is concerned, are woefully weak; in fact, some say that there is no real long-range policy. They had been less pessimistic concerning Japan, since the United States was more completely in the saddle there and the international aspects were less complicated.

Nevertheless, the future of Asia is not an exclusively American show, and these observers feel that any display of lack of decisiveness on our part is not a good omen for keeping the peace.

To put it mildly, there has been a considerable degree of confusion concerning our policies in Japan. Much has been said by many authoritative officials, and they have not always agreed with one another.

SPHERES OF AUTHORITY

To set the record straight, so far as division of the conquered territories was concerned, there were certain agreements among the United States, Russia, Britain, and China; the spheres of these nations are generally defined now, and the authority of each nation within its sphere is clear-cut.

In the territory we are governing, principally Japan proper and part of Korea, the basic American policy is decided in Washington. These decisions are up to President Truman and the State Department under Secretary James F. Byrnes. The Joint (Army-Navy) Chiefs of Staff advise the President on military and naval matters. Theoretically General MacArthur is our chief of police in Japan, subject to the orders of the joint chiefs. He is on the scene and great authority has been vested in him, so naturally his recommendations carry great weight.

Military and diplomatic authorities here agree, however, that it is not up to General MacArthur to make the final decisions; he is the instrument, rather, to carry out Washington's policies.

The original basic policy for rule of Japan was outlined in the Potsdam Declaration, issued before the Japanese surrender. In this declaration the Allies promised to eliminate Japan's future ability to make war by dismantling her armed forces and her munitions industries, to punish her war criminals, and to occupy her soil as long as she could be considered a menace.

Then Japan surrendered and General MacArthur went in with his occupation forces. While he was establishing himself in an absolutely secure military position and commencing the dismantlement of the Japanese Army, the clamor on the home front for ultrarapid demobilization of our own Army began to assume irresistible proportions and the Congress went along with the popular sentiment.

Two significant statements soon came out of Japan. First, Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army in Tokyo, observed that "if the Japs continue acting as they are now, within a year this thing should be washed up." Then General MacArthur himself exploded his bombshell on the War Department and blandly forecast that he should be able to cut his Japan-Korea forces to 200,000 within 6 months.

A DIFFICULT PERSONALITY

It is common knowledge in military circles that the War Department has unbounded admiration for General MacArthur's military genius. It also is common knowledge that General MacArthur is regarded as a rather difficult personality. His independent actions on a number of occasions have embarrassed the General Staff back home. For instance, in the face of the cries for rapid demobilization, it embarrassed the War Department to justify General Eisenhower's need for 400,000 men in Germany when General MacArthur was talking of doing his job with 200,000.

Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, is polite and diplomatic. He did not criticize General MacArthur's statement; yet, he significantly dwelt, in his talk to the Congress on Thursday, on the fact that General MacArthur originally had asked for great numbers of men and that the War Department's original demobilization plans, now being speeded, had to be pegged on these early large demands.

Acting Secretary Acheson was less polite. In a statement that from a diplomat was positively fiery, he tartly declared that it

was the United States Government, not General MacArthur, that was determining American policies in Japan. The State Department intends to see that Japan is socially and economically revolutionized and that her future war-making potential is destroyed, regardless of what military decisions General MacArthur may take, he averred.

While a number of congressional spokesmen stormed against Acting Secretary Acheson, he received unexpected support from a top-ranking spokesman of the Army Air Forces. Lt. Gen. Barney McK. Giles, formerly second in command of the AAF, and now deputy commander of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, returned from his non-stop flight from Japan with some vivid ideas about Japanese policy.

ONE-HUNDRED-YEAR OCCUPATION

The Japanese were acting fine and peaceful, he observed, and General MacArthur was handling the situation beautifully. But, General Giles declared, the millions of Japanese soldiers who had had to lay down their arms without even fighting were convinced that they had not been defeated. If we got out too quick these sullen warriors would stir up another war, he declared; therefore, it was his opinion that we should occupy Japan for "not less than 100 years."

The final confusing element came Friday when General MacArthur, in an exclusive interview granted to Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press, placed himself unequivocally on the side of a long and severe occupation. The Allies must stay in Japan for many years, General MacArthur declared. His own intentions are to see that Japan is kept on an "austerity basis," that her war criminals are relentlessly punished and that every vestige of her ability to wage war is destroyed.

There was no more trace of softness in General MacArthur's sweeping declaration than there has been in the measures he is progressively putting into effect in Japan.

Asked if he believed that Japan would ever become a world power again, General MacArthur said: "Never again when the terms of the surrender have been accomplished."

"Japan industrially, commercially, militarily, and in every other way is in a state of complete collapse."

"Her resources of every kind are absolutely exhausted. Her food supplies are scant, and she faces conditions of emergency that may well become catastrophic. Her punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter."

Asked whether he would refer to it as an invasion or as a pacification, he replied, "Neither. It is the occupation of a conquered country by the forces that defeated it."

Meanwhile, however, the State Department took steps to establish a closer liaison with the supreme military commander. It ordered Arthur B. Emmons, foreign service officer and a far eastern expert, to proceed to Tokyo to serve as its "link" with the general. Meanwhile a staff of State Department experts is being established in Tokyo.

NAVY BELIEVED PIQUED

Not much has come out to date about how the Navy feels about General MacArthur's policies in Japan. Diligent inquiries this week seemed to justify the impression that the Navy was sour over what one source referred to as "the whole deal." Rightly or wrongly, the Navy feels that it made the major contribution to victory in the Pacific and it undeniably feels that it should have had at least some share of governing Japan.

It is a relatively small matter, but some Navy authorities point to the fact that the Fifth Marine Division is doing occupation duty in Kyushu, but no publicity about its activities has been released by General MacArthur's organization.

It may be authoritatively said that the Navy definitely is against any "softness" or "briefness" in our occupation of Japan. The Navy feels that if there is another war in Japan it will have to repeat its difficult and costly role; it wants everything possible to be done to avert a return engagement in the Pacific.

It would be unwise to assume that, because of all the smoke, Washington is irrevocably gloomy on our prospects in Japan. To sum up, the feeling here is that the controversies are unfortunate, and that it would be better for the United States, both in the eyes of Japan and in the eyes of the rest of the world, to steer a firmer course with less squabbling in the Far East. There is no basic lack of confidence, however, that General MacArthur will rule Japan with firmness. It also is hoped that the Government eventually will work out its long-range policies for Japan, and see to it that they are carried out.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I should like also to put into the RECORD some letters I have received. I have not asked permission to use the names, but I am going to try to get it. If, however, any Senator would like to see the letters, I should be glad, indeed, to let them do so. They are responsive to the very question which the distinguished Senator from Arkansas asked, as to whether or not the statement of Mr. Acheson was considered a rebuke and in the nature of a smearing campaign.

Here is a letter which came from Tennessee:

NASHVILLE, TENN., September 22, 1945.
Hon. Senator WHERRY,
United States Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WHERRY: Permit me to congratulate you upon the list of questions which you propounded to Dean Acheson.

Regardless of his answers, however, it seems to me that a man who gets peeved over a thing like MacArthur's statement of how many men he thinks will finally be needed to hold Japan in line is a small man.

Certainly, MacArthur has shown he possesses what it takes. If this is a sample of Acheson's caliber, he lacks a lot, in my judgment, and I hope enough Senators agree to hold up his confirmation.

Sincerely,

Here is one from Oklahoma:

ALVA, OKLA., September 21, 1945.
Hon. Senators WHERRY and CHANDLER,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATORS: I want to compliment you on your stand relative to the insulting attitude of Dean Acheson in regard to General MacArthur.

It is high time someone called a check on such high-handed egotism as is being manifested in some of our high places in Government.

It is astounding how men—and supposedly of high caliber—sometimes let their ignorance crop out.

Dean Acheson probably knows about as much about the military needs in Japan as a pig does about hip pockets. And to question as high an authority as General MacArthur is to but show his lack of intelligence.

I am only one of thousands of fathers who have boys in the service who are in sympathy with you in your stand.

Yours,

That is an answer to the Senator from Arkansas. As I have said, I am withholding the names until I can get permission to have them printed.

Here is a letter from Ohio:

NEW PHILADELPHIA, OHIO,
September 21, 1945.

HON. KENNETH S. WHERRY,
United States Senator from Nebraska,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I write to commend you for opening your splendid defense of our splendid, glorious, unequalled General MacArthur. The campaign of vilification which has been studied, deliberate, and politically carried on against him is just one more disgraceful scandal in government.

Yours truly,

Here is a letter from a man who lives in Cincinnati, Ohio, who encloses an editorial from the Cincinnati Times-Star.

CINCINNATI, OHIO, September 21, 1945.
KENNETH S. WHERRY, Esquire,
United States Senator.

HONORABLE SIR: I enclose editorial from today's Times Star, which may be of interest.

Where does this fellow Acheson come from and how does he get that way? Since when did the State Department become the Government of these United States?

Very respectfully yours.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Times-Star be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WOULD ACHESON START SOMETHING?

General MacArthur's statement that, as things look now and barring unforeseeable factors, the forces occupying Japan can be reduced to 200,000 by the end of 6 months, was, on its face, a report of progress which the facts justified his making. Not so the public utterance of Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, implying that MacArthur was endeavoring to modify the Government's policy toward Japan, and stating that the policy will be carried out whatever it takes. This will make the country wish that Secretary Byrnes was in Washington now, instead of London. The head of the State Department is not supposed to carry on a public debate with a commanding general in the field, and at least Jimmy Byrnes knows it.

The plain fact is that MacArthur has moved so swiftly and successfully that the Washington policy-makers have fallen as far behind him as war maps fell behind Patton in his dash across France. The occupation of Japan has taken a course unprecedented and unexpected. Indeed, it represents a new and refreshing sort of collaboration, to use a familiar word. The Japanese are complying, so far as can be seen, with all MacArthur's order, and seemingly going beyond them in bringing in men accused of being war criminals, in suggesting additions to the lists of the accused, and in even volunteering to undertake their trial and punishment. This never happened before anywhere. You might charge it all to a dark scheme or merely to the ways of an unpredictable people. But the apparent motive is just to clear up the wreckage of war speedily—as was done after the cataclysmic earthquake of 1923—and make the country again a going concern.

A prime factor, of course, has been MacArthur's complete compliance with the Allied terms of surrender as regards the Mikado, who in turn has been able to secure the complete compliance of his people. Meanwhile, flabbergasted Washington officials look on, and a few fatuous Senators talk of having Hirohito arrested. By and by, when the thinking of these officials catches up with swift-moving events, we may look for a policy as to Japan. There are rumors that it may mean the use of millions of soldiers in order

to impose democracy there—which seems to be a contradiction of terms. We shall have to wait and see.

Mr. WHERRY. Here is a letter from Washington, D. C., written by a man who served with MacArthur in the First World War. He says this is a deliberate plan to blacken the name of MacArthur and remove him from his command.

I quote a letter from my own State, written by one of my very best friends:

The war is over. Why keep millions of our boys in the Army, while they ought to be at home preparing themselves for their future careers. And that is the way 99 out of every 100 feel about it.

The criticism of the State Department of the statement of General MacArthur as to the necessary size of the occupation army in Japan comes with very poor grace. General MacArthur knows more about it than all the departments in Washington.

Respectfully submitted.

Here is one from Kansas City, Mo.:

Acheson must go!

Missourians are proud that you and Senator CHANDLER have been quick to rebuke Dean Acheson for his impudent and unwarranted criticism of General MacArthur.

That is written by a consulting engineer.

Here is an article which I ask to have inserted in the RECORD. It is by Mr. W. R. Walton, managing editor of the South Bend Tribune, who comes to the defense of General MacArthur. Mr. Walton was out in the Pacific and had a long talk with the general before he returned to the United States.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Star of September 23, 1945]

MACARTHUR ESTIMATED OCCUPATION ARMY SIZE
EARLY, EDITOR REVEALS

(By W. R. Walton, managing editor, South Bend Tribune)

SOUTH BEND, IND., September 22.—How big a force will it take to occupy Japan?

The furore started early this week when General MacArthur, Allied supreme commander, said he could do it with 200,000 men.

To this writer, his announcement came as no surprise, because General MacArthur outlined his plan to three of us over the luncheon table in his Yokohama residence 2 days after the surrender ceremony on the battleship Missouri.

We were a little startled, too, and raised inquiring eyebrows, but when the supreme commander had finished, we were wholeheartedly with him. At that time, however, we couldn't tell the world about it because the general was talking off the record and insisted he had to remain loyal to the more than 100 other correspondents.

OCCUPATION CALLED GAMBLE

It seems that many Americans are willing to criticize the general for not being more ruthless from the start.

I wonder how many of them realize just what a gamble America was taking that day when less than 10,000 marines and blue-jackets scrambled ashore at the Yokohama naval base, while airborne troops were landing at Atsugi air base outside Yokohama.

They were invading a country which had a fully armed and undefeated army of 4,000,000, at least 1,000,000 of whom were on Honshu Island. No one knew—not even General MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz—what the reaction would be. They had been assured by

the imperial government that the occupation would be without resistance. But Japan is filled with fanatical young men—like those who piloted the kamikaze planes. That army is still being disarmed.

NO SYMPATHY VOICED

He went on to discuss his plans for Japan. There was no pity or sympathy in his voice. To put it simply, he means to incapacitate Japan so far as war is concerned for generations to come.

He means to bring every Jap back from China, and there are 4,000,000 of them, he says. In the future they're going to live on the four main Japanese islands. We asked if he thought the islands could support such an increased population.

"Well, they can die, can't they," General MacArthur replied.

That didn't strike me as the words of a man who intends to be soft.

Again, while driving through the ruins of Yokohama, he pointed to areas with such comments as "We killed thousands in that section." He might just as well have been speaking of cabbages.

TO AVOID HATRED

From what General MacArthur told us, it was apparent he does not want to build up hatred in the Japanese for Americans. He intends to break the military caste that has had Japan in its grip. He wants the people to have a taste of democracy, to break down some of the age old traditions.

He told us of his plans to extend suffrage to the women of Japan, who heretofore have raised their sons for one purpose only—that of serving in the armed forces.

He spoke of plans for handling the prisoners of war and they fit into the general pattern he has laid down. He said the Foreign Minister expressed incredulity at the atrocity stories told by allied prisoners. General MacArthur promised to provide conclusive proof.

MAY USE JAP COURTS

The general said he was considering having these prisoners tried in Japanese courts by Japanese judges and juries. In that way the Japanese would punish themselves and they could bear no grudge against the allies. I got the idea, however, that punishment would be severe.

We had an opportunity to observe the Japanese for ourselves. No one could deny that the Japs were docile, that they were whipped. What else was lurking behind their poker faces we could only guess.

But one thing was certain: From now on they're going to take their orders from the headquarters of General MacArthur. And so is Hirohito. If General MacArthur says he can rule them with 200,000 troops, he can do it.

Mr. WHERRY. Here is a letter from a certified public accountant who lives in Boston, Mass.:

BOSTON, MASS., September 21, 1945.
Senator WHERRY,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WHERRY: I note that action on the nomination of Dean Acheson is scheduled for next week.

Robert Young, in his book Behind the Rising Sun, did not speak very well for Mr. Acheson's actions at the time Mr. Young was held in prison by the Japanese.

In view of Mr. Acheson's recent statements I wonder if he is the proper person to be delegated any authority in connection with the Japanese surrender. It would seem to me that authority in Japan should not be divided and that General MacArthur should have absolute authority unhampered by anyone from the State Department until such time as it is believed he is not doing the job as it should be done.

Very truly yours.

Here is a telegram from Huntington, W. Va. I presume I have received 150 telegrams. If Senators want to see them I shall bring them to the Senate Chamber. I am merely reading some of the communications I have received in order to give the viewpoint of a cross section of the country.

HUNTINGTON, W. VA.,
September 24, 1945.

United States Senator WHERRY,
Washington, D. C.:

Met you when here. Dr. Logan, Presbyterian missionary to Japan, 39 years now located States. General MacArthur has not made a mistake yet in occupying Japan, congratulations on your stand.

Here is a telegram from Florida:

WINTER PARK, FLA.,
September 23, 1945.

Honorable KENNETH WHERRY,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Just returned from Pacific theater of war. As recent member of general headquarters special staff, strongly recommend Senate rejection of Dean Acheson as tactless, impetuous, illogical, immature, uninformed, and unfair candidate for State Department post. Nation can place implicit confidence in superb qualities of Douglas MacArthur, soldier, statesman, gentleman of honor, and master strategist. Identify sender in Who's Who.

Here is a letter from Eastland, Tex.:

EASTLAND, TEX., September 21, 1945.

Senator KENNETH WHERRY,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WHERRY: You are hereby petitioned to permanently block the nomination of Communist Dean Acheson as Assistant Secretary of State of the United States. The play is like this, for the Communist planners to get Acheson in office as Assistant Secretary of State for awhile, then get Jimmy Byrnes out of office, and, presto, the United States has a Communist, Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State of the Republic of the United States.

That as I said, is from Eastland, Tex. Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I refuse to yield any further until I have finished my statement. When I have concluded I shall be glad to yield to any Senator. I want to put in the RECORD a letter from a man by the name of Smith, of Dallas, Tex., who encloses an article published in the Dallas Morning News.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, let me ask who wrote the letter?

Mr. WHERRY. It is from a man in Dallas, Tex., who has kindly sent me the article from the Dallas newspaper.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President—

Mr. WHERRY. I have the floor and I refuse to yield.

Mr. CONNALLY. I was merely asking the Senator who wrote the letter. I did not understand him to say who wrote it.

Mr. WHERRY. It is from a Mr. Smith, of Dallas, Tex., and this is what the writer says:

DALLAS, TEX., September 21, 1945.

Hon. KENNETH WHERRY,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Perhaps the enclosed has not come to your attention. This, we believe, echoes the sentiment of 90 percent of the people out here.

This outrage on General MacArthur is the evidence of the inefficiency of the man the

administration is trying to place in the important position of Under Secretary.

If there is anyone in Washington or elsewhere better qualified to handle the Jap situation than General MacArthur, he should be there instead of the general, and certainly Acheson is not the man.

We are pleased to know that we have a few representative men in the Senate who have the courage to recognize the ability of men like MacArthur and General Wainwright and will protect them against the insults of such political parasites who have assumed authority in the bureaus in Washington.

Very truly yours,

WM. N. SMITH.

The article from the Dallas Morning News is by Mr. Ted Dealey, who by invitation was present at the surrender of Japan aboard the U. S. S. *Missouri*. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ACHESON STATEMENTS CALLED INSULT TO GENERAL MACARTHUR; WRITER BACKS COMMANDER—OCCUPATION CHIEF DESCRIBED AS KNOWING SITUATION BEST

(By Ted Dealey)

One would have a great deal of temerity, after having spent only a week in Japan, to set himself up as an authority on the problem of how best to handle that conquered country.

But this writer cannot refrain, nevertheless, from siding wholeheartedly with Gen. Douglas MacArthur in his belief that only 200,000 American troops will be needed in Nippon for the army of occupation and against Dean Acheson, of the State Department, who has quite different ideas and who has not hesitated to express them.

In the first place, it might be asked with all propriety, What does Mr. Acheson know about Japan or the Japanese that General MacArthur is ignorant of?

It's entirely possible that Mr. Acheson has been in Japan some time or other, but even if he has, it's a lead-pipe cinch that he has not visited the country since Pearl Harbor days. And it is equally sure that General MacArthur knows what is what in the Pacific Ocean areas on the basis of his experience before and during the war.

The American people do not want their boys to be policing Japan for the next 20 years with a half million or a million men and their best chance that this does not come to pass is to leave policy making in the Nipponese home islands to MacArthur who is on the ground and who ought to know what methods are best to pursue.

If 200,000 men are not enough for a functioning army of occupation, then Japan and the Japanese people are a much tougher outfit than appears to a casual visitor in that country.

NIPPON SMALLER THAN TEXAS

After all, the Jap home islands, taken as a whole, are much smaller in area than is the State of Texas. Speaking in round figures, there are fewer than 150,000 square miles in the 4 home islands of Japan, while Texas can boast of an area 267,000 square miles in extent.

Doesn't it seem reasonable that 200,000 Texas Rangers could preserve order in this State, tough as we think we are?

If the conquered Japanese are looked upon as a sullen, morose, and hostile people who are only biding their time before starting another war, then perhaps the big occupation army proponents would be right.

But the Japs are not taking their defeat in this way. They are a regimented and a thoroughly docile people. They have been accustomed for so many years to rendering

complete obedience to their war lords and their Emperor that it is easy for them to switch about and display this same spirit of cooperation and obedience to the Americans, now that our military leaders are in the saddle.

Several publishers had lunch with General MacArthur in Yokohama as recently as the 4th of this month, and on that occasion we asked the general how long the army of occupation would have to stay in Japan. This was the reply:

"Six months if we handle the Japs right, and by that I mean if we are not too ruthless and cruel; indefinitely if we do not handle them right."

STATEMENT IS SURPRIS

This rather floored us, because up until that time we had no idea that General MacArthur even remotely entertained the idea that all American troops could be removed from the Japanese home islands within a half year.

So the next question was a natural corollary. We inquired, "Well, if we do move out of Japan within the next 6 months, what is to prevent the Japanese from starting to build up for another war 25 years from now?"

"I'm going to fix things," replied General MacArthur, "so that the Japs will have a hard enough time eating for the next 25 years, much less having the leisure and materials to build up for another war. The Rising Sun is a setting sun. Japan is through forever as a military power."

And that stands to reason. Japan is an insular empire. Its agriculture is not sufficient without imports to feed its own people. It has no minerals, such as iron, sulfur, magnesium, aluminum, oil, or the like, with which to build ships of war, airplanes, or munitions factories. All these have to be imported, and yet today Japan has no navy and very little merchant shipping.

Of commercial ships it has left today less than 800,000 tons, and of this total only about 375,000 tons are in serviceable condition. How can Japan start another war, even if it wanted to, if we see to it that they build no new navy and if we watch over their imports, which we assuredly will?

WOMEN TO GET VOTE

MacArthur told us he planned to institute woman suffrage in Japan and that he planned also to encourage labor unions in the islands. The latter, he said, were just getting started before the war. In addition to these measures, he plans to seek out and strengthen and put eventually into power the antiwar party of Japan, which most certainly exists and which will flourish and grow powerful now that the war lords are either committing harakiri or are getting themselves ready to be tried before American courts as war breeders and criminals.

Thus, under the MacArthur policy, Japan will be ruled within a fairly short time by the better element of its own people—that element of the Japs that believes in democratic government, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and is motivated by a sincere desire to get along peaceably with the rest of the world.

General MacArthur and his staff know who these Japanese antiwar people are and have known for a long time. They are at the present time searching them out and preparing to put them in positions of power.

How much better this is, from our standpoint, than the forced contemplation of our sustaining a military government in Japan for several generations through a tremendous army of occupation?

The Japs we saw in Japan were not hostile or unfriendly. They were more apathetic and indifferent than anything else. They didn't seem to mind that they were now being

bossed by Americans rather than their own war lords. For untold generations they have been accustomed to being ground under the heel of their own ruling class.

It makes very little difference to them now that their war lords are passing out of the picture and a new bunch of bosses are coming in. As a matter of fact, a great many people in Japan are actually relieved that the Americans came into their homeland and are now in the process of emancipating them from the slavery that has been theirs almost from time immemorial. We received this impression from undoubted authorities.

When General MacArthur said we will not have to occupy Japan for more than 6 months "if we are not too ruthless and cruel," he was not indicating by that remark that he favored a soft peace for the Japs.

MacArthur will be plenty tough. But he knows the Jap psychology. He knows that to get cooperation from the Japs he has to treat them firmly but with strict justice and some consideration.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I want to refer to the sentiment in another section of the country. I have picked out some editorials because I thought they were very important.

Here is one from Tucson, Ariz. I never met the writer of this editorial, but I have read many editorials, and this is one of the finest I have ever read in my life. It comes from a newspaper away down in the Southwest, the Arizona Daily Star, published every morning of the year by W. R. Mathews and Clare R. Ellinwood, Tucson, Ariz. I read:

Regardless of what opinions one may have on the occupation of Japan, one thing has become apparent from official statements. A struggle is going on within the State Department, within the White House, and within the War Department over the matter of official policy in connection with Japan. That Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson dares to rebuff General MacArthur—

That is what the press is saying—dares to rebuff General MacArthur, would indicate that the so-called liberals who champion a policy of "Russia is always right, or Britain is always right, but America is always wrong" are winning out.

For instance, General MacArthur announces that 200,000 men will be sufficient to disarm Japan, and that the occupation need not be a prolonged job. General Elcheberger, another successful general, is on the spot and agrees with this estimate. After the successful campaign these men have conducted, it would seem that they are qualified to speak.

But no, they are not.

Instead of jubilation or relief back in Washington, General MacArthur's announcement brings anger and disappointment. The plans of some of the young liberals like Mr. Acheson have been upset. They want to reform Japan, as well as Germany and Italy. They plan for Japan an economic and social revolution.

That is their interpretation of the release. This is the editor of the Tucson paper speaking.

Mr. Acheson boldly says that "whatever it takes to carry out this policy will be used to carry it out"—

This is the editor of the Tucson, Ariz., paper speaking. This is not my interpretation, this is his interpretation, and editors throughout the country have interpreted it in the same vein—

and that "occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy."

Those words of Mr. Acheson call for sober, even solemn, consideration by the American people. Their implications are far-reaching. They mean that demobilization—

I wish to get into the RECORD this statement from this editor:

They mean that demobilization will have to be slowed down and indefinitely prolonged to allow Mr. Acheson and his subordinates to carry out their "economic and social revolution."

American soldiers are going to be kept in Japan in larger numbers than military experts like General MacArthur and General Elcheberger say are necessary.

The confidence with which this bureaucrat tells Congress and the people of the country what they are going to do is only matched by the way President Truman has since equivocated on his first spontaneous approval of General MacArthur's announcement. Somebody has spoken in firm enough tones to President Truman to cause him to speak evasively where once he spoke frankly. When people are evasive they know something which they are afraid to tell about.

I wish to stop in the reading of this editorial and suggest again to the Senate that this raises the whole question of policy making. Who has been consulted in regard to the policy making heretofore? Who in the United States Senate or what committee was consulted about the Potsdam agreement, the occupation of Germany, or of Japan? As the White House announcement said, the United States alone is dictating the policy for Japan, because in this release that is given out it is said that even though it has to be done by the United States alone, they are going to carry out this so-called revolution over there in Japan, so that they can disarm Japan and prevent Japan being an aggressive nation.

I say, who makes the policy? Does not the Senate advise and consent? We are certainly doing so today in connection with the pending nomination. Do we not help make the policy?

Let us remember the discussion that took place at the time the extension of the reciprocal-trade agreements was before us. By the way, this man Acheson was for them, this same man Acheson who sold Bretton Woods to the people of this country. Look at his record. I have had only a few hours, over the week end, to look it over, but we find this man ready to go the limit in spending the taxpayers' money all over the world. This is the man, the next Under Secretary of State, or perhaps the Secretary of State, who will pass upon the reduction in schedules under the reciprocal trade agreements, this man who has declared himself for all these international benefits and reliefs.

Since we had the reciprocal trade extension matter up in the Senate, there have been instances throughout the country indicating to us a question whether we should have made such reductions in the schedules. There is the matter of the importation of potatoes from Canada. I understand that nearly a million bushels have come in, and we have to absorb those and pay the support price. There are so many potatoes in some of the States that the people cannot take them, and they are being sent to the dehydrating plants, and even Europe cannot buy them.

I say to Senators from the Middle Western States, this is the man who is to pass on the reduction of schedules under the reciprocal trade agreements. I cannot afford to have my record show that I joined in unanimously confirming this man's nomination, if he is going to reduce the schedules so as to work a hardship against the farmers of the State of Nebraska.

Another matter this policy question brings up, of course, is the matter of the demobilization of the Army, and I am certainly interested in that. Demobilization is completely dependent upon our policy both in Europe and Asia. The Senator from Texas will find many people writing him about whether or not we are going to keep soldiers in the Pacific area, and foster a revolution. He will receive many communications about that. The mothers and fathers are writing me, and writing with tears in their eyes, in an effort to get the boys home as soon as they can, and our job is to see that after we have permanently secured peace in Japan the boys are brought home.

I will go just as far as will any Member of the United States Senate on the terms necessary to assure a permanent peace, and I think they are set out in the Potsdam agreement. I will support them wholeheartedly. But if it amounts to going into a policy about which we know nothing, and which has not been clarified, which will result in a longer time being taken for demobilization, then certainly I shall stand on this floor and call it to the attention of the Senate if I am the only man who does so, and if I am the only one who votes against the confirmation. I can go back to my people with a clean record and tell them that the blood of American boys is not on my hands for fostering a revolution which might take hundreds of thousands of lives before it is ever put down. I read from the statement:

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government and is still held, so far as I know, and I think I know.

I wish now to put into the RECORD a resolution that was offered by Mr. COFFEE, a Democratic Member of the House of Representatives, calling for an investigation. This was in the Seventy-seventh Congress, in 1941. The resolution called for a thorough investigation into the sale of oil and scrap iron to Japan. I want the resolution in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That there is hereby created a special joint congressional committee (hereinafter referred to as the "committee") to be composed of five Senators, to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and five Members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The committee shall select a chairman from among its members. It shall be the duty of the committee to make a full and complete investigation with respect to the extent to which, the sources from

which, the manner in which, and the mediums through which, the so-called Axis Powers are obtaining or have obtained essential war materials from the Western Hemisphere. The committee shall report to the Senate and to the House of Representatives at the earliest practicable time the results of its study and investigation, together with its recommendations, if any, for necessary legislation.

For the purposes of this concurrent resolution the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-seventh and succeeding Congresses, to employ such clerical and other assistants, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per 100 words. The committee shall have power to employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it deems necessary for the performance of its duties. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and agencies of the Government. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$20,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers approved by the chairman.

Mr. WHERRY. I wish to say that this man the Senate is about to confirm—I realize, of course, that the administration has the votes—went before a committee in defense of a rule which prevented the investigation of the sale of oil and scrap iron to Japan late in 1941. I cannot give the statement, because the record was executive, but I have the facts on good authority, and I can make the statement.

Here we find a policy in 1941 which is to appease Japan, to sell oil to Japan, to sell scrap iron to Japan. Today we find a policy to appease some other country, but to press down the iron heel on Japan. What is the policy today? If the policy of 1941 was the correct policy, this man Acheson has now made a complete about-face in his attitude.

Mr. President, I do not have any of the executive records. They are not available. But if any Member of the Senate wants me to give him the names of those who can furnish information, I will give them, and Senators can make the investigation themselves.

Mr. President, I read from the editorial in the Arizona Daily Star of Tucson, Ariz., as follows:

The resignation of Mr. Grew takes on a new importance. His moderating influence, an influence whose value can be measured by the hundreds of thousands of lives saved by the early surrender, has been supplanted by those whose ambitions appear so far to be alarming.

The astounding part about this development is that civilians in our Government, of unproven competence, seem more anxious to use our armed forces extensively than the men who did the fighting and have proven their competence to speak.

Thus we see the spectacle of a bureaucrat like Mr. Acheson boldly slapping a great and successful general like General MacArthur in public and getting away with it. With apparent confidence that the public will not realize the far-reaching implications of what

his words mean, he speaks of carrying out a "social and economic revolution" in Japan "regardless of cost."

American soldiers and American money, "regardless of cost," are going to be used to carry out a policy the people of the country know nothing about.

Mr. President, did anyone know anything about that policy? I did not know anything about it until last Thursday.

When the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] replies, and I know he is anxiously waiting the opportunity to reply, I ask that he tell the Senate whether he knew about this policy and this social and economic revolution some are about to start in Japan, and if the Senator did know about it, will he tell us why the Senate of the United States has not been informed about it? I am held responsible by the people I represent, and I have a right as a Member of this body to know what the policy is.

I continue to read from the editorial in the Arizona Daily Star:

That is what is going to happen unless the people and the men in the armed services arouse sufficient opposition in Congress to stop this gross misuse of American power.

Mr. President, I have not met the editor of the Tucson (Ariz.) Daily Star. I know nothing about the standing of that newspaper in its community. I think, however, the editorial is one of the finest I have ever read. I think it contains much good sense. I think it is time the American people woke up to the need for knowing what policy we are going to have in Japan.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial from the Charlotte (N. C.) Observer. I have met the editor of the Charlotte Observer. I am not sure how much prestige that newspaper has throughout the South, but the editor of that newspaper writes some of the finest editorials that have come to my attention. This particular editorial deals with the misuse of power and the way MacArthur's name has been blackened, and also deals with the question of what our future policy toward Japan is going to be. It is an outstanding editorial and, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this editorial, which corroborates the editorial from which I just read, published in the Tucson (Ariz.) Daily Star, be placed in the RECORD at this point.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. REED] suggests that I read it. I should like to read it, but I do not wish unduly to delay the Senate on the vote on my motion.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KID GLOVES OR MAILED FIST?

Since the Japanese surrender, this newspaper has been disposed to leave all important decisions on the occupation of Japan up to General MacArthur on the ground that, as a man long experienced in the Orient and having the most potent of personal reasons for dealing sternly with the enemy, he knew more about the situation than we could possibly know at this distance.

Yet the general's expressed hope that 200,000 men will be enough for an occupation army has aroused some misgivings.

That number of men seems to be very small to control a warlike nation of 80,000,000 people who continue to give evidence

that they do not yet realize that they are a beaten country.

General MacArthur did not say positively that 200,000 men would be enough. He merely hoped that, in view of the smoothness with which the occupation has proceeded so far, it would be enough.

But even this hope has given another ground for outcry by those who are incensed by what they call the "kid-glove" policy of General MacArthur toward the beaten foe.

They have heard the stories of Japanese cruelties to prisoners that surpassed in bestiality anything the Germans had conceived. They have read the blustering statements of Japanese military leaders that their country will come back as a great power and that the present reverse is only temporary. They contend, therefore, that the Japanese should be given some of their own medicine in the form of a harsh and merciless occupation.

There is ground for those misgivings. But on the other side we have this to the credit of General MacArthur:

Utilizing the authority of the Emperor instead of the force of American arms, he has dissolved the Japanese military organization, disbanded several militaristic societies, and brought about the formation of a new government and a new diet under the leadership of men who were imprisoned for opposing the old military clique.

All but a very few of the major war criminals on the wanted list have been brought in by the Japanese themselves and are now in Yokohama prison awaiting trial.

American prisoners of war have been returned in a steady procession to Allied hands.

The Japanese news and propaganda agencies have been put under the strictest censorship and have been forced to stop using language that gives the impression that the Japs are not beaten.

The general promises further that the Japanese educational system will have a thorough going-over to eradicate all teachings leading to the superman and Son of Heaven philosophies.

The occupation of Japan was entirely different from that of Germany, whose armies had been destroyed on her own soil. The Japanese Army was intact; no foreign soldier had set foot on her homeland. There was not even a friendly underground to help the occupying armies.

Consequently, MacArthur had to move with all the caution of a man closing on a treacherous enemy in the dark. A mistake might have been fatal.

That he made no such mistake is a great item to his credit.

Japan has lost her navy, her merchant marine, her industries, her empire. Her army is disbanded, her government in the hands of former prisoners, her national heroes awaiting trial like common criminals, her Emperor acting merely as the mouthpiece of a conquering commander.

It is not necessary to be brutal in order to make Japan feel our strength. She has felt it already, and with all her sources of trade and raw materials gone she will feel it for a century to come.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, it has been my effort to show the Senate what is being said in editorials carried in outstanding newspapers throughout the country. The newspapers to which I have referred are not "red sheets." Oh, some may say that "Senator WHERRY is frightened over what 'red sheets' are saying." But I am quoting from expressions of opinion carried in outstanding newspapers, as the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY] suggested that I do. I have introduced into the RECORD editorials from outstanding newspapers,

which are concerned about America's future policy, which are concerned about America's armed forces, which are concerned about our boys in the armed services, and are concerned over demobilization, as well as over our huge governmental Budget. The editorials I have presented came from newspapers located throughout the United States, and I ask the Senators to take note of what they say.

Mr. President, I have not asked that the nomination be rejected. I simply wish to have the nomination recommended to the Foreign Relations Committee, to give us an opportunity for further investigation to determine whether the nomination to become Under Secretary of State. I ask the Senator from Texas to tell the Senate, if he rises to answer, whether the committee gave much consideration to the nomination. I do not know whether the committee did. I do not question the action taken, by the Foreign Relations Committee. I ordinarily vote to accept the judgment of the committee. Even the other day I would have voted for the confirmation of this man on the recommendation of the committee. I have always accepted the committee's recommendation. Except in one or two instances I have gone along with the administration because I believe the administration in developing its own program and making its own record it must make the decision as to who shall be called upon to carry out the program and policy of the administration.

But in view of the events of the past few days and even the past few hours, which have been brought to my attention, as well as editorials and newspaper comment, I believe more time should be taken for consideration of the nomination before the Senate acts on it. I believe that those who wish to should be permitted to present their views, so we may find out what the policy of the United States is going to be relative to the so-called economic and social revolution which it is proposed to bring about in Japan at whatever the cost may be. That policy has not been clarified by Mr. Acheson's answer. It may be said that the administration has made answer. I cannot see anything in the administration's answer that has clarified the situation. I think it ought to be clarified. I am sincere in that statement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article by Paxton Howard, published in the Progressive, a newspaper which I diligently read. Mr. Howard reviews the condition to which Japan has been reduced today, and what lies in store for us if we seek a peace of vengeance.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FLAG OF HOPE—OR OF HATE?

(By Harry Paxton Howard)

Gen. Douglas MacArthur on September 8 drove into Tokyo, capital of defeated Japan, with a single squadron of American cavalry. As happens with other Americans at times, his auto broke down en route. He waited in the Yokohama road 15 minutes, then got another car to carry him into the devastated capital.

The Japanese Government offered to line the 3-mile route with armed police. The American general declined. Near the Imperial Palace the squadron of Seventh Cavalry alighted from their trucks for the short march to the American Embassy. There, General MacArthur stood alone before Lieutenant General Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army, which is now garrisoning Tokyo, and said:

"General Eichelberger, have our country's flag unfurled and in Tokyo's sun let it wave in its full glory as a symbol of hope for the oppressed and as a harbinger of victory for the right."

Such is the spirit that may, if carried out with sincerity and loyalty, mean a new day for Japan and for the world. "Symbol of hope for the oppressed. Harbinger of victory for the right." But the very day that this was proclaimed in Tokyo, some newspapers in the United States were furiously demanding that we be "tough" with the oppressed people of Japan, that we hang the Emperor who had accepted our drastic terms for surrender, that we should cynically ignore and violate all the promises of popular liberation that we made at Potsdam, that we should treat the surrendered people with a brutality and violence outdoing anything the British have done in India or the Soviet in Poland. "We are being too soft," screamed the stay-at-home patriots. "When a yellow man is down, kick him."

Whether we hold the flag "as a symbol of hope for the oppressed," and faithfully fulfill our promises for a free Japan liberated from the militarists who plunged their country into the terrible holocaust of war, or whether we make the American flag a symbol of oppression and revenge on a prostrate people, with American militarists replacing Japanese as ruthless oppressors, is more than a question of morality and sentiment. It concerns the entire future of the Far East, our reputation, our standing in the eyes of Asiatic peoples, our chances for enduring peace. No peace can rest on a policy of hatred and insensate revenge on a beaten people.

There is nothing mysterious about the Japanese mind. I lived in Japan for 5 years. I was myself a victim of the Japanese police, and was finally deported by the Japanese Government. Some of the finest people I have ever known were deliberately murdered by Japanese militarists and armed police. Scores of outstanding persons whom I never met were similarly murdered by militarist and patriot-maniac assassins. Those victims had and have my warm and sincere sympathy—as they should have that of every decent, freedom-loving, peace-loving American.

The victims of whom I am writing were Japanese—Japanese labor men, Japanese Socialists and Syndicalists, Japanese businessmen, Japanese politicians, Japanese pacifists. They were of various origins and viewpoints—like Americans who love peace and who love democracy. But they opposed, from one viewpoint or another, the rule of the Japanese military gangs, the subordination of Japanese life to the requirements of military expansion, the suppression of civil liberty in one aspect or another in Japan. So they were murdered.

What shall we say of these people? Were they "bestial apes," as the New York Herald Tribune and Mayor LaGuardia scream? Were they "feudal minded" barbarians, as the poison papers of Marshall Field and William Randolph Hearst tell us in their daily doses of viciousness and hatred? Or were they people with whom we could really cooperate for a peaceful and stable world, with the power of militarists forever ended and imperialism replaced by the free cooperation of equal peoples?

It is remarkable that the most vicious, hate-mongering, racist elements in the American press are in essential agreement

with the Japanese militarists whom they most violently denounce. It is repeatedly their assertion, as it has been that of the Japanese militarists, that Japan is "unfit" for democracy; that the Japanese people are a special "breed" who don't want such "western importations." If we are looking for something mysterious in human mentality, we may find it in this meeting of American imperialist and Japanese imperialist minds.

But there is basically nothing mysterious about it. They are minds which are essentially hostile to all the ideals of equal liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and to life itself upon which democracy is based. They are the forces which have pushed us forward in the past and are pushing us forward today toward Asiatic dominion. Our Republic was based upon a rebellion against imperial domination, upon our right to be free. These people would make us the great world empire, with the American flag the symbol of ruthless might and aggressive domination over weaker peoples.

The United States chose a way of expansion which was unique in the world. We were established as a republic, but our colonists moved toward open land, and repeatedly came in conflict with the Indian inhabitants. There were brutal wars of aggression and conquest. We are as capable of such things as are any people. But at the very foundation of the Republic, the founding fathers in their wisdom devised a system by which we would not become a new empire, ruling over subject peoples and territories on this continent.

Virginia, far the greatest of the original States, did not become hegemonic in a group of 13 States, and extend the power of this group westward to the Pacific. Instead, it was specifically laid down that new territories acquired should be entitled and should be prepared for self-government, and that when self-governing institutions were established they could apply for admission to the Union as States.

Virginia voluntarily gave up its great territories west of the Appalachians. And we expanded westward. However devious, brutal, and aggressive much of our expansion has been, the fundamental virtues of our system kept us a republic. Our flag advanced to the shores of the Pacific, and the "conquered" territories became free and self-governing States. Their native inhabitants did not remain "subjects." Ultimately, they became citizens of the great Republic.

Our system was not perfect. There has been discrimination, exploitation, injustice. We have not achieved Utopia, and never shall. But we devised for the first time in history a program for democratic expansion which was basically sound and effective. And in terms of human freedom and welfare some of the "conquered" Western States rank higher than some of the "original" Eastern. Some of the original States, through the terrible anachronism of slavery and its after-products of inequality and discrimination, still rank far below most States in the essentials of democracy. But even they have not retrograded. They have come up from slavery, and their peoples are increasingly calling for and gaining the realities of democratic life.

But this great process of democratic expansion, by which we developed from a little federation of 2,000,000 people to a mighty Republic of 135,000,000 in 48 States, stopped at the shore of the Pacific. Beyond the vast ocean lay Asia—not a field for American colonization, but only a field for empire. No provision had ever been made in the American Constitution for our flag to wave over permanently subject peoples. But when we were pushed—in 1898—into war in the Far East, we became an active participant in the struggle for Asiatic dominion. It was a concept basically hostile to the whole democratic fabric upon which our Republic was founded. But we got into it, and became the allies

instead of the enemies of Imperial domination over subject peoples.

We no longer play a minor part in these struggles for Asiatic dominion. We now play the major part. We have become the dominant power in the western Pacific, with a foothold on the Asiatic Continent itself. We may accept the idea of a permanent conflict for ultimate domination, and look forward to war with the Soviet Union—which has now become the dominant power on the continent of Asia, but we do so at our peril. For the atomic age is one of lightning and terrible destruction, and our great and teeming cities are the most perfect targets in the world. If we are to survive, we must use our tremendous weight and influence for the organization of permanent peace.

But whatever the future is to be, the relentless logic of our treatment of Japan is that we must be honorable and just to our defeated foes. Unless we follow this, we have no claim to put anyone on trial as a war criminal. Asiatic peoples are watching us today. And the Japanese people are watching most closely, to see whether we are going to be tough to the people and soft to the militarists.

If our country cannot be saved from the Imperialists who look forward to another war a generation hence, we have no choice. We must have the Japanese as our allies, and must treat them with this in view. If we are to move forward in Asia toward the great goals of our own Republic—the cooperation of free and democratic peoples in a free world—we again have no choice. We must have the Japanese, and other Asiatic peoples, as our friends and collaborators in the building of that world.

This is the logic, and the only logic, of the situation. Whatever we may do toward Japanese militarists, it must be guided by justice and not revenge, and must aim at the ultimate end of destroying completely their influence over Japanese political life, in order that the forces of Japanese democracy may grow and strengthen themselves free from terrorism and violence.

If we single out, justly and properly, the militarists who have been the enemies of peace and democracy in the Far East, we shall find—as we are already finding—ever-increasing numbers of Japanese who will look to us as friends and liberators. But if our "trials" are to be lynchings of the yellow men, we shall rouse a terrible and lasting hatred which can only play into the hands of all our enemies in Asia and elsewhere, and make inevitable a real war for survival a generation hence.

Which road shall we take? What is the meaning of the American flag to be during the days, months, and years to come? Is it to be what a British visitor bitterly termed it after a trip to the slave South a century ago, before the Civil War:

"Where bastard freedom waves
Her fustian flag in mockery over slaves?"

Or is it to be, as General MacArthur said in simple words at Tokyo, "a symbol of hope for the oppressed and a harbinger of victory for the right?"

Which shall it be? The decision is in our hands.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I am not asking a hard peace or a soft peace. I am asking for a peace that will do what the American people want done in the Pacific area—a peace which will be permanent, which will be lasting. Some experts say that not for years and years will there be any difficulty in connection with the subjugation of the Japanese; that they are there on their little islands; that they have to work out their own social and economic problems; that they have little food and clothing;

that they have no army—and what more are we asking for?

Mr. President, in concluding my remarks I wish to say that I am for just as hard a peace as anyone favors—a peace which will make certain that the Japanese will not again become aggressors. But I am not for starting any revolution in Japan which will involve the sacrifice of the lives of thousands of American boys. I do not want our boys sacrificed if it is unnecessary that such sacrifice be made. I favor the speediest demobilization of the Japanese armed forces that promptly can be done.

Mr. President, in all sincerity I submit to the Senate and to the majority leader that the nomination be recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations so we may have an opportunity to investigate into the nominee's background, in order that we may find what future policies he favors, so we may know what the policies of the United States Government are going to be. I think that should be done before we vote on his nomination. I respectfully ask Members of the Senate to cooperate to that end; and if the nominee's record is clear, I shall be the first one on the floor of the Senate to vote in full support of Mr. Acheson.

I now yield the floor.

Mr. WHERRY subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks in connection with my motion to recommit the pending nomination to the Foreign Relations Committee, a portion of an editorial entitled "The Emperor's Status" from the New York Times of September 22, 1944. It states, among other things, what the Japanese Government understood with reference to the interpretation to be placed upon the Potsdam ultimatum.

There being no objection, the portion of the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE EMPEROR'S STATUS

The Potsdam ultimatum to which Tokyo ultimately yielded called not only for the destruction of Japan's war-making powers but also for the elimination for all time of "the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest." This was to be followed by the general democratization of the country.

A good beginning in carrying out this program has already been made. More than three-quarters of the Japanese home army has been disarmed and disbanded; many of the most notorious war criminals have been put behind lock and key. Japan's economic system is being brought under Allied control, and the latest instructions call for a purge of all extreme nationalists from positions of power and influence in presumably both Government and private enterprise. To have accomplished all this with the limited forces at their disposal and without any incidents is a brilliant achievement, for which full credit should be given to General MacArthur and all his men.

But there is one fundamental problem on which all others depend, a problem that must still be solved, and this is what to do with the Japanese Emperor, who as god, emperor, high priest, and titular owner of all Japan, is at the head of the whole Japanese economic and social system. Does he, whose signature and seal adorn all the imperial rescripts exhorting Japan to war, belong among those "extreme nationalists" who deceived

and misled the Japanese people, or are only his subjects and subordinates in this category? That inquiry raises the further question as to just what commitments we have incurred by agreeing to deal with the Emperor.

There is obvious confusion on this point not only in the minds of the Japanese but also in the minds of many Americans. The Japanese Government accepted the Potsdam ultimatum "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler." On the basis of this understanding, the Emperor himself proclaimed that he had been "able to save and maintain the structure of the imperial state." And Japan's acceptance of this understanding as an agreement and an Allied obligation was further underlined by Premier Higashi-Kuni in a speech in the Diet in which he cited the Japanese proviso without amplifying it with the Allied answer. Yet it is this answer which must govern Allied action, and this answer involves no Allied obligation toward the Emperor whatsoever.

In his reply to the Japanese acceptance note State Secretary Byrnes clarified the Allied position toward the Japanese "understanding" in the following words:

From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the supreme commander of the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. . . .

The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I also ask to have printed in the RECORD an article from a newspaper—I assume the New York Times—having to do with the number of forces we shall need in the occupied territories in the European theater.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES ACTS TO SPEED FREEDOM IN REICH—ALL BUT TOP JOBS LIKELY TO BE YIELDED IN 15 MONTHS—ELECTION SCHEDULE DRAWN

BERLIN, September 21.—Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's command apparently hopes to end American military government in Germany, except for the top over-all posts, within the next 15 months. Military officers will be withdrawn steadily from civil administration posts as elections produce German officials competent to assume authority. United States group control council headquarters confirmed today.

This tentative election schedule has been set:

January: Gemeiden—communities ranging from rural hamlets to towns of about 20,000 population.

March: Landkreisen—equivalent of American counties.

May: Stadtkreisen—larger towns and cities.

October: Laender—states.

At present the lowest level of the military government is a detachment in charge of a landkreis. Under present plans these assignments would be eliminated as soon as possible after the March vote. By current estimates, German state governments could be expected to take office by November or December 1946, and thereafter United States supervisors would be needed only in zonal affairs.

Generally, officials look for the United States occupation army—already scheduled to be reduced to fewer than 400,000 men by spring—to be a mere token force of a few thousand a year hence.

"An occupation army has only one function—to present police power," said a civil-affairs expert, and it must be admitted that, contrary to expectations, we have not had to call upon the Army for help. The Germans have obeyed us without resistance."

OTHER POWERS MUST ACT

Because the occupation of Germany is a four-power affair, however, it may be necessary to persuade other Allied nations to reduce their military establishments here before the American force reaches its final token size.

Germans in the United States zone as yet have produced only rudimentary evidence of political interest. There is no political inertia among the scattered Communists who outlasted the Nazi persecution, but among the masses who formerly belonged to other pre-Hitler parties, interest is practically nil.

A people's party of Catholic elements has appeared in Bavaria, while at Frankfurt on the Main both Communists and Social Democrats conducted rallies after American authorities belatedly followed Russia's example and permitted Germans to assemble publicly.

The American plan is for each certified non-Nazi Party to enter candidates in the forthcoming elections. In the Soviet zone, a hard and fast combination of Communists and Social Democrats is expected to win any vote. Marshal Georgi K. Zhukoff, Russian military administrator in Germany, permits, even if Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats now allied with them in a union should split away.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nebraska for his willingness to yield a moment ago.

The Committee on Foreign Relations has handled this nomination and made its report to the Senate. We know Mr. Acheson, and have known him for many years. He has been Assistant Secretary of State for a considerable period, and he will remain Assistant Secretary of State unless his nomination to be Under Secretary is confirmed.

So I suggest to the Senator from Nebraska that if Mr. Acheson is as bad a man as he thinks he is—

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Acheson had already resigned from the position as Assistant Secretary.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I am in error. I suppose he resigned in view of this appointment. He was out only a day or two, and I had overlooked that fact.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Apparently there was no relation between the two events. It is generally understood that he had resigned and retired, and this other matter came up subsequently. I do not think there is any relation between the two.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator. In a conversation with Mr. Acheson he told me that he intended to resign as Assistant Secretary, and that it had no relationship whatever to the other appointment. I presume this matter arose subsequent to his resignation.

Mr. President, I believe that the Senator from Nebraska is unduly alarmed. He speaks about the policies which Mr. Acheson advocates, and the policies which he is going to make. Mr. Acheson does not make the policies. He is only Under Secretary of State. Above him is the Secretary of State, and above him is the President of the United States, who is charged with the responsibility of formulating our foreign policy.

There is no reason for sending this nomination back to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I am sure that the minority members of the committee will corroborate my statement when I say that the Foreign Relations Committee has endeavored to handle these questions with no partisan spirit. I do not think there would be any advantage in sending this nomination back to the committee.

At this point I should like to place in the Record, for the benefit of the Senator from Nebraska, a complete biographical sketch of Mr. Acheson. I will not read it all, because it is too long. He was born in Middletown, Conn.

There being no objection, the biographical sketch was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEAN G. ACHESON

Born Middletown, Conn., April 11, 1893; Groton School graduate; Yale, A. B. 1915; Harvard, LL. B. 1918; member of bar of District of Columbia; United States Navy, 1918-19, ensign; private secretary to Associate Justice of United States Supreme Court, 1919-21; law practice, 1921-33, 1934-41; Under Secretary of Treasury, 1933; appointed Assistant Secretary of State February 1, 1941; member Foreign Service Personnel Board, Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service and Foreign Service School Board, 1941-; chairman Executive Committee on Commercial Policy, 1941-44; chairman Board of Economic Operations, October 9, 1941 to June 24, 1943; member Frozen Funds Commission, 1941-; member Requirements Commission, War Production Board, 1942; director, Office of Foreign Economic Coordination, June 24-November 6, 1943; chairman, Policy Committee and Coordinating Commission, Committee for Economic Policy in Liberated Areas, 1943; United States member of the Council, first session of Council of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Atlantic City, N. J., 1943; member, Department of State Policy Commission, January 15, 1944; member, Department of State Committee on Postwar Programs, January 15, 1944; chairman, Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, June 20, 1944; delegate, United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, N. H., 1944. Legal resident of Maryland.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, there is nothing deep, dark, or dismal about Mr. Acheson. He has been around Washington for many years. He was formerly Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and of late years has been an Assistant Secretary of State. He is a resident of the State of Maryland. I am sure that the Senators from Maryland can advise the Senator as to his character and standing. At one time he was a member of probably the most powerful law firm in the city. He retired from private practice at considerable expense and sacrifice to enter the State Department at the specific request of Mr. Hull, who had a particular job which he thought he could do.

After his resignation, as suggested by the Senator from Maine, he intended to reenter private practice. He told me how anxious he was to return to his private practice; that the compensation of Assistant Secretary of State was very meager, and that he wished to return to his old firm, where the remuneration would be much greater. I presume he was persuaded by Secretary Byrnes to take the Under Secretaryship.

It seems to me that the Senator from Nebraska is about to magnify, expand, and inflate what is a very trivial matter into something which may become of tremendous importance within Japan, in its effect upon her people, and even upon a good many of our people here at home.

I wish to read the outrageous statement which Mr. Acheson issued. Here is the crime. Here is the bloody body. Here is the broken window through which the burglar climbed. Here is the mutilated figure of the innocent occupant of the house. I shall read from a stenographic report of what he said. Newspaper people are inquisitive. They are sometimes really almost impertinent in the questions they ask. Of course, that does not apply to any of those now in the press gallery [laughter], but there are some like that. This is from the stenographic report:

Sir, there were reports that you were disturbed over some of the recent statements made by General MacArthur. Do you have any comment to make on the occupation?

Answer. Well, I have not any comment to make on the state of my own being. That is not a very important matter.

I have no comment to make on the military aspects of what General MacArthur stated. That is a purely military matter with which the State Department is not properly concerned.

Is there anything wrong about that? It was a military matter as to how many troops would be required to occupy Japan. That was a military matter, and it was perfectly appropriate for General MacArthur to express his opinion on that subject, but normally that opinion would not go to the newspapers. Normally it would come up through appropriate channels to the Chief of Staff, and then to the President of the United States. General MacArthur saw fit to put it in the newspapers. I am not objecting to that. I am not criticizing that course. However, all Senators know that when a subordinate military commander has something to report, or some suggestions as to policies, the practice is to send it up through channels. But General MacArthur did not do so. That is all right. The Under Secretary of State says—and I think very appropriately—that that is a purely military matter, with which the State Department is not properly concerned. Does the Senator from Nebraska challenge that statement by Mr. Acheson? Does he challenge the statement of Mr. Acheson when he says that that is a military matter? He said, "I have no comment to make on it." Is there anything wrong with that?

I am trying to find the terrible attack which he made upon General MacArthur, and the humiliating rebuke which he gave him. I have read the statement

over a number of times, and I cannot locate anywhere in it a humiliating rebuke to General MacArthur.

Mr. Acheson further says:

I think I can say that I am surprised that anybody can foresee at this time the number of forces which will be necessary in Japan.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Without taking sides in this dispute, I think that is where he stubbed his toe. Having said that he could not talk on military matters, he immediately said that he was surprised that anyone should have an opinion on the subject. I am perfectly neutral in this controversy, but I believe that Mr. Acheson violated the principle which he had just stated.

Mr. CONNALLY. I read that not to justify it in its entirety, but to try to find out wherein lies the terrible attack. I do not believe that that is a terrible attack. He said that he was surprised that anyone should have an opinion on the subject. Let me say to the Senator from Maine that the estimates with regard to the occupation forces in Japan have already been changed several times. At first it was said that 900,000 men would be required to occupy Japan and the contiguous islands. General MacArthur changed his own mind very quickly, because instead of 17 divisions, which he wanted at the outset, he changed it to 6. Then he changed it to 3, and then to 2. If General MacArthur, who can make no mistakes as to estimates and no mistakes in statements to the press, has changed his own estimates four or five times, is there any basis for anyone to complain when someone says, "I do not know, and I do not know anyone else who knows just how many men will be required to occupy Japan"?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to ask the Senator a question. Does the Senator feel that if General MacArthur had not made public the release stating that he could occupy Japan with 200,000 men, the American people would ever have received the information if it had to come through Mr. Acheson?

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say to the Senator—

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator answer the question?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; I will answer it. I am not evading the question. The Senator boasted when he started his speech that he was in possession of some military knowledge which he had obtained from high military officers whose names he could not divulge. Why is it that the Senator can have that sort of information, and cannot divulge it to the American people? If he is so anxious for the American people to have it, why does he not give it to them?

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator please answer my question?

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator is debating an important question on the floor of the Senate, and withholding from the Senate and from the American people certain vital information.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator answer my question?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; I shall answer it in a moment, when it is appropriate to answer it and when I come to it in the logical development of my remarks.

Mr. WHERRY. If the Senator is going to do that, I should like to suggest—

Mr. CONNALLY. Let the Senator go ahead and suggest.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator referred to the logical development of his remarks. I should like to have the Senator be logical and answer my question.

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator think the release would have been made public if it had not been made by General MacArthur?

Mr. CONNALLY. Of course it would.

Mr. WHERRY. Then I should like to ask another question.

Mr. CONNALLY. I ask the Senator to wait a minute; let me answer one question at a time. Those in authority would have gone right straight to the Senator from Nebraska, just as they did with other military secrets, and the Senator would have immediately put it in the newspapers, as he put this matter in the newspapers; and so it would have gotten to the people, even though it is claimed that Mr. Acheson tried to suppress it.

Mr. WHERRY. Would it have gone to the Senate?

Mr. CONNALLY. Let me answer the Senator. It would have gone to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary of State, and then they would have sent it to the President.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall yield in a moment.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to ask the Senator where he got that information.

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall yield in a moment. The Senator refused to yield to several Senators on one or two occasions. I shall yield to enable the Senator to ask any questions he may wish to ask, but I shall do so in my own way and in my own time.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield now, in his own way and in his own time?

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall yield in a moment. If the Senator will cool himself off a little, that will help. I know he is heated up. He is like a fox hound that sees a victim, and he is spurred on by his enthusiasm of some years hence.

Mr. President, the Senator said it would not be known. The Foreign Relations Committee is here. We have honored members of the committee on both sides of the aisle. We are not going to conceal from the American people anything they should know. We would have known it. We knew the estimates. First, they said it would take 900,000 men. Was that information concealed from the American people? They found out everything about that.

So the whole matter is merely an unjustified attack upon the War Department, the State Department, and all others concerned, charging that they are concealing something from the people of the United States.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me for a moment, I should like to say that General Eisenhower estimated it would take between 500,000 and 600,000 United States soldiers to occupy the section of Germany which we are to occupy. Subsequently he reduced that number, not through the newspapers, but through the general channels of the War Department; and General Marshall himself gave out the information that the number had been reduced to 400,000.

Mr. CONNALLY. Of course that is so.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall yield in a moment.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for the suggestion he just made. As I suggested earlier in my remarks, if either one of these generals in the field wishes to make a recommendation, the thing for him to do is to send it through the proper channels to the Chief of Staff, and it will go from him to the President of the United States.

Let me say to the Senator from Nebraska that in one breath he says he does not wish to see in Japan a rebellion which will cost the lives of 200,000 Americans, but in the next breath he says that Japan is prostrate, unarmed, and cannot move a muscle. Yet he is worried about a military uprising in Japan. I say to the Senator that I want to see our boys return home at the earliest possible moment. I have used such feeble powers as I possess to that end. I have talked to the Chief of Staff, I have talked to the Secretary of War, and I have made remarks here on the floor of the Senate. All of us want the boys to come home. But when we have met and announced a statement in regard to Japan, namely, that we wish to pursue a policy toward Japan which will eradicate the war lust from the Japanese system, because we do not want another war in a few years, we should use whatever number of men it requires to occupy Japan until we can make our late enemy realize that war does not pay. Until we can make them come to the conclusion that their military ambitions are not going to be recognized in this world. I am in favor of keeping in Japan the number of men necessary to perform that task. I do not wish to see the world plunged into another great World War; and the Senator from Nebraska should know, and I think he does know, that in Japan, probably even to a greater extent than in Germany, there is a fanatical military spirit which builds up their ego and makes them think they are the conquerors of the world and a superior race. We wish to do whatever is necessary to be done to drive out that spirit. That is what Mr. Acheson was talking about when he said in his statement, which has been characterized as a terrible assault on General MacArthur—and let me say to the Senator from Maine that he apologized for what he said, which is what the Senator from Maine criticized, as follows:

That may come from my inadequate knowledge of the military field.

However, that is not very important. He was not assuming to determine the

matter. He said he had inadequate knowledge.

What he had to say was that the determination of the number of men needed is a military question and a military problem, to be determined by the military authorities, but, after all, under the higher level of the President and the civilian control of this Government. Is there anything wrong with his statement that the military are simply the instruments of higher policy? In the war the military performed the battle duty; but the fields of its activity, the places where it would attack, and the agencies through which it would carry on its military duty were all determined by the civilian authority, by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Marshal Stalin, and other heads of governments. The military is an instrument. It is not itself the repository of power.

Next I shall refer to another portion of Mr. Acheson's statement; or at least, I shall do so when the consultation on the other side of the Chamber has concluded. I yield four minutes to the Senators on the other side of the aisle, until they can confer and get through with their joint statement.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding 4 minutes to me. The argument which the Senator has been presenting—

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I observe that the conference is over.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the Senator yielded to me for 4 minutes.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I make the point of order that a Senator who has the floor cannot parcel out his time to any other Senator.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. I have made a rather careful examination of both the statement of General MacArthur and the statement of Dean Acheson, since the last meeting of the Senate. I wish to say to the Senator from Texas that I do not think General MacArthur selected the newspapers to inform the War Department of the number of men needed for the occupation of Japan. He could not have prevented the newspapers or he did not prevent the newspapers from getting information.

As I understand his statement, originally he asked for 500,000 men to occupy Japan. Subsequently he revised the estimate and asked for 400,000 men. But in his statement which was widely published in this country he said that, if unforeseen circumstances did not arise, within 6 months he could do it with 200,000 Regular Army troops. He sent that word to the War Department. I have talked with high ranking generals who have been in Japan, within the week, and they assert that General MacArthur did not do anything which would justify an attack upon him by the newspapers, as they did attack him by claiming that he mixed politics with the running of the Army. I disavow any interest in politics in connection with General MacArthur's possible candidacy for the office of President or for any other public office, so that I can dissociate myself from any

of his backers if he should determine to run for office. But I wish to say that I had an opportunity to talk with General MacArthur when I was in New Guinea, and I have had an opportunity to ascertain some of the things on his mind.

I find that there is a misunderstanding regarding Dean Acheson's statement. I have no fault to find with him. I hope that what has happened to others whose nominations have been hurriedly confirmed will not happen to him, if his nomination is confirmed, because we seem to be getting along fairly well now. I have a copy of the statement which Dean Acheson made. I think the trouble came about when the newspaper men asked him, "May we quote you on this?" And he seemed to have expanded a little and said, "You may quote me on that," or perhaps he voluntarily said, "You may quote me on that." While disavowing any knowledge of the conditions he said, in effect, "This is from my inadequate knowledge of the military field."

I do not believe any citizen questions General MacArthur's knowledge of the military field from Port Moresby to Japan, perhaps, or from here through Pearl Harbor to Japan. But when Dean Acheson said, "I am surprised that any one can foresee now the number of forces that will be necessary," I think he laid himself open to some criticism by those of us who fear that he might have been joining in the somewhat general public clamor of trying to pull down General MacArthur who was on the spot. I assert again that General MacArthur has perhaps performed one of the outstanding services of American military field commanders in all military history. General MacArthur, in speaking of the situation, said in effect "It is one which unquestionably will be determined upon the highest diplomatic level of the United Nations, and it is one to which the answer cannot fail but be influenced by important events in the near and proximate future." So I think the whole situation has been generally misunderstood. I think that General MacArthur's statement was seized upon and misunderstood. I assert again that I am very sure that General MacArthur sent his communications through the General Staff because General Marshall and the President, at first blush, approved the statement. When Dean Acheson said that he could be quoted it gave at least the appearance of an opportunity to assume that an insult was intended against General MacArthur. I do not think it was intended as such, and I do not believe that General MacArthur deserved the criticism which he received.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator for his observations. I wish to say that I am not attacking General MacArthur. I have no quarrel with what he did. If he wanted to give his statement to the newspapers, it was all right with me.

Mr. CHANDLER. I do not believe that he did give the statement to the newspapers. I know that he did not send his official communications to the newspapers.

Mr. CONNALLY. Well, I would not object to it if he had.

Mr. CHANDLER. However, we can not keep newspapers away from the public.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have no objection to the publication of any information which is of interest to the people of the United States. I merely say that the normal way for General MacArthur to have made a recommendation was to have sent it through the regular channels to the Chief of Staff and to the President. The Senator from Kentucky is on the Military Affairs Committee, is he not?

Mr. CHANDLER. Yes; and I have been a member of that committee for a long time. I do not believe there is any record that General MacArthur said to the press in effect, "I will occupy Japan in 6 months with 200,000 soldiers, and you can quote me on that." I think that he sent his statement through the regular channels, but the newspapermen were smart and got hold of it, and reported it through the press. Then Dean Acheson said he was surprised, and when questioned by representatives of the press, he said, "You can quote me on this." That invited a general quotation from General MacArthur.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator. I accept the Senator's statement. General MacArthur did not give the information out to the newspapers, but they got hold of it. Some newspapermen have radar minds. They look into the heads of persons and find something there. [Laughter.]

Mr. BARKLEY. I do not know whose fault it was that the information got into the newspapers, but I make no charge against anyone.

Mr. CONNALLY. And neither do I.

Mr. BARKLEY. General Marshall stated to the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives on the day he addressed us on the subject of demobilization, which was last Thursday, that he had only that morning received the official report from General MacArthur with respect to the requirement of 200,000 soldiers, but that the newspapers had carried the story 2 or 3 days previous to that time. Perhaps the delay in getting the information to General Marshall or to the War Department resulted in some one catching up with it on its way and putting it into the press. I do not believe General MacArthur was responsible for that, but the information did get into the press before the War Department received it.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have no objection to the information having been published in the newspapers. What I am trying to ascertain is where Mr. Acheson committed the heinous crime of making an attack upon General MacArthur. I have read most all of his statement. Here is the important part of it, according to my judgment:

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government and is still held so far as I know, and I think I know.

Does anything in that statement attack General MacArthur? Is there any language in it which commits assault and battery upon General MacArthur? I do not think so. Every Senator admits

that matters of Government policy are determined by the President and by the Secretary of State, and that military matters are determined, not in the final analysis but in the recommendatory stage, by the military authorities, and ultimately by the top level. I hope that that will always be the policy of the United States, irrespective of the glamor and glory and panoply of war and those who love war. I hope that in this Republic of ours the civil authority will always have supreme jurisdiction over the military and over the naval. I look with apprehension and regret upon the tendency to put in high civilian positions military men, who sit behind desks with a row of stars on their shoulders and uniforms about their bodies. We should return to the custom of filling civilian positions with civilians, and let the civilian authorities dominate this Republic. That is what Mr. Acheson was trying to do. The matter of policy is determined by the civilian authority, such as the President and the Secretary of State, in conjunction with our allies.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I agree with the statement of the Senator from Texas that as soon as possible we should restore civilian authority. The pending question is, as I understand it, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of Dean Acheson?

Mr. CONNALLY. That is correct.

Mr. CHAVEZ. What difference does it make what General MacArthur or some civilian representative of the Government may have said? The question is, Shall we vote upon this nomination "yes" or "no"?

Mr. CONNALLY. I think the Senator is correct.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I am becoming a little annoyed by having to listen to a discussion relative to the statements of General MacArthur and Dean Acheson, and not getting down to a vote on the pending nomination.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am sorry.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I am glad the Senator is making his statement. However, it will not change one vote either way.

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, I do not know.

Mr. CHAVEZ. General MacArthur does not need any defense. If Senators believe that Dean Acheson is not the proper man for the position to which he has been appointed, they can vote against him. If they think he is the proper man, they can vote for him. I should like to have an opportunity to vote.

Mr. CONNALLY. I sympathize with the Senator from New Mexico. The reason I am making my remarks is that I was not present the other day when the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] raised the issue and the majority leader asked me to submit some remarks because I happen to be the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The committee has favorably reported the pending nomination to the Senate.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. President, if the Senator from Texas will yield, I should like to say that I think he

is rendering to the country a very great service in explaining this matter. Undoubtedly there is a great deal of misunderstanding pertaining to it. I have reached that conclusion, not from the statement of the Senator from Nebraska, but from reading editorials, statements of commentators in the press, and from statements made by persons over the radio. I think the country as a whole should be given a clarification of this important matter. It may all be a tempest in a teapot, and I have no doubt that it is. If it is such, it is a wise thing for the Senator from Texas to explain it in detail so that there will be a better understanding of it throughout the country. From interpretations of the situation which have been given by editors of newspapers, as well as news and radio commentators, it seems to me that a clarification is absolutely necessary. So I do not entirely agree with what the Senator from New Mexico has said.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator from Colorado. In his usually wise and able manner, he has completely met the issue.

Mr. President, let us see what else Mr. Acheson said. What I am about to read is really an important part of the whole statement:

In carrying out that policy, the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy.

Is there anything wrong with that statement, that the military is the instrument of the policy-making power, and is not the determinant itself on policy? I do not think there is anything wrong with them, when anyone considers the relationship of the Army and the civilian authority.

He further said—and I wish the Senator from Nebraska would not choose the time I am speaking for all his conferences. I want him to hear what I have to say, because I am trying to answer some of the questions he asked.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I have always found the distinguished Senator from Texas courteous.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am trying to be now.

Mr. WHERRY. The official reporter was asking me a question.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not care who it was.

Mr. WHERRY. I did not call him in for a conference, and he was not consulting with me. I think it is highly discourteous to accuse a person of bringing in a secretary and conferring with him when the official reporter comes here to find out something about what I wanted in the RECORD. I cannot understand why the distinguished Senator from Texas, whom I have always treated with such high regard, and who has the high regard of all the Members of the Senate, would take an opportunity to do such a thing.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I abjectly apologize to the Senator from Nebraska. I meant no unkindness. I was trying to reply to the discussion he

started. He started it last Thursday. He made extensive remarks.

Mr. WHERRY. Who started what?

Mr. CONNALLY. This discussion about Dean Acheson.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator means I started the discussion about confirming Mr. Acheson?

Mr. CONNALLY. On the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator from Texas stated he was not here last Thursday.

Mr. CONNALLY. I was not.

Mr. WHERRY. Has the Senator read the RECORD?

Mr. CONNALLY. I have read it.

Mr. WHERRY. And the Senator says I started the discussion?

Mr. CONNALLY. I may have made another grievous error. [Laughter.] I wish to say to the Senator very kindly that I had no intention of ruffling his feelings, I meant no discourtesy, but when it comes to courtesy, I think we might use the reverse lend-lease, and when I am replying to the Senator's speech it looks to me as though he should do me the courtesy to listen, rather than spend time conferring with various persons. I do not know what the subject matter of the conference was, and do not care what it was, but I think the Senator owes me the courtesy, if he is talking about courtesy, to listen to what I am saying when I am trying to reply to him.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I have listened to what the Senator has said, and I am delighted to stand on my feet and yield for any question. The Senator gave me 4 minutes once, and retracted it.

Mr. CONNALLY. No; I did not do that. Before us is the guilty man.

Shake not thy gory locks at me

My withers are unwrung.

[Laughter.]

In all kindness, the Senator knows I am not going to be discourteous. I do not mean to be discourteous. I am very fond of the Senator.

Let us see what else Dean Acheson said. What are the policies, the horrible policies, Dean Acheson is going to put in effect?

That Japan will be put in a position where it cannot renew aggressive warfare.

Has anyone any complaint about that? That is one of the policies we want to enforce in Japan, and I thought it was subscribed to by all Members of the Senate. I know it is subscribed to by the people of the United States, that Japan will be put in a position where it cannot renew aggressive warfare. That means we are going to teach them not to start another world war, not to have another Pearl Harbor, not to treacherously assault us at Pearl Harbor while their emissaries are standing at the White House pretending that they want a treaty of peace. I want Japan to be taught that it will not pay to renew aggressive warfare, and I think that Dean Acheson is to be applauded for letting the country know that that is one of the policies to which this Government will adhere.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield for a question, not for a speech.

Mr. CHANDLER. Can we not all agree that General MacArthur is just as anxious as anyone else to bring about in Japan complete adherence to the Potsdam declaration, and complete subjugation of the Japanese people in every particular? There is no issue so far as that is concerned, is there?

Mr. CONNALLY. I am not making any issue. We are talking about confirming Dean Acheson or not confirming him. I have no complaint about General MacArthur, and I am not attacking him at all. I am not complaining about what General MacArthur has done. No doubt General MacArthur, if he is a good soldier—and the Senator says he is, and I assume he is—will carry out in Japan the policies which this Government, through its President and its State Department, lays down. I assume he will carry out the policy which the United States and its allies agree upon.

Mr. CHANDLER. Has the Senator any doubt about General MacArthur being a good soldier?

Mr. CONNALLY. I said I assumed he was.

Mr. CHANDLER. Does not the record show that he is a good soldier?

Mr. CONNALLY. So far as I know, it does. I was not over in the Pacific area, as the Senator from Kentucky was, right where these operations were taking place. I did not have the privilege of going.

Mr. CHANDLER. The Senator had the privilege of sending someone.

Mr. CONNALLY. I say, the Senator has more knowledge, and if he has not more knowledge, he had no business being sent. That was why he was sent, and I agree the Senator had better opportunity for judging than I had. I take it General MacArthur is a good soldier and a good man, and a good subordinate of the President of the United States when it comes to carrying out policies.

Now, let us see what else there was. We do not want Japan to be able to make aggressive warfare. Does anyone complain of that policy? If so, I should like to have it put into the RECORD, along with the letter from some constituents saying they do not agree to it. [Laughter.]

What else does he say? Here is the bug under the chip:

That the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war will be changed so that that will to war will not continue and that whatever it takes to carry this out will be used to carry it out.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator please interpret that statement?

Mr. CONNALLY. I am just getting ready to interpret it.

Mr. WHERRY. As Mr. Acheson would like to have it.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am going to interpret the statement. I do not know anything about what Mr. Acheson thinks. I

am ready to interpret it, and I hope the Senator will listen this time.

What is this statement?

That the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war.

Does the Senator deny that there is such a feeling in Japan, and has been for a quarter of a century?

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator mean that he is willing to go into Japan with American boys and foster revolution?

Mr. CONNALLY. No; I did not say anything about revolution.

Mr. WHERRY. Is the Senator willing to do that? Is that what he means?

Mr. CONNALLY. Willing to do what?

Mr. WHERRY. Is it the administration's policy—

Mr. CONNALLY. I am explaining what this means.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator should do it in a logical way.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am willing to go in there and change their minds.

Mr. WHERRY. No matter what it takes?

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not know what it will take, but I am ready to go in there and undertake to change their minds.

Mr. WHERRY. No matter what it takes?

Mr. CONNALLY. Just a moment; I will answer the Senator's question. I am willing to go in there and do the things necessary to change their minds toward a constant will to war. We saw their will to war at Pearl Harbor. If they had not had a will, they would not have slipped up on us like a thief in the night, like a porch climber, and assaulted us and murdered our men. That is a will to war. I am willing to teach the Japanese that the will to war will not bring them dividends.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Is not that exactly what General MacArthur is doing? Is he not doing it exactly as the Potsdam agreement designed it should be done?

Mr. CONNALLY. If that is what he is doing, the Senator should not complain at Mr. Acheson backing him up. [Laughter.]

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator interpret what Mr. Acheson says as indicating he wants to go further than General MacArthur has gone? Does the Senator want to interpret it to mean that he has gone further than the Potsdam agreement has called for?

Mr. CONNALLY. If the Senator will bear with me, in my poor, humble, staggering way, I shall try to answer him.

I am not interpreting anything but what is in this paper. I do not know General MacArthur's secret mental convolutions, and I do not know Mr. Acheson's mental lucubration; but I do know what is in this paper. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. If the Senator from Texas knows what is in that paper, are the remarks he is about to make to be

considered as the administration's policy toward Japan?

Mr. CONNALLY. Administration! Antiadministration! Administration! Mr. President, I have not talked to the administration about this matter at all. Mr. Acheson came to see me the other day about a matter, and we did not even mention the question of his confirmation. I am not blindly following any administration leader or any political leader either.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator again yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Did the Foreign Relations Committee hold hearings on the nomination of Mr. Acheson?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. Acheson came to the committee. He was present and willing to testify, but no one cared to interrogate him, and the committee voted to report his nomination favorably, because he had been before the committee previously. He had been acted upon favorably once before when nominated to be Assistant Secretary.

Mr. WHERRY. Did he announce his policy then? Did he say what he was going to do with Japan?

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, well, he is not announcing any policy.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Acheson has been before the Foreign Relations Committee time after time. Everyone on the committee knows him and knows him well.

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; every member of the committee knows him. Mr. Acheson is not making the policy. He is simply expressing his views about the policy. Let us see what he says:

That the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war will be changed so that that will to war will not continue and that whatever it takes to carry this out will be used to carry it out.

I wholly subscribe to that doctrine.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Is that not what we have been fighting for?

Mr. CONNALLY. I was going to suggest that throughout this war we have all proclaimed that we were going to make the result of the war so decisive that Japan and Germany would never dare to attack us again, and we are trying to put in the minds of the Japanese people that that is our purpose. Let me address myself to the Senator from Nebraska for a moment. He speaks about the social and economic system. Does he know what those systems are in Japan? Does he know that Japan is a feudal country, and has been for centuries? Does he know that in Japan there is still present the old Samurai theory of militarism?

The Japanese have been brought up on the theory that a few great families, a few great industrialists rule the nation, and have a right to rule the nation. They are the ones who have fostered the agitation for new markets and

new territories and new outlets, and they have built up the military concept. We want to dislodge that theory from the minds of the Japanese people, and if it requires the destruction of these hard groups of industrial czars and social magnates to do it, I am willing to do it.

Mr. President, I am speaking for the peace of the world. I am speaking for the lives of boys not only in the United States but in distant lands across the seas. I do not want another world war. If we can stamp out of the minds of the Japanese the will to war and if we can stamp out of the minds of the Germans the will to war I am hopeful that we shall be blessed by many years of peace.

Mr. President, I have read the entire statement by Mr. Acheson. I find in it no reflection and no attack on anyone. The nearest approach was the matter which the Senator from Maine suggested, and that probably could have been handled in a more diplomatic way. But, Mr. President, many people talk too fast and talk too much. [Laughter.] I would not be surprised if both parties to this transaction had not talked a little too fast and a little too much. But it is not of the magnitude, it is not of the importance that is sought to be attached to it here.

Mr. President, I do not care to discuss the matter any further. Mr. Acheson is well known, I am sure, to a great many Senators. He is a man whom I regard as possessing unusual ability. I think he is one of the strong men in the State Department. I think he is a valuable man, a valuable servant of the Government, and I would not judge his whole future on the basis of some trivial incident.

If someone were to take a microscope and examine all of us I wonder if he would determine our whole career on the basis of one little insignificant something? If so, we would all be in a pretty bad fix. If the membership of the Senate were dependent on such an examination I am afraid there would not be a quorum of the Senate present. Everyone makes mistakes now and then. I am not admitting that what we have been speaking of is a mistake, or for that matter that it is of any significance if Mr. Acheson did make a mistake.

Mr. President, the Senate of the United States should have something more important to do than spend so much time on such a matter as this. I apologize for making so long a statement. I did not intend to make a speech or make any remarks. I was not present in the Senate Thursday. I looked over the Record of Thursday. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], I suppose in deference to the fact that I happened to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, thought I ought to say something to explain why the Committee on Foreign Relations had recommended the confirmation of Mr. Acheson's nomination.

Mr. TUNNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. TUNNELL. I ask the Senator if he understands that General MacArthur in any way is to be here for confirmation or that his name is to come before the Senate for action? His seems to be the

name that has been so much discussed at this time. We are not passing on General MacArthur.

Mr. CONNALLY. Not at all.

Mr. TUNNELL. The question directly before us, as I understand, is as to whether Mr. Acheson's nomination shall be recommitted to the Foreign Relations Committee. The Foreign Relations Committee, I believe the Senator said, voted unanimously to report the nomination.

Mr. CONNALLY. All members who were present did.

Mr. TUNNELL. Yes. The Senator from Nebraska says he does not know whether he will vote to make the confirmation unanimous. I believe he said something to that effect, or that he was not ready to act. The question before the Senate is whether anything contained in recent statements so reflects on Dean Acheson that his nomination ought not to be confirmed. There have been no charges made against him.

Mr. CONNALLY. No.

Mr. TUNNELL. Does the Senator think anything has been brought out which should influence the matter?

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say to the Senator that I think he is entirely correct in his statement. Even at the worst, the offense would seem to be that Mr. Acheson did not agree or had a different idea respecting something said by General MacArthur. All of us wish to have freedom of opinion. I have differed frequently with the President of the United States. But if it is a crime to disagree with the general, so far as I know, that is the only crime with which Mr. Acheson has been charged—that he did not agree with some remark made by General MacArthur. I have no complaint of General MacArthur.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. I think the Senator's last statement with respect to what Dean Acheson said to the press is the all-important thing in this debate, in view of the fact that the Senator from Nebraska has referred not only once but a dozen times to a so-called social and economic revolution which the State Department wants to carry on in Japan. I submit that anyone who does not agree with what Dean Acheson says with respect to destroying the Japanese social and economic forces which have made war, he must admit that he wants to return Japan to her previous position as a militarist nation with the power to again make war upon this country and other Allied Nations.

In addition to what Dean Acheson said, I should like to invite the attention of the Senate to the terms of the Potsdam agreement.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have it in my hand.

Mr. LUCAS. I read:

Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security,

and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

If that declaration is carried out, it certainly involves a change in the social and economic order of Japan.

More important, I shall read the last part of paragraph 10:

The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

If we carry out this one policy, we must of necessity change the social system in Japan. If we carry out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration in their entirety, certainly we must change the social order in Japan.

Paragraph 11 reads as follows:

Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

That involves a complete change in the economic system of Japan. All her industries which made for war are to be destroyed. Certainly the economic and social systems of Japan are going to be changed. Everyone must recognize this inevitable fact. Acheson's statement is on all fours with the Potsdam Declaration. If the social and economic orders are not changed, we can get ready for another war. If they are not changed, we have fought this war in vain. All the special pleading about a social and economic revolution in Japan costing the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans is ridiculous.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator from Illinois cannot yield. I have the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator from Texas yield so that I may ask the Senator from Illinois a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator from Illinois take the figure 200,000 from any statement I made?

Mr. LUCAS. The record will speak for itself.

Mr. WHERRY. I said that hundreds of thousands of men might be required.

Mr. LUCAS. Did not the Senator from Nebraska ask me a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I do not care to yield for a joint debate.

Mr. LUCAS. I should like to finish my statement.

Anyone who advocates a different policy than that set out in the statement made by Mr. Acheson, advocates the return to the old order. It is unfortunate that the Senator from Nebraska has heralded to the country an article he read in the Washington Post as the basis for his inquiries instead of taking Mr. Acheson's statement.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I decline to yield further at this time.

Mr. LUCAS. Anyone who advocates a different policy than that set out in Mr. Acheson's statement is advocating a return to where we were 5 years ago, back to the policy of isolationism, back to the policy under which we would permit Japan and Germany to rearm and become aggressors, thereby bringing on World War III, which would mean the beginning of the end of civilization.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator from Illinois. Let me make a few comments, and then I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Nebraska if he desires to have me yield. I wish to be courteous, but when I yield to one Senator, it is not quite in order to yield to another Senator and let them engage in a controversy.

I hold in my hand the Potsdam Declaration, to which the Senator from Illinois has referred. I have it marked in red pencil. I was about to comment on it when the Senator from Illinois made his statement.

Mr. President, the Potsdam Agreement constitutes the terms upon which Japan surrendered. They are her terms as well as our terms. The condition of the surrender was that Japan should accept the conditions of the Potsdam Agreement. That agreement provides that—

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest—

Is there any objection to that? Do we not wish to put out of power those who brought about this war of world conquest?—

for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

Is there any controversy about that? Is there any challenge to that statement? Is it not a wise one? Is it not a wholesome one? Is it not one which is in the interest of the peace of the world?

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Does not that fit in with the declaration of Mr. Acheson in his statement?

Mr. CONNALLY. He refers to it and approves it.

I read further from the Potsdam Declaration:

Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

If the Senator from Nebraska objects to any change in the social system of Japan, if he objects to any change in the industrial system of Japan, I do not see how he can avoid the conviction that in the course of time there will again be generated the feeling that the Japanese must conquer with arms, with swords in their hands, with airplanes in the air, and with battleships plowing the deep. We are trying to get away from that, and in order to get away from it we are trying to negative, overcome, and eradicate

the great forces in Japan which have mothered that thought.

Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

Does anyone complain about that? That is in the Potsdam agreement. That has been accepted by Japan. That has been accepted by us, and that is to be the chart for the future. Of course, it will cause some changes in Japan. That is what we want. We do not want to revive the Samurai system, with a sword on each Japanese, a rifle in his hand, and a pistol in his pocket.

I read further from the Potsdam agreement:

The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

Is there any objection to that? Is there any objection to our trying to teach the Japanese how to have free democratic government such as our own? We have always preached the doctrine that democracy was interested in peace and was against war. Is there any harm in teaching the people of Japan that in following their war gods, in worshiping at their military shrines, and in dipping their hands in ceremonial blood, they are on the road to ruin? Why can we not teach them to live as democratic nations live? If we do we shall eradicate from their system a desire for war.

Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

Is anyone against that? Is anyone against free speech? Is anyone against freedom of religion or of thought?

Mr. President, I very much hope that the Senator from Nebraska will withdraw his motion and let the Senate vote direct on this nomination.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President—

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I have no disagreement whatever with the Potsdam Declaration, which the Senator has been reading. That is why I inserted it in the RECORD. I made that very plain in my opening remarks.

I am in total agreement with every phrase of the Potsdam Declaration. What I am taking exception to is the statement about which I wish to have a clarification, but the Senator from Texas certainly has not clarified it for me.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have not?

Mr. WHERRY. No.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have endeavored to do so. I am merely a poor mortal, of course.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator has not clarified for me—for what reason, I do not know—anything relative to what Mr. Acheson has said about what will happen to Japan. The Senator has not clarified for me what Mr. Acheson has said about going into Japan and stirring up social and economic revolution.

Mr. President, I realize that I am outnumbered in this matter and that my

motion will be rejected. But if there is only one vote in favor of it, I certainly shall have rendered that much service to the American people. A number of interpretations have been offered here today. The Senator from Illinois told us how he felt about it. Now the Senator from Texas has given his interpretation, and shortly we shall hear from the majority leader, I judge, and he will give us his interpretation. But Mr. Acheson did not clarify a thing.

I have asked whether Senators know what Mr. Acheson meant relative to the administration's policy. No one knows what he meant. There has been a tremendous amount of speculation about what is in his mind. Some say we can radar this thing. That is what Senators have been trying to do.

I have asked certain questions in connection with Mr. Acheson's statement about going into Japan and making economic or social changes there. I wish to know how far he wants to go. Is he going to use any men or any money? What kind of a doctrine is he going to teach? Are we going to go in there to appease some other nation?

Mr. President, I know I am hopelessly in the minority on this question, I realize that my motion will be rejected; but I have made it in all sincerity; and believe me, Mr. President, there will be many people in the United States who will be more interested in the clarification of Mr. Acheson's statement than they will be in the somewhat jocular way some Senators have treated my motion on the floor of the Senate.

[Manifestations of applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The occupants of the galleries must not indicate their feelings regarding the proceedings. If they do, the Sergeant at Arms will be directed to clear the galleries.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I hope the occupants of the galleries will not be expelled. They do not often get an opportunity to attend the sessions of the Senate and hear what is happening here. I know it is against the rules of the Senate for them to applaud, but I know sometimes they cannot resist the outbursts of emotion which well up within them. I hope the President pro tempore will not be too hard on them.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair realizes, of course, that the occupants of the galleries do not ordinarily violate the rules of the Senate, but the rules of the Senate must be observed.

The Chair calls attention to paragraph 6 of rule XIX of the Senate, which reads as follows:

Whenever confusion arises in the Chamber or the galleries, or demonstrations of approval or disapproval are indulged in by the occupants of the galleries, it shall be the duty of the Chair to enforce order on his own initiative and without any point of order being made by a Senator.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BARKLEY. I wish to add a suggestion to what the Senator has read about the Potsdam agreement. It was

followed up, as the Senator knows, by a more elaborate statement which was in substance sent to General MacArthur on the 29th of August, and was sent to him officially on the 6th day of September. It attempted to integrate the Potsdam agreement. If the Senator will permit, I should like to call his attention to one or two paragraphs of it.

Mr. CONNALLY. I wish to have it all printed in the RECORD.

Mr. BARKLEY. Of course, it is all to be printed in the RECORD.

Under part 1, which is entitled "Ultimate Objectives," we find the following:

The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

And so forth. The document is a long one, but it is almost in the same language as that used in the Potsdam agreement.

Under part 4, which is entitled "Economic Demilitarization," we find the following:

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not permitted to revive.

In the mind of the Senator from Nebraska or in the minds of other Senators that may mean a revolution. Dean Acheson did not refer to it as a revolution. He was talking about economic and military changes in Japan which would rob her of the power and ability to make war.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to call the attention of the distinguished majority leader to the fact that Mr. Acheson said they are determined to carry that out at any cost.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, Mr. Acheson did not say that, in the first place.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the Senator's statement.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Acheson did not say that. He said they are determined to carry out the policy that is agreed to and established, whatever it may take. If the Senator from Nebraska is against that, that is his privilege.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I wish to have it distinctly understood that I am for the Potsdam agreement 100 percent. I am just as much for an enduring peace in the Pacific as any other Senator possibly can be. The idea that certain Members of the Senate are the only ones who want a lasting peace in that area is as far from the fact as it can be. Some Senators have been waving the flag and have been speaking of themselves as the only ones who want peace in the Pacific area. Mr. President, let me say that I know something about the war, just as other Senators do. Mr. Acheson has said that it is proposed to sponsor and foster

a social and economic revolution in Japan and that they will carry it out, whatever the cost. That is what he said.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, Mr. Acheson said nothing of the kind. The word "cost" is not in his statement. The word "revolution" is not in his statement. That is the misguided interpretation which the Senator from Nebraska placed on Mr. Acheson's statement last week.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I ask the distinguished majority leader whether we have not had at least half a dozen interpretations made regarding what Mr. Acheson meant.

Mr. BARKLEY. At least none of them was as far wrong as was the interpretation made by the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. Then let us have a clarification of the statement. Why not do that so that we may understand it correctly?

Mr. BARKLEY. I should like to read what he said on the 6th of September:

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others: the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

Subsequently the statement deals with the "promotion of democratic forces," as follows:

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization, and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends.

All those things are a part of our policy. All those things are a part of the outline which we established at Potsdam, and of course they are the policies which any responsible official of the American Government has in mind when he says those are the policies to be established by the Government of the United States.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. President, in conclusion I wish to say that there is nothing in the statement of Mr. Acheson which mentions a revolution. No such word is used in his

statement. The language complained of is as follows:

That Japan will be put in a position where it cannot renew aggressive warfare.

No one complains about that. Even the Senator from Nebraska has said that he is in favor of the Potsdam Declaration. Objection is being made to the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war. That is all. Our State Department officials do not care anything about Japan's system except to eradicate that portion of it which fosters and promotes a will to war. That is in the agreement in connection with the Potsdam Declaration.

Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Nebraska will withdraw his motion to recommit the pending nomination to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The committee has done its duty. It has disposed of the nomination by reporting it favorably to the Senate. Now let the Senate make the ultimate disposition of it.

I think we are undoubtedly magnifying the importance of this incident; but I believe that its magnification may have a very deleterious effect in Japan and in other foreign countries by suggesting that a disagreement exists between the military and the State Department, as well as between other departments of our Government. That kind of an impression going forth will not do any of us any good. We are working with our allies who are parties to the Potsdam agreement. They have subscribed to it. Japan has subscribed to it. We have subscribed to it. It is the program for the years in the future. There is nothing which Mr. Acheson said that in any way transgresses upon or went beyond the terms of the Potsdam agreement.

Several Senators. Vote! Vote!

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] to recommit the pending nomination to the Committee on Foreign Relations. On that motion the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I wish to say that I intend to vote against the motion of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY]. I know Mr. Acheson. I have known him well. I do not believe that any further investigation could possibly reveal anything that I, at least, do not already know about him. I think that he is qualified to be Under Secretary of State. I do not think that the Under Secretary of State makes the policies of the United States Government. I think that such policies must be made by the President. Therefore I do not believe that the disagreement with Mr. Acheson's policies as expressed in the controversy, so-called, with General MacArthur is any ground for refusing to confirm this nomination.

I voted against the confirmation of Mr. Wallace to be Secretary of Commerce because I thought that as Secretary of Commerce Mr. Wallace would be in charge of a fundamental policy of government, and that his presence in the Cabinet would affect such policy. I think that unless some important question is involved the President is entitled

to have confirmed anyone whom he appoints. So far as the office of Under Secretary of State is concerned, I do not think that we should interfere with the President's right to select a man for that post merely because we happen to disagree with his policies. That applies also to a Cabinet officer. A Cabinet officer cannot himself reflect substantially the policy of the United States Government.

Insofar as there is a difference of opinion between Mr. Acheson and General MacArthur regarding policy, I sympathize with General MacArthur. I think there has probably developed a fundamental difference in policy toward Japan about which I should like to speak at a later time. But I think it is not involved in the vote on the confirmation of Mr. Acheson's nomination. I think the country should understand that a vote by any individual Senator to confirm Mr. Acheson's nomination, or a vote by the Senate as a whole to confirm the nomination, would in no way be passing upon the difference as to the general question of policy which may appear between Mr. Acheson's statement and General MacArthur's statement, if there is any difference of policy between them. I therefore wish to explain why I shall vote for Mr. Acheson's confirmation, and at the same time disagree to a large extent with what I think is the tendency of the policy which he has advocated.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I do not know Mr. Acheson. I do not know General MacArthur in any personal sense. I approach the pending question as objectively as I think any man can approach it. Frankly, I am a bit confused as to the sequence of events which have led up to the present moment. As I understand the situation, General MacArthur made a statement in Tokyo the effect of which was that if nothing untoward happened he could get along with 200,000 regular soldiers, thereby permitting many of our soldiers to return to their homes. I hope that statement is true. The country hopes that it is true.

Mr. President, at a press conference—I am speaking not of any private conference—at the State Department representatives of the press suggested that Mr. Acheson was disturbed over some of the recent statements which had been made by General MacArthur. It is no business of the State Department to determine the number of soldiers to be used in occupied countries. The policy in that regard is not determined by Mr. Acheson, or even by the State Department. Of course, they are instrumental in determining the policy. But the policy had already been made at Potsdam by the highest level of government. The statement of General MacArthur was confined to the number of soldiers which would be necessary for occupation, and did not refer to policy.

Mr. Acheson said:

I have no comment to make on the military aspects of what General MacArthur stated. That is a purely military matter—

That is correct—

with which the State Department is not properly concerned. I think I can say that I am surprised that anybody can foresee at

this time the number of forces which will be necessary in Japan.

That was none of Mr. Acheson's business. That was a matter for the War Department and for the Army. In the determination of the number of men necessary in Japan there is no one human being so well qualified to speak as is Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He is the supreme commander in the Pacific theater. His statement is the most authoritative one that could be made.

Then Mr. Acheson continued as follows:

The important thing is that the policy in regard to Japan is the same policy which has always been held by this Government and is still held, so far as I know, and I think I know. In carrying out that policy, the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy, and the policy is and has been that the surrender of Japan will be carried out.

Mr. President, I agree with that statement. The occupation forces do not make the policy of the United States Government any more than does the State Department determine the number of soldiers to be used in the army of occupation.

The press of this country, the citizenry of this country, and the newspapermen who were present at the conference certainly received the impression that Mr. Acheson was administering a rebuke to General MacArthur. No man occupies a place of greater responsibility than does Douglas MacArthur. Next to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State is presumed to be the most influential voice in the State Department. The net result of all this has been a state of confusion which should be cleared up, and it should be cleared up before the Senate has to vote upon the question of confirming Mr. Acheson for the office to which he has been appointed.

With all due respect for my good friend the majority leader and the Senator from Texas, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I should think they would find it desirable in their minds that we clear up this confusion instead of letting it continue.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. REED. I yield.

Mr. CONNALLY. What confusion is the Senator talking about?

Mr. REED. I am talking about the confused state of mind of the country.

Mr. CONNALLY. Here is the statement. Anyone who can read the English language should understand it. I do not see why there should be any confusion.

Mr. REED. The Senator from Texas was not paying attention to what I was saying.

Mr. CONNALLY. I heard the Senator mention my name as being the chairman of the committee, and I rose to pay him the attention I thought he deserved.

Mr. REED. Will the Senator from Texas tell the Senator from Kansas to what statement he is now referring?

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator said he wanted this confusion cleared up. What confusion is he talking about?

Mr. REED. The Senator from Texas then referred to some statement which he held up.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have the statement here—the Potsdam agreement and the statement.

Mr. REED. I was talking about a particular statement which appears on page 3 of the mimeographed memorandum which was sent here. While we are on that point—

Mr. CONNALLY. Just a moment. Is the Senator asking me a question, or not?

Mr. REED. No; I was not asking the Senator a question.

Mr. CONNALLY. Then I am satisfied.

Mr. REED. I hold in my hand a mimeograph copy of a statement which I secured only a few minutes ago. The senior Senator from Kentucky, the majority leader, was gracious enough to let me read his copy at an earlier hour in today's proceeding. I wonder if the Senators on this floor have been furnished with a copy of this document, which was made up in the State Department and sent here, and which purports to be an answer to the Senator from Nebraska. It is a rather voluminous document consisting of 12 pages. Only 15 minutes ago was I able to secure a copy, and I got it from the secretary for the majority, who was good enough to give me a copy.

Mr. President, I do not think the Senate should vote when it has only inadequate and incomplete information. I think I suggested to the majority leader 2 hours ago that before the vote came on the pending motion, and before it came on the confirmation of Mr. Acheson, this document should be in the hands of every Senator, and every Senator should be given an opportunity to read it.

Mr. President, what harm could there be if this nomination went back to the Committee on Foreign Relations? The committee then could hold a hearing, at which all parties could be heard, all misunderstandings cleared up, and all confusion removed. This and other documents and all other pertinent information would be before the committee, and then before the Senate. I submit that that is the fair and reasonable and dignified way to proceed. It would not hurt anyone, and in a matter so important, in connection with a situation about which there is so much confusion in the United States, extending to other countries of the world, we should be very sure of our ground.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kansas yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. REED. I yield.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. The first estimate of forces necessary to occupy Japan was 900,000 men. Then MacArthur, I assume after investigation—and we all know his reputation for efficiency—issued a statement that he could occupy Japan with 400,000. I think that was the number, was it not?

Mr. REED. It was 900,000, and then it was reduced to 400,000, and finally he said 200,000.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Was there anything wrong about that?

Mr. REED. No; it was very welcome news to the United States.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Of course, everybody was happy about it.

Mr. REED. That is correct.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Then what is all this fuss about? Was the State Department disappointed that we could control Japan with an Army of only 200,000 men?

Mr. REED. That inference could be and was drawn from what Mr. Acheson said. Whether he intended to be understood that way I do not undertake to say, but that is the inference that was drawn. The newspapers broadly printed the fact that the Under Secretary of State had rebuked General MacArthur. That is unfortunate.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Who was in better position to say how many men it would take to control Japan than General MacArthur?

Mr. REED. No one.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. That is the whole question in issue. What business is it of the State Department to find fault with him? They should have cheered him.

Mr. REED. I think it was none of their business. I think Mr. Acheson clearly spoke out of turn. His friends, in personal conversation, rather agree that that is the fact. They do not want to see him possibly humiliated, as they would call it, by having the nomination held up. I am much more concerned that the confusion in the country because the State Department has undertaken to administer a rebuke to General MacArthur in regard to something that is none of their business should be cleared up.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I shall vote for the motion of the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I am not willing to have this issue come to a vote in the state in which it has been left so far as the discussion has proceeded, as it seems to me that it may not be entirely clear precisely upon what the Senate must vote.

I have been impressed by the return to the arena here of the redoubtable Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] in all his ancient form, exhibiting the vestigial remnants of the dramatic power which has so often thrilled this Chamber. It has been conspicuously if not unhappily absent for the past 2 years, when he has been performing a remarkable feat of prestidigitation in bringing 91 Senators in this Chamber to such a point that they could agree in following him in foreign policy. I think it is one of the greatest feats that has been performed, and that history will ultimately so regard it. Today we see him in his ancient form, as a gladiator in the arena, or a matador in the ring, and it has seemed somewhat like ancient times.

However much I must agree with the Senator from Texas in his conclusion on the question before us, in agreement with the Senator from Ohio, whom the Senator from Texas rather unjustly and perhaps unkindly dragged in by his heels, when it finally appeared the Senator from Ohio was going to agree with him, I have to express a good deal of appreciation of and agreement with the Senator from Nebraska in some of the issues

which he framed, as I happen to agree with him in most of the matters which it seemed to me were in issue, but which we cannot resolve by this vote. I have been entirely in accord with him on Bretton Woods, and reciprocal trade, particularly the importation of Canadian potatoes, which is a very tender subject with me. I agreed with him on aviation, when we were trying to preserve the United States air program in complete freedom, as against the program which Mr. Acheson has so eloquently and so successfully advanced over my futile objections thus far. And there are several other matters. If those were the issues, I should certainly have to support the Senator from Nebraska.

To me the unfortunate aspect of the situation is that apparently we should try the issue here between Mr. Acheson and General MacArthur, both of whom are now functioning, Mr. Acheson under the temporary appointment, as I understand, as Under Secretary of State, for which he holds a commission, so that he is Acting Secretary of State at this time, and General MacArthur, who has been given the very tremendous responsibility of carrying on our affairs in Japan.

It certainly would be most unfortunate if an apparent division should seem to lend substance to any suggestion that the divisions in council which have been the despair of democracy are continuing even under our Chief Executive now in office, whose entire course in this body was dedicated, by his great committee, to eliminating suggestions of disagreement and friction of this character.

Mr. President, I am inclined to agree with the Senator from Texas that the fault was not great in this particular episode. I appreciate that it well may be that Mr. Acheson said a little something that he should not have said; that in a way he exhibited his dramatic powers and treaded a little on the military side when he said what he did with respect to making forecasts. But, on the other hand, it was a somewhat minor fault, and profoundly as I disagree with some of the principles which Mr. Acheson, as Assistant Secretary, necessarily has presented, and undoubtedly will present as Under Secretary if his nomination is now confirmed, as I think we all realize it is likely to be, that is not the immediate issue. The immediate issue is whether or not a President of the United States is entitled to have in his immediate official family, as a Secretary or Under Secretary, in that very close relationship, men in whom he has confidence and whose character is not under serious attack.

We must assume that the policies are determined in the final analysis by the Chief Executive, insofar as the executive power extends, and certainly all the history of our present President during his tenure of office with us showed that he was dedicated to that very end.

I have a great deal of sympathy for the President in not being able to bring his boys entirely under control in this unfortunate controversy that has been perhaps somewhat magnified. But I personally know Mr. Acheson. I have had very serious disagreements with him in the policies which he has so effectively presented dealing with the so-called free-

dom of the air. From much of that discussion before the Foreign Relations Committee and in other forums I have accumulated a very considerable respect, first, for the brains, second, for the guts, and, third, for the energy of this gentleman, and I submit those are qualities that we very much need in our State Department at this time.

So I am quite prepared to accept President Truman's conclusion that Mr. Acheson is the one who can most effectively implement those policies under the direction of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and under the final control of the President of the United States, and it is for those reasons that I shall find myself obliged to vote contra to the motion of the Senator from Nebraska, although I sympathize very deeply with much of what he has said. I also think he has rendered a profound public service by bringing to public knowledge the far more complete enunciation of the United States policy regarding Japan which was issued by the White House on Saturday night and which all the people of this country are now privileged to know.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the debate this afternoon. Recently at a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee I voted to report favorably the nomination of Mr. Acheson to be Under Secretary of State. In fact, I think I seconded the motion to approve his nomination.

I like Mr. Acheson personally. He is a man of character and ability. I do not agree with him in all the positions he has taken, in the past, nor do I expect to in the future. On this particular issue I feel it is unfortunate that the Acheson-MacArthur angle has entered into the picture.

First let me say that I think the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] was very sincere and very courageous, as he always is, in raising this issue.

This is not a vote of approval or disapproval of General MacArthur. I regret as much as anyone in this Nation the effort which is being made in the country today by some people to smear General MacArthur. I think General MacArthur is a great American. He is a great soldier. He is a great leader and I believe he is handling the situation in the Pacific area in a very admirable way. It is very unfortunate that we should see headlines such as this: "Boos hint Communists plan MacArthur smear campaign."

It is very unfortunate to hear speakers on the radio attempt to smear General MacArthur. It is a sad commentary on decency and fairness. It is a reflection on those who are doing the smearing.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BRIDGES. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. In what newspaper did that headline appear?

Mr. BRIDGES. It appeared in the Times-Herald of this morning.

Mr. McMAHON. Oh! [Laughter.]

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRIDGES. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. The headline appears above a news article from New York City. I have a copy of the newspaper in my hand, and, if the Senator will yield for a moment longer, I wish to say that the article states that the booing took place in Madison Square Garden, where 12,000 Communists and their sympathizers met last Tuesday night. At that meeting General MacArthur was booed.

I ask unanimous consent to have the article inserted in the RECORD at this point in the remarks of the Senator from New Hampshire.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BOOS HINT COMMUNISTS PLAN MACARTHUR SMEAR CAMPAIGN—DEMONSTRATION AT NEW YORK MEETING SEEN BUT START OF SCHEME TO DIM GENERAL'S STAR

(By Guy Richards and Russ Symontowne)

NEW YORK, September 23.—A few small boos—harbingers of bigger and better boos to come—greeted the name of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at the Madison Square Garden meeting of 12,000 Communists and their sympathizers last Tuesday night.

The boos went almost unnoticed against the background of tumultuous cheering for the early overthrow of capitalism and the quick rise of the Socialist state, demanded by leaders of the newly reorganized party.

SEEN AS TEST BOOS

But it is almost certain these were test boos, little samples of a wide variety of boos and hisses, hoots and jeers soon to come rolling from the party's production lines.

In fact, we were told by Communists off the record, and it took little reading between the lines of party publications to assure us, the great Red propaganda machines are ready-greased for a full-scale smear campaign against the general who brought an end to the world's greatest war.

GROUNDWORK DESCRIBED

Today we will describe how the groundwork for this campaign to discredit MacArthur has been laid and what the Reds hope to gain by it in this country. In another article we will attempt to show how this "get MacArthur" movement fits into the jigsaw picture of Moscow's plan for world expansion.

Before he left New York for Chicago, where he spoke tonight, William Z. Foster, national chairman of the party, gave us a quotation which broadly summarizes the party's new hatred of MacArthur.

"MacArthur's conduct in Japan," said Foster, "has been such as to require his correction by the President and by the State Department. His activity on behalf of a quisling regime in the Philippines, his methods in Japan and Korea, demonstrate that he is unfit to carry out the job of crushing Japanese fascism and its collaborators."

"It is no wonder that the reactionary, pro-Fascist press in America is grooming him for the Presidency in 1948."

A careful study of the columns of the Daily Worker, the Communist official organ, and talks with Communist leaders disclosed the party's alleged grievances against MacArthur.

MAC ARTHUR IS TARGET

But also it was revealed to us that the party is not hankering at this time for an out-and-out fight with the Truman administration and intends to use MacArthur as a convenient target for abuse it might otherwise heap upon the President and State Department.

"We may never learn to love Harry Truman but we may still wish to support him in 1948 against some greater reactionary," one Communist put it. "For the time being,

at least, MacArthur will serve our purpose very well."

Now, turning to the specific Communist case against the general, we found that until quite recently the party had very little against him.

BLASTS FROM DAILY WORKER

Quite suddenly the Daily Worker began, shortly after VJ-day, to blossom forth with headlines, articles, and editorials blasting the general.

"As a reactionary military man he didn't matter so much to us," said one Communist high in the leadership. "But as a reactionary boss of Japan, playing with its Fascist elements, he matters a great deal."

The first thing griping the Reds is the fact that only American soldiers are occupying Japan.

"Instead of planning a joint occupation with our allies, as in Germany, the United States is making the job harder and costlier," a Worker editorial of last Wednesday read.

WANTED REDS IN JAPAN

"Of course we wanted Russian soldiers in Japan," a Communist leader told one of us. "We wanted the same quick and virtually bloodless revolution we had in European countries, in Poland, Rumania, and even France. We wanted the old Fascist leaders, not merely the military but the industrial war makers as well, turned out immediately and democratic elements installed in their places. As it is, every day MacArthur plays with these industrialists and politicians they entrench themselves and fix fascism's hold more tightly on Japan."

So, it is the party line to fix the blame upon MacArthur for the over-all occupation plan which was surely decided upon by the administration in agreement with the other Allies.

In many editorials in the last 2 weeks the Worker has harped upon MacArthur's continuance in office of Japanese officials.

"If we can raise enough heat we might be able to force the administration to withdraw MacArthur from Japan," a Communist told one of us. "Frankly, we are not very hopeful. But it might be done. He's been spanked several times by the administration."

A series of articles, signed with a nom de plume and date lined from the Philippines, appeared last week in the Worker, purporting to show that under MacArthur's orders troops in the Philippines were working with Quislings and in some instances actually jailing Filipinos who worked in the underground.

RED FEAR CITED

Russia's mounting fear of American might peeps through the lines written by James S. Allen in the Worker, September 16:

"It is well known," Allen wrote, "among those in close contact with MacArthur, and it has also been voiced in the press, that the commander views Japan as a base of reconnaissance against the Soviet Union."

The Daily Worker is seeking hard to make it appear that MacArthur is on the defensive. This is an old and familiar party tactic, used often before against its enemies. When MacArthur announced that he believed only 200,000 troops would be needed to occupy Japan, instantly the Worker declared this was "bait" to make American mothers and fathers of soldiers and sailors accept his "soft" handling of the Japanese.

NOT VERY HOPEFUL

But, while the party feels that abusing MacArthur as a "Fascist" is helpful and useful in restoring it to prewar vigor, one leader confided to us it really had little hope of altering the course of affairs in Japan.

"However," this man said, "we will certainly fix his wagon for the Presidency. You see, we don't really think he can be elected

President. But you never can tell what will happen in politics, and it is a good thing to knock him out of the race now."

"However," he continued, "that isn't the main idea. Our real fear is that the reactionary and Fascist politicians and newspapers will build him up and then use him to force the nomination and election of some lesser known Fascist tool. If we can discredit him thoroughly now, he will lose his value to the American reactionaries long before 1948 rolls around."

It was a little boo for MacArthur at the Garden last Tuesday, but that little boo will soon become a great big boo, if the Communists can so contrive it. The party line says: "Get MacArthur."

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, the point I wish to make is that if it comes down to a question whether or not we in America are going to stand behind General MacArthur and the job he is doing over there, then I want to be counted as being for General MacArthur and the gallant men under him. I think most Americans in this country feel as I do respecting this. I regret the effort to tear him down and to smear him at a time such as this, when he is over there representing not only America but the Allied Powers, and when he is doing an excellent job.

But, Mr. President, I think the Acheson nomination does not involve that issue. So I propose to vote for Mr. Acheson as I did in the committee. In making this explanation, I want it to be clear that my vote in no way is a reflection on the able Senator from Nebraska or on the courageous stand he has taken in defense of that great American, Douglas MacArthur.

MAJ. GEN. LESLIE R. GROVES

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I wish to speak about another matter for a few minutes because I am obliged to take a train out of the city in about 40 minutes. I do not wish to delay a vote on the pending nomination.

Mr. WHITE rose.

Mr. STEWART. Does the Senator from Maine wish me to yield to him?

Mr. WHITE. If the Senator would be so courteous, I should like to make a very brief statement respecting the nomination of Mr. Acheson, but I shall wait until the Senator from Tennessee has concluded his remarks, if that is his desire.

Mr. STEWART. It will take me only a few minutes. I am pressed for time.

Mr. President, on September 19 I submitted a resolution (S. Res. 175) which requests the President of the United States to appoint Leslie R. Groves, who is now a major general, Army of the United States, to be a major general of the line in the Regular Army of the United States; that is, to give him a permanent rank of major general. As the resolution provides, this would be done "in recognition of his outstanding services to the Nation and particularly the planning, organization, magnitude of work, and risks demanded by his contribution in the development of the atomic bomb."

As everyone knows, at least a large portion, if not the major portion, of the work done in the development of this bomb was done in the State of Tennessee, at Oak Ridge, where on Saturday

of this week, I understand, there is to be a celebration, which will be attended by Secretary of War Patterson and others.

I call attention to this resolution today chiefly for the purpose of emphasis. In doing so, I should like to refer to a number of comments from newspapers throughout the country. I shall not take the time to read them all, but shall ask unanimous consent that they be printed in full in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

I refer first to an editorial entitled "He Deserves Reward," published in the Memphis Commercial Appeal of Sunday, September 9, 1945. It reads, in part, as follows:

For 3 years the activities of Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves were cloaked in complete anonymity and secrecy. While others, more conspicuously placed, were receiving public adulation and decorations for military accomplishment, he was quietly plodding along in one of the most responsible tasks ever assigned a human being—that of directing the atomic bomb project.

I shall not read all of the editorial, but I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in full in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HE DESERVES REWARD

For 3 years the activities of Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves were cloaked in complete anonymity and secrecy. While others, more conspicuously placed, were receiving public adulation and decorations for military accomplishment, he was quietly plodding along in one of the most responsible tasks ever assigned a human being—that of directing the atomic bomb project.

It was his job to produce what science had made possible, and that meant production from the ground up—construction of the gigantic Tennessee and Washington plants, and development of the testing reservation in New Mexico. It involved the employment of skilled technicians and the training of thousands of others and, when the time came, direction of productive operations and final testing of the weapon. In addition there was the over-all responsibility of maintaining complete secrecy, one of the most difficult of all the many complex phases of the undertaking.

The entire world knows the success of the project, although it cannot yet begin to estimate the effect of release of atomic energy on man's future. Such success is deserving of reward by those chiefly responsible for achieving it. Civilian honors will, no doubt, be accorded those scientists who participated. Military honors should, of course, go to those American Army officers having directive responsibility.

In that connection we can think of no better way of rewarding General Groves than to make his current rank permanent, or to give him even higher rank and make that permanent. His achievement comes easily within the classification of superlative, not only as to its effect on the Pacific war, but as it relates to the future of peace or war. In its way it was as great a victory as any achieved under combat leadership.

His present permanent rank is that of lieutenant colonel. When the Army is ultimately reduced to what is to be its peacetime level, high temporary ranks held by many officers will have to be relinquished. It would be a great pity if that were to happen to General Groves, and we do not believe the people would want it to happen.

Public attention is currently focused on the weapon and the potentialities of its power. It will not be amiss for it to be thinking of honoring those who produced it.

Mr. STEWART. Next I refer to an article in the September 3 issue of News Week, on page 42, under the title "National Affairs." Almost a full page is devoted to General Groves. He is referred to as the "Atom Man," and tribute is paid him. In this article it is suggested that recognition be given by the President of the United States for his services. I read a portion of the article:

President Truman's military advisers have fixed their general ideas of what this Nation's policy on atomic power should be. In order to maintain our headstart over other nations, they want continued research in and production of atomic energy, but for the Government's sole account and under its complete control. Only when the danger of aggression has been banished would they share our advanced discoveries with the world at large.

The article then proceeds to discuss General Groves and the work which he did at Oak Ridge in Tennessee in connection with the development of the bomb, which, of course, won the war. I ask that the article be printed in full in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ATOM MAN

President Truman's military advisers have fixed their general ideas of what this Nation's policy on atomic power should be. In order to maintain our head start over other nations, they want continued research in and production of atomic energy, but for the Government's sole account and under its complete control. Only when the danger of aggression has been banished would they share our advanced discoveries with the world at large.

The President's diplomatic advisers believe with the military experts that no such sharing will be warranted in the next few years. Assuming then that Mr. Truman recommends and Congress adopts their policy, the military men see a long-time job ahead for a mild-mannered colleague, Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves.

WHAT MAKES KNOW-HOW

An Army chaplain's son, Groves, when named executive director of the "Manhattan District" project in June 1942, already had much experience on big Army construction jobs, among them the Fort Peck Dam and the Pentagon Building. Through them, he had developed a prodigious memory, a mastery of detail, and ability to harmonize conflicts. He had experienced disasters, too. In 1927, a TNT explosion in a Vermont powder plant had killed an Army sergeant standing near him, and in 1931, while he was surveying the route for the proposed second inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua, he survived an earthquake, winning the republic's Medal of Merit for relief work.

Groves' first task on atomic fission was to choose from among the blocks of research amassed by mathematicians, physicists, nuclear-physicists, and chemists the foundation stones for the plants on which the late President Roosevelt decided to risk \$2,000,000,000 so that atomic energy could be released in quantities sufficient to win the war. Two years at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before entering West Point, plus occasional dabbling in pure science after getting his Army commission, enabled Groves to talk the scientists' language.

BOSSES WANTED

Groves' second task was to contract for building and operating the plants, and the second enterprise found some big firms reluctant. Du Pont, for example, remembering its rake-over by the Nye munitions investigation a decade ago, came in only after Groves explained the urgency of the project and then put its management fee at cost plus \$1 profit. And though some other firms sought to profit unreasonably by the speed factor, the only irregularity uncovered to date has been the short-changing of the Government by a few contract off-area bus drivers at the Oak Ridge, Tenn., plant. They have been prosecuted.

In his third task—enrolling a construction force of 100,000 or more and an operating force of 65,000—Groves made the American Federation of Labor joint recruiting agent with the War Manpower Commission. To William Green and the chiefs of AFL craft unions supplying the needed skills, Groves, at a meeting in the fall of 1942, said: "Of this project, I can only say that unless the Germans edge us out, it will win the war and save the lives of labor's sons. We can't have jurisdictional strikes." There were none.

FATHER WOULDN'T TELL

To safeguard the secret, Groves limited his social life to the Army and Navy Club, where reticence is respected. Sometimes, his daughter Gwen joined him on the club's tennis court. But, until the President announced it, neither the 16-year-old subdeb nor her mother knew that he was working daily with glittering scientist-socialites, whom the project had summoned to Washington.

Groves' promotions—to brigadier general when he took the job and to major general later—piqued the curiosity of his son Richard, who was a student at West Point. Upon his graduation last June, the young man probed his father; "Dad, the fellows here all ask me what my old man has done to rate two stars and his own sleeper plane." Groves let him remain perplexed.

Three times, aides left unlocked at night in Groves' office safe drawers containing project papers. Discovering the third offense himself, Groves called the culprit before him, exploded with a "Good Heavens," then asked: "Isn't this a bad example for the lower ranks?"

Groves' own example to his staff—a 12-hour workday—has not been altered by the Japanese surrender. Should he be detached from the Manhattan District and revert to his permanent rank of lieutenant colonel, Groves, just turned 49, has told friends he might leave the Army and try farming for a while. They think it unlikely that he'll leave. To Secretary of War Stimson's comment on his service, "truly outstanding," the President is scheduled soon to add another honor—the Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. STEWART. I refer next to an editorial in the Washington News of Monday, September 10, 1945, entitled "Recognition, Please." The editorial reads in part, as follows:

President Roosevelt and Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves would have been forced to justify that \$2,000,000,000, the work, the time, and the material that went into an unsuccessful project. And that would have been something to explain. After President Roosevelt died, the burden fell on General Groves alone. You can imagine the constant weight of that tremendous secret on him, as he went from the Pentagon to his home at 3508 Thirty-sixth Street NW., each night.

The editorial states that General Groves deserves high recognition for the excellent work which he did in this connection. I ask unanimous consent that

the editorial be printed in full in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RECOGNITION, PLEASE

You'll want to follow the picture-story of the atom, which we begin today on page 8. And as you follow this fascinating story, ponder what would have happened to the two men chiefly responsible for the \$2,000,000,000 set-up that solved the secret of the atom bomb—if that gigantic outlay had flopped.

President Roosevelt and Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves would have been forced to justify that \$2,000,000,000, the work, the time, and the material that went into an unsuccessful project. And that would have been something to explain. After President Roosevelt died, the burden fell on General Groves alone. You can imagine the constant weight of that tremendous secret on him, as he went from the Pentagon to his home at 3508 Thirty-sixth Street NW., each night.

This Nation can give nothing further to the person of President Roosevelt. It can and should recognize the achievement of General Groves and the highly successful way in which he carried out his mission.

The planning, organization, magnitude of work and risks demanded by General Groves' task were no less than those required to mount an invasion. Our invasion leaders have had well-merited recognition. General Groves deserves as much.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I should like to take the time to say a little more about General Groves, and express my thoughts along the lines indicated by the editorials and by the resolution which I have submitted; but I realized that many Senators are now under pressure, and that there is some anxiety on the part of a few Senators to get away a little early this afternoon. For that reason I shall not consume any more time discussing this particular subject. However, I should like to say that I am sure the entire Nation agrees with the editorial comment to which I have referred. A number of other newspapers have also made favorable comments concerning General Groves and his excellent work. I believe that the entire Nation feels that for the President of the United States to bestow upon General Groves the permanent rank of major general would be a fit recognition of this achievement. I believe he is entitled to it. I think he is entitled to much more than that. Compared with the accomplishments of the man, that is a very small gesture, but at least it is in the right direction.

Mr. President, I should now like to refer briefly to another matter.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

FOOD SHORTAGES—FATS AND OILS

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I shall ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a report consisting of five typewritten pages. I wish to have it printed as a part of my remarks. I do this in the interest of time. The report is brief and to the point. It concerns hearings which were held by the so-called Small Business Committee, of which the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], chairman of the full committee, and I are members. The

hearings were held during the vacation, and they concern food shortages which had developed in the country, particularly with respect to fats and oils.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Among the most serious food shortages which developed in this country as a result of the war is that of fats and oils, which during recent months became particularly acute in the southern cotton producing States.

Due to this condition, Members of the House and Senate received numerous complaints from various sections of the South, indicating that agricultural laborers in the area were refusing to work, that mines were closed down, and that laborers generally were dissatisfied as a result of their inability to obtain sufficient fats and oils which comprise a large part of the normal diet of such workers.

Due to the seriousness of the situation, the Senate Small Business Committee's complaints subcommittee conducted public hearings on the matter, for the purpose of ascertaining what relief could be offered to fats and oil users, particularly in the critical southern areas.

These hearings involved a thorough examination of both supply and distribution problems and regulations affecting these products, which finally resulted in the following relief to the most seriously affected areas:

1. The Department of Agriculture diverted 12,000,000 pounds of salt meat and fatback which had been earmarked for export, to be channeled through dealers in the Southern States.

2. Military set-asides of lard were eliminated in five Southern States, having already been reduced in 24. The States in which the set-asides were eliminated are (1) Kentucky, (2) Tennessee, (3) Arkansas, (4) Texas, and (5) Oklahoma.

3. Eleven million pounds of oil from the producers of shortening and cooking oils in consumer-size packages were channeled by the Department of Agriculture into 10 key Southern States in the Cotton Belt.

It was testified during the hearings that 24,000,000 pounds of fats and oils would be required to eliminate the critical shortage throughout the Southern States for the third quarter. It is estimated by the Department of Agriculture that the adjustments which were made following the committee hearing would be more than ample to supply the amount of lard, salt meat, and other fats and oils needed by the South to assure the usually required diets of the workers in that area.

During the hearings witnesses for the Department of Agriculture and the Office of Price Administration were questioned at length concerning the feasibility of reducing exports of lard to England and other countries. It was pointed out that approximately 33,000,000 pounds of lard were scheduled for shipment to our allies during the third quarter. The agencies questioned, however, were disinclined to eliminate these exports in order to solve the domestic situation, expressing the belief that other steps could be taken to ease the critical shortage.

It was suggested during the hearings, that perhaps a portion of the exports going to Great Britain might be "borrowed" during the months of August and September in order to ease the southern shortage, and later repaid during the heavy slaughtering period which yields large amounts of fats and oils. Representatives of the Department of Agriculture expressed the belief that it would be a mistake to mortgage the future fats and oils supply in this manner, and that such action might create an extremely critical

supply picture at a later time, and expressed the belief that a course which they were at that time preparing to follow, namely the adoption of the three-point relief program, would be much more satisfactory as far as the domestic fats and oils supply situation in the South is concerned.

It was pointed out that the average annual consumption of fats and oils per capita, all over the United States, is about 48 pounds in normal times, but that the average annual consumption in the South is much higher, running about 100 pounds per person. At the time the hearings were held, the per capita consumption of fats and oils throughout the United States had dropped to a rate of about 28 pounds a year and no special provisions were made for the southern States, thus making the problem in that section particularly acute.

However, the Department of Agriculture and the Office of Price Administration had already requested certain large packers to ship additional supplies of fats and oils which they were realizing from the reduced set-asides in the 24 States into the critical southern area in order to alleviate the situation. It was felt by these agencies, and rightly so, that maintenance of agricultural laborers on the job in the South and particularly in the cotton belt, was extremely important because of the fact that the cotton crop itself yields large quantities of cottonseed oil, one of the major United States sources of edible oils.

The Office of Price Administration indicated that it would continue to maintain relatively high point values on fats and oils throughout the country as long as the extreme shortage continues to exist. By this means, it was hoped that any additions to the civilian fats and oils supply would be channeled to the critical Southern States. The reasoning behind this procedure is that high point values in the North would discourage the purchase of fats and oils due to the preference of persons in this area for meats, other than the fat meats included within the general term "fats and oils." Thus, by limiting northern purchases, distributors of fats and oils would tend to ship to southern markets in which fats and oils have a high demand and in which persons are more inclined to spend their point supplies for such products.

Representatives of the Army and Navy testified during the hearing that neither branch of the military service had any excessive stocks of fats and oils and that their purchases were not too large for their requirements. The Army representative indicated that this branch of service carries approximately 1 month's supply of fats and oils in its inventory, making replacement on a varying basis, to correspond to consumption both in this country and abroad. The Navy representatives testified that about 3 months' stocks have been carried by this branch of the service but that at the present time they were engaged in reducing to a 2 months' inventory. Thus, adjustments in military procurement, according to the witnesses, does not offer any solution to the fats and oils problem.

Therefore, the action which the Department of Agriculture and the Office of Price Administration have already taken seem to offer the best solution to the critical situation which developed in the cotton States.

While this action does not alleviate the general situation throughout the country, it will, in the long run, tend to lessen the general fats and oils shortage as a result of the fact that larger amounts of cottonseed oil will be realized from the South if workers are kept in the fields. Thus, while the only long-run answer to the fats and oils shortage generally is more production, the steps which have been taken to aid the South will eventually help in obtaining such production.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I wish to read a portion of the report:

Among the most serious food shortages which developed in this country as a result of the war is that of fats and oils, which during recent months became particularly acute in the southern cotton producing States.

Due to this condition, members of the House and Senate received numerous complaints from various sections of the South, indicating that agricultural laborers in the area were refusing to work, that mines were closed down, and that laborers generally were dissatisfied as a result of their inability to obtain sufficient fats and oils which comprise a large part of the normal diet of such worker.

Due to the seriousness of the situation, the Senate Small Business Committee's Complaints Subcommittee conducted public hearing on the matter, for the purpose of ascertaining what relief could be offered to fats and oils users, particularly in the critical southern areas.

These hearings involved a thorough examination of both supply and distribution problems and regulations affecting these products, which finally resulted in the following relief to the most seriously affected areas:

1. The Department of Agriculture diverted 12,000,000 pounds of salt meat and fat back which had been earmarked for export, to be channeled through dealers in the southern States.

2. Military set-asides of lard were eliminated in 5 Southern States having already been reduced in 24. The States in which the set-asides were eliminated are (1) Kentucky, (2) Tennessee, (3) Arkansas, (4) Texas, and (5) Oklahoma.

3. Eleven million pounds of oil, from the producers of shortening and cooking oils in consumer-size packages were channeled by the State department of agriculture into 10 key Southern States in the Cotton Belt.

Let me add that the cooperation of the Secretary of Agriculture, Hon. Clinton Anderson, has been, in common parlance, 100 percent. I believe that it was largely through his efforts, and those of certain officials of the OPA, that we were able to obtain quick relief. We have not as yet had complete relief. We learned at the hearing that fats and oils are consumed on a larger scale per capita in the Southern States than in other portions of the country. For example, the per capita consumption in the South, as I recall, is about 100 pounds, whereas in the over-all picture for the entire 48 States it is approximately 48 pounds. We do not yet have the relief to which we are entitled. I wish to point out that we found that a large portion of the fat meat, lard, and shortening which should have been diverted into the portion of our country where the field hands and laborers were actually starving to death for want of it had been earmarked for export. Our information was that it was to be sent to the British Isles, where, according to our information, there already is a larger per capita supply of fats and oils than we have in this country. As a matter of fact, I think a great many foodstuffs and perhaps other things are in shorter supply in this country than in the British Isles—a subject which I imagine will be discussed pro and con before the boys from Britain go back with the baskets they brought over here the other day.

I desire to call particular attention to the relief which was granted through the Department of Agriculture. Let me say

further that I wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture requesting that we be permitted to have a conference with him before any further commitments were made in the next quarter for the furnishing of certain foodstuffs to Britain and others of our allies in Europe. In the letter I also requested that a complete survey of the situation be made, that we be advised about it, and that the interests of our own people at home be given full protection—a thing which I feel sure the Secretary will do, of course. As a matter of fact, he agreed to have the conference; and I am sure he will have and does have the protection, welfare, and interests of the American people at heart. But, Mr. President, we are not in a position to be prodigal with our supply of fats, oils, and certain other foodstuffs. We have permitted certain sections of the country really to suffer on account of the lack of them. It is with that situation in mind that the subcommittee of the Senate Small Business Committee will, within the next week or two, I imagine, hold further hearings on the same subject. That is all I wish to say on the matter, Mr. President.

NOMINATION OF DEAN G. ACHESON TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the nomination of Dean G. Acheson to be Under Secretary of State.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the situation relative to Dean Acheson and General MacArthur has been discussed so thoroughly, I ask unanimous consent that a very brief statement I have prepared be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATOR WILEY URGES GENERAL MACARTHUR AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

I shall vote to confirm the nomination of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. I should, however, like to make clear my position with regard to the matter which has arisen in connection with him and with General MacArthur. I should like, moreover, to present my thought with regard to General MacArthur's future role in the service of the American people.

I do not believe that there is any vital difference or conflict between the State Department and General MacArthur.

A. General MacArthur, acting as supreme commander of the United Nations, did right in releasing his statement to the press to the effect that by next July only 200,000 men would be required in our occupation forces in Japan and Korea unless unforeseen factors arise.

General MacArthur is in the field. He knows the situation in Japan; he knows the Japanese people; he knows the East, its philosophy, its mental processes, its way of life. As a matter of necessity (as over-all commander) his discretion is unlimited, and he has exercised that discretion to the complete satisfaction of the American people. No one would think of curtailing his freedom in the issuance of statements to the press.

By comparing the White House directive of August 29 on far eastern policy with General MacArthur's actions, we can see how closely and faithfully the general has carried out his orders.

General MacArthur is a soldier fulfilling his duty. That duty entails a knowledge, as we have said, of the oriental mind (which

the general knows far better than we here at home). He made his statement possibly partly for oriental consumption for reasons which to him were adequate.

B. Dean Acheson was right in asserting the primacy of civilian over military authority in our Republic as the determinant of policy.

It is, however, to be sincerely regretted that his statement was so worded as to involve any disparagement of General MacArthur's purpose and discretion or as to permit of any such interpretation. I can certainly understand the feelings of those of my colleagues who hastened immediately to prevent what they considered a slur against General MacArthur's honor.

To my knowledge there has been no dispute as to Dean Acheson's qualifications other than his remark with regard to General MacArthur. I shall, therefore, vote for the confirmation of his nomination.

C. Following Dean Acheson's statement, General MacArthur, in an interview, stated that his current assignment would be his last in public service.

General MacArthur has lived a strenuous life in the service of the Republic. He has served with unselfish devotion and with unparalleled excellence in countless fields and on countless fronts. He has already written such chapters of valor that he will live in our history as long as America lives. No American would deny him a well-deserved rest.

But for all his honors and for all his labors, it is not for General MacArthur to say whether this will be his last assignment in the public service. It is up to the American people to make this decision.

In my humble opinion, the American people will refuse to consider his current assignment as his last assignment on behalf of our Nation. In my opinion, as soon as the minimum needs for security of the United Nations are met through Japan's demilitarization, the American people will demand that General MacArthur be recalled for further duty in the land of his devoted countrymen, a land which he has not seen for so many years.

I believe that as soon as a single Cabinet Department of National Defense is set up, the ideal military man to fill that position would be Douglas MacArthur.

In any case, General MacArthur should immediately be brought home following the fulfillment of the minimum requirements for Japan's demilitarization.

Once Douglas MacArthur said prophetically and determinedly, "I will come back." Now I believe that the American people say, "You will come back—to continued service in the land you have served so well and so long."

Let us not, in any event, make a mountain out of this relative molehill in Asia, when the true mountain of crisis lies now in Europe.

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD, at this point, an editorial published in the Wanderer, a weekly Catholic newspaper published in St. Paul, Minn. The editorial is entitled "General MacArthur: Guest Editor." As a preliminary to the editorial, there are some remarks about General MacArthur. Following that is printed a copy of the address General MacArthur made at the time when the surrender document was signed by the Japanese. It seems to me that when diplomats are fighting over the bleeding corpse of a wounded world, quarreling like wolves over the body of a bleeding sheep, the sentiments expressed by General MacArthur should be considered. I think his words will go down in history as on a par with Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. He

manifests an understanding of spiritual values much neglected these days.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR: GUEST EDITOR

We take great pleasure in turning over this editorial column today to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, soldier and Christian gentleman. What he says was not written at the behest of the Wanderer, but every word is well worth repeating in the columns of a Catholic publication that has tried, in season and out of season, to uphold the idea that wars have never, by themselves, solved world problems and that genuine peace is the product not of military victory but of religious and moral regeneration. Or, as the motto of Pope Pius XII declares: "Peace is the work of justice."

The fact that General MacArthur gave voice to such sentiments at the moment of the Japanese surrender, moreover, lends added significance to his words and justifies the hope that they will ultimately prevail over the preachments of hatred and vindictiveness and national pride currently propagated by irresponsible elements.

Addressing the Allied and Japanese delegates assembled for the Japan surrender ceremony aboard the U. S. S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, MacArthur declared:

"We are gathered here, representatives of the major warring powers, to conclude a solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored. The issues, involving divergent ideals and ideologists, have been determined on the battle fields of the world and hence are not for our discussion or debate. Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the peoples of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice, or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone benefits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all of our peoples unreservedly to faithful compliance with the undertakings they are here formally to assume."

"It is my earnest hope and indeed the hope of all mankind that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past—a world founded upon faith and understanding, a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance, and justice. * * *

And after the representatives of Japan and of the nine Allied Powers present had signed the surrender agreement, MacArthur closed the ceremony with these words:

"Let us pray that peace be now restored to the world, and that God will preserve it always."

In full accord with the Christian chivalry revealed in MacArthur's attitude during the formal ceremonies was the address he delivered immediately afterward, from which we quote the following significant paragraphs:

"Today the guns are silent. A great tragedy has ended. A great victory has been won. The skies no longer rain death—the seas bear only commerce—men everywhere walk upright in the sunlight. The entire world is quietly at peace. The holy mission has been completed and in reporting this to you, the people, I speak for the thousands of silent lips, forever stilled among the jungles and the beaches and in the deep waters of the Pacific which marked the way. I speak for the unnamed brave millions homeward-bound to take up the challenge of that future which they did so much to salvage from the brink of disaster."

"We have known the bitterness of defeat and the exultation of triumph, and from both we have learned there can be no turning back. We must go forward to preserve in peace what we won in war."

"A new era is upon us. Even the lesson of victory itself brings with it profound concern, both for our future security and the survival of civilization. The destructiveness of the war potential, through progressive advances in scientific discovery, has in fact now reached a point which revises the traditional concept of war."

"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliance, balances of power, leagues of nations all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative."

"We have had our last chance. If we do not now devise some greater and more equitable system Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advance in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh."

Thank you, General MacArthur. What you say has been frequently reiterated by thoughtful Catholic publicists in this country and elsewhere. For that they were scoffed at and denounced as theorists who ignored the cold realities of international affairs. That a realist of your stature, who surely cannot be accused of any bias in favor of our late enemies, has seen fit to voice a warning against reliance on power and might alone, pleading instead for a return to God and moral law, augurs well for the peace of which this Nation is at this moment the foremost custodian.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I am sorry this debate has arisen concerning two of our most efficient public servants. I do not intend to take part in the debate, but I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the *RECORD* a short editorial which appeared in the *Barre (Vt.) Daily Times* of September 22, 1945. I think the editorial adequately expresses the opinions of a great many of the people of this country.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

Dean Acheson has had a long and distinguished career in public service, and there is no legitimate reason why his nomination as Under Secretary of State should not be immediately approved by the Senate. It is true that he may have disagreed with General MacArthur on the question of the number of men needed to occupy Japan, but he did not, as charged, insult or blight the name of the general, for whom we have the utmost respect and affection. It was an honest difference of opinion and should be treated as such. Acheson is rightly deserving of the promotion to the office to which he has been named by President Truman.

The *PRESIDENT* pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] to recommit the pending nomination to the Committee on Foreign Relations. On this question the yeas and nays have been demanded and ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. BRIDGES (after having voted in the negative). I have a pair with the

Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS]. I understand that if he were present and voting he would vote as I have voted. Therefore, I will allow my vote to stand.

Mr. HILL. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. GLASS] are absent from the Senate because of illness.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. BANKHEAD], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH] are detained on public business.

The Senators from Rhode Island [Mr. GERRY and Mr. GREEN] are detained in a conference with the Secretary of the Navy.

The Senator from Florida [Mr. PEPPER] and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] are absent on official business.

I am advised that if present and voting, all the Senators whose absences I have announced would vote "nay."

The Senator from Montana [Mr. WHEELER] is detained on official business.

Mr. WHITE. I announce the unavoidable absence on official business of the junior Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND]. On this question if he were present and voting he would vote "nay."

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. AUSTIN] and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BUSHFIELD] and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. THOMAS] are absent because of illness.

The result was announced—yeas 12, nays 66, as follows:

YEAS—12

Brooks	Moore	Shipstead
Butler	Reed	Wherry
Capehart	Revercomb	Wilson
Capper	Robertson	Young

NAYS—66

Alken	Guffey	Millikin
Andrews	Gurney	Mitchell
Bailey	Hart	Morse
Ball	Hatch	Murdoch
Barkley	Hawkes	Murray
Blibo	Hayden	Myers
Brewster	Hickenlooper	O'Daniel
Bridges	Hill	Overton
Briggs	Hoey	Radcliffe
Buck	Johnson, Colo.	Saitonstall
Burton	Johnston, S. C.	Smith
Carville	La Follette	Stewart
Chandler	Langer	Taft
Chavez	Lucas	Taylor
Connally	McCarran	Thomas, Okla.
Cordon	McClellan	Tunnell
Donnell	McFarland	Tydings
Downey	McKellar	Vandenberg
Ellender	McMahon	Wagner
Ferguson	Magnuson	White
Fulbright	Maybank	Wiley
George	Mead	Willis

NOT VOTING—18

Austin	Glass	Russell
Bankhead	Green	Thomas, Idaho
Bushfield	Kilgore	Thomas, Utah
Byrd	Knowland	Tobey
Eastland	O'Mahoney	Walsh
Gerry	Pepper	Wheeler

So Mr. WHERRY's motion to recommit was rejected.

The *PRESIDENT* pro tempore. The question now is, Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?

Mr. LUCAS, Mr. BALL, and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The yeas and nays are ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WHITE (when Mr. KNOWLAND's name was called). I again announce the necessary absence on official business of the junior Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND]. If he were present he would vote "yea."

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. BRIDGES (after having voted in the affirmative). I have a general pair with the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS]. I am advised that if present he would vote as I have voted, and I therefore allow my vote to stand.

Mr. HILL. The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. GUFFEY] is absent on official business in one of the Government departments. I am advised that if present and voting he would vote "yea."

I announce further that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. GLASS] are absent from the Senate because of illness.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. BANKHEAD], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH] are detained on public business.

The Senators from Rhode Island [Mr. GERRY and Mr. GREEN] are detained in a conference with the Secretary of the Navy.

The Senator from Florida [Mr. PEPPER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. TAYLOR], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] are absent on official business.

I am advised that if present and voting, all the Senators whose absences I have announced would vote "yea."

The Senator from Montana [Mr. WHEELER] is detained on official business.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. AUSTIN] and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BUSHFIELD] and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. THOMAS] are absent because of illness.

The result was announced—yeas 69, nays 1, as follows:

YEAS—69

Aiken	George	Morse
Andrews	Gurney	Murdock
Bailey	Hart	Murray
Ball	Hatch	Myers
Barkley	Hawkes	O'Daniel
Bilbo	Hayden	Overton
Bridges	Hickenlooper	Radcliffe
Briggs	Hill	Revercomb
Brooks	Hoey	Robertson
Buck	Johnson, Colo.	Saltonstall
Burton	Johnston, S. C.	Smith
Capehart	La Follette	Stewart
Capper	Lucas	Thomas, Okla.
Carville	McCarran	Tunnell
Chandler	McClellan	Tydings
Chavez	McFarland	Vandenberg
Connally	McKellar	Wagner
Cordon	McMahon	White
Donnell	Magnuson	Wiley
Downey	Maybank	Willis
Ellender	Mead	Wilson
Ferguson	Mitchell	Young
Fulbright	Moore	

NAYS—1

Wherry

NOT VOTING—26

Austin	Green	Russell
Bankhead	Guffey	Shipstead
Brewster	Kilgore	Taylor
Bushfield	Knowland	Thomas, Idaho
Butler	Langer	Thomas, Utah
Byrd	Millikin	Tobey
Eastland	O'Mahoney	Walsh
Gerry	Pepper	Wheeler
Glass	Reed	

So the nomination of Dean G. Acheson to be Under Secretary of State was confirmed.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will proceed to state the other nominations on the Executive Calendar.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Frank McCarthy to be Assistant Secretary of State.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

FOREIGN SERVICE

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Maxwell M. Hamilton to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Finland.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Bennett Champ Clark to be associate justice.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Wilbur K. Miller to be associate justice.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of E. Barrett Prettyman to be associate justice.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Alexander Holtzoff to be associate justice.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John A. Carver to be United States attorney for the district of Idaho.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Whitfield Y. Mauzy to be United States attorney for the northern district of Oklahoma.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

UNITED STATES MARSHALS

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Granville T. Norris to be United

States marshal for the eastern district of Oklahoma.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Dave E. Hilles to be United States marshal for the western district of Oklahoma.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

THE NAVY

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Capt. Gilchrist Baker Stockton, to be rear admiral in the Naval Reserve.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I wish to point out to the Senate that the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate has more or less temporarily adopted a policy of holding up nominations for temporary promotions to the higher echelons of the Navy. In the case of Captain Stockton, because of the peculiar type of job this reserve officer was to handle in the Philippines, we deviated from our policy.

I know that the Senate will be pleased to hear that, now that the war is over, in view of the fact that we are trying to demobilize the Navy, as well as the Army, we are attempting to have the Navy Department in every case justify any temporary promotion from now on in the higher echelons.

POSTMASTERS

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations of postmasters.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the postmaster nominations are confirmed en bloc. That completes the Executive Calendar.

Mr. BARKLEY. I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of all confirmations of today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of legislative business.

FULL EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1945

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, without intending to have the bill taken up today, but merely in order to make it the unfinished business so that it can be taken up for consideration tomorrow, I move that the Senate proceed to consider Senate bill 380, Calendar No. 582, the so-called full-employment bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 380) to establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free competitive economy, through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and the Federal Government.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, I have no objection to our proceeding immediately with the bill, except that it occurs to me that a bill which has been reported regarding Army volunteers could probably pass the Senate in 30 minutes. Until that is done, the entire draft problem will remain complicated.

Mr. BARKLEY. I appreciate the importance of that bill, and if it could be considered without long debate, I should be in favor of laying aside temporarily the full-employment bill. The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs is not at the moment in the Chamber, and I do not like to do anything about the bill until he is present. If my motion shall be agreed to, and we can reasonably hope to dispose of the bill referred to by the Senator from Michigan after brief discussion tomorrow, or at any other time, by laying aside the full-employment bill, I shall be agreeable to that program.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I thank the Senator for his statement. It seems to me that in view of the turmoil of public opinion, both in and out of Congress, with respect to enlistments, the quicker we can undertake this experiment the sooner we can know whether or not it will be necessary to proceed with the draft.

Mr. BARKLEY. I appreciate we cannot know what further legislation will be necessary until we know the degree of success the voluntary system may attain, and it is important to dispose of the matter at the earliest possible date. I shall cooperate to that end.

Mr. VANDENBERG. In addition to that is the fact that the full-employment bill cannot even pretend to take effect for 3 or 4 months, and after that will not really become effective for 6 months, so that I think we might spare an hour.

Mr. BARKLEY. All that is cumulative argument in favor of disposing of the other matter as quickly as possible.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, I wish wholeheartedly to join the senior Senator from Michigan in urging early consideration of the bill which has just been reported by the Committee on Military Affairs permitting volunteering in the Army and Navy. I hope the majority leader will, during the course of the consideration of the full-employment bill, find time to have the bill dealing with volunteering in the services taken up and disposed of. I realize it cannot be taken up today, because it was reported today by the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, but I point out that the bill has been passed by the House of Representatives and is ready and ripe for consideration tomorrow by this body. I wish to urge earnestly that the bill dealing with volunteers be taken up at the earliest possible moment.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY] to proceed to the consideration of the Senate bill 380.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 380), to establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free competitive economy,

through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and the Federal Government, which had been reported from the Committee on Banking and Currency with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and to insert:

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This act may be cited as the "Full Employment Act of 1945."

FREE ENTERPRISE AND FULL EMPLOYMENT

SEC. 2. (a) It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to foster free competitive private enterprise and the investment of private capital.

(b) All Americans able to work and desiring to work are entitled to an opportunity for useful, remunerative, regular, and full-time employment.

(c) In order to assure the free exercise of the rights to an opportunity for employment set forth above and in order to (1) foster free competitive private enterprise and the investment of private capital; (2) promote the general health and welfare of the Nation; (3) foster the American home and American education as the foundation of the American way of life; (4) raise the standard of living of the American people; (5) provide adequate employment opportunities for returning veterans; (6) develop trade and commerce among the several States and with foreign nations; (7) maintain expanding markets for agricultural products and assure expanding income for agricultural enterprises; (8) contribute to the economic development of underdeveloped areas of the country; (9) encourage and strengthen competitive small business enterprises; (10) strengthen the national defense and security; and (11) contribute to the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace among nations, the Federal Government has the responsibility to assure continuing full employment, that is, the existence at all times of sufficient employment opportunities for all Americans able to work and desiring to work.

(d) To that end the Federal Government shall, in cooperation with industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and others, develop and pursue a consistent and carefully planned economic program with respect to, but not limited to, taxation; banking, credit, and currency; monopoly and monopolistic practices; wages, hours, and working conditions; foreign trade and investment; agriculture; education; housing; social security; natural resources; the provision of public services, works, and research; and other revenue, investment, expenditure, service, or regulatory activities of the Federal Government. Such program shall, among other things—

(1) stimulate, encourage, and assist private enterprises to provide, through an expanding production and distribution of goods and services, the largest feasible volume of employment opportunities;

(2) stimulate, encourage, and assist State and local governments, through the exercise of their respective functions, to make their most effective contribution to assuring continuing full employment;

(3) provide for an income for the aged sufficient to enable them to maintain a decent and healthful standard of living, and promote the retirement from the labor force of the older citizens; and

(4) to the extent that continuing full employment cannot otherwise be assured, provide such volume of Federal investment and expenditure as may be needed, in addition to the investment and expenditure by private enterprises, consumers, and State and local governments, to assure continuing full employment. Such Federal investment and expenditure, whether direct or indirect, or

whether for public works, for public services, for assistance to business, agriculture, home owners, veterans, or consumers, or for other purposes, shall be designed to contribute to the national wealth and well-being and to stimulate increased employment opportunities by private enterprises. Any such Federal investment and expenditure calling for the construction of public works by the Federal Government shall provide for the performance of the necessary construction work by private enterprises under contract, except where the performance of such work by some other method is necessary by reason of special circumstances or is authorized by other provisions of law; and all such work shall be performed in accordance with all applicable laws, including laws relating to labor standards.

(e) It is the policy of the United States to discharge the responsibilities herein set forth in such a manner as will contribute to an expanding exchange of goods and services among nations and without resort to measures or programs that would contribute to economic warfare among nations.

THE NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT BUDGET

SEC. 3. (a) The President shall transmit to Congress at the beginning of each regular session the National Production and Employment Budget (hereinafter referred to as the "National Budget"), which shall set forth—

(1) for the ensuing fiscal year and such longer period as the President may deem appropriate, an estimate of the number of employment opportunities needed for full employment, the production of goods and services at full employment, and the volume of investment and expenditure needed for the purchase of such goods and services;

(2) current and foreseeable trends in the number of employment opportunities, the production of goods and services, and the volume of investment and expenditure for the purchase of goods and services, not taking into account the effects of the general program provided for in paragraph (3) hereof; and

(3) a general program, pursuant to section 2, for assuring continuing full employment, together with such recommendations for legislation as he may deem necessary or desirable. Such program shall include whatever measures he may deem necessary to prevent inflationary or deflationary dislocations or monopolistic practices from interfering with the assurance of continuing full employment.

(b) The National Budget shall include a review of the economic program of the Federal Government during the preceding year and a report on its effect upon the amount of the national income and upon the distribution of the national income among agriculture, industry, labor, and others.

(c) The President shall transmit quarterly to Congress a report on economic developments, together with such modifications in the National Budget and such legislative recommendations as he may deem necessary or desirable.

(d) When the National Budget and the quarterly reports thereon are transmitted to the Congress, they shall be referred to the Joint Committee on the National Budget hereinafter established.

PREPARATION OF NATIONAL BUDGET

SEC. 4. (a) The National Budget shall be prepared under the general direction and supervision of the President, and in consultation with heads of departments and establishments.

(b) The President shall consult with industry, agriculture, labor, consumers, State and local governments, and others, with regard to the preparation of the National Budget, and for this purpose shall establish such advisory boards, committees, or commissions as he may deem desirable.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL BUDGET

SEC. 5. (a) There is hereby established a Joint Committee on the National Budget, to be composed of 15 Members of the Senate, to be appointed by the President of the Senate; and 15 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The party representation of the Joint Committee shall as nearly as may be feasible reflect the relative membership of the majority and minority parties in the Senate and the House of Representatives.

(b) It shall be the function of the Joint Committee—

(1) to make a continuing study of matters relating to the National Budget and to consult with the President with respect thereto;

(2) to make a study of the National Budget transmitted to Congress by the President in accordance with section 3 of this Act; and

(3) as a guide to the several committees of Congress dealing with legislation relating to the National Budget, not later than April 1 of each year (A) to file a report with the Senate and the House of Representatives containing its findings and recommendations with respect to each of the main recommendations made by the President in the National Budget, and (B) to prepare and report a joint resolution setting forth for the ensuing fiscal year its summary recommendations concerning the National Budget.

(c) Vacancies in the membership of the Joint Committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

(d) The Joint Committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. The provisions of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes shall apply in case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena, or to testify when summoned, under authority of this section.

(e) The Joint Committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments.

(f) The expenses of the Joint Committee shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman or vice chairman.

INTERPRETATION

SEC. 6. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as directing or authorizing—

(a) the operation of plants, factories, or other productive facilities by the Federal Government;

(b) the use of compulsory measures of any type whatsoever in determining the allocation or distribution of manpower;

(c) any change in the existing procedures on appropriations; or

(d) the carrying out of, or any appropriation for any program set forth in the National

Budget, unless such program shall have been authorized by provisions of law other than this act.

AUTHORIZATION TO FILE MINORITY VIEWS AND TO PRINT AMENDMENTS

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I ask unanimous consent that permission be granted for the filing of minority views during the recess of the Senate and that various amendments which are to be proposed to the bill may be submitted and printed during the recess, so they may be available by tomorrow.

Mr. BARKLEY. I thought the Senator asked and secured such consent last Thursday.

Mr. TAFT. Consent was secured during the last recess of the Senate. I have now renewed the request to apply to the present recess.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

Mr. BARKLEY. I move that the Senate take a recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 54 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday, September 25, 1945, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATION

Executive nomination received by the Senate September 24 (legislative day of September 10), 1945:

THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

William C. Mathes, of California, to be United States district judge for the southern district of California, vice Ralph E. Jenney, deceased.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate September 24 (legislative day of September 10), 1945:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dean G. Acheson to be Under Secretary of State.

Frank McCarthy to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

FOREIGN SERVICE

Maxwell M. Hamilton to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Finland.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Bennett Champ Clark

Wilbur K. Miller

E. Barrett Prettyman

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Alexander Holtzoff to be associate justice of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

John A. Carver to be United States attorney for the district of Idaho.

Whitfield Y. Maury to be United States attorney for the northern district of Oklahoma.

UNITED STATES MARSHALS

Granville T. Norris to be United States marshal for the eastern district of Oklahoma.
Dave E. Hilles to be United States marshal for the western district of Oklahoma.

IN THE NAVY

APPOINTMENT IN THE NAVAL RESERVE FOR TEMPORARY SERVICE

Capt. Gilchrist Bates Stockton to be a rear admiral in the Naval Reserve, for temporary service, to continue while serving as naval aide and liaison officer to the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, to rank from the date of confirmation by the Senate.

POSTMASTERS

IOWA

Gussie M. Jarvis, Bradgate.
John J. Franta, Gilbertville.
Henry A. Nemmers, Lamotte.
Perry M. Dougherty, Legrand.
Oley C. Hanson, Otho.
Edward Moroney, Swaledale.

OREGON

Glenwood Pounds, Adrian.
Marie W. Havill, Beaver Creek.
Darrell L. Howser, Burns.
Leola L. Stoddard, Butte Falls.
Robert G. Henderson, Chemawa.
Sadie E. Wadsworth, Delake.
Arthur Roy Kerr, Depoe Bay.
Clara D. Neal, Sublimity.
Irwin H. Howe, Trail.
William H. Lohkamp, Wecoma.

SOUTH CAROLINA

William F. McLellan, Hamer.
James C. Norton, Little Rock.
Mary Lucile Turner, Moore.
Wiley G. Grist, Sr., Ocean Drive.
Vera S. Buie, Patrick.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1945

The House met at 12 o'clock noon, and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore, Mr. McCORMACK.

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication:

SEPTEMBER 24, 1945.

I hereby designate the Honorable JOHN W. McCORMACK to act as Speaker pro tempore today.

SAM RAYBURN.

The Chaplain, Rev. James Shera Montgomery, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Blessed Lord God, we praise Thee for Thy wonderful story of deathless love. Thou who art the creator of every good thing, lay Thine hand upon us and bless us. We do not present our supplication before Thee for our righteousness, but for Thy great mercies. O Lord, hear; O Lord, forgive; grant that we may hate the evil and love the good and establish justice in Thy name—what a privilege! what an opportunity! what a duty! Let none dare pass them by.

We pray that the living members of all great faiths may move forward as a united army, establishing righteousness as sons and daughters of the one God and Father of us all. Forbid that our country should regard any substitute for that spiritual relation of the human soul whose builder and maker is God. In this